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“India Ink”:
Interstices of Autobiography and Popular Images
Rane Arroyo





and creative  
writing at the Univer
­sity of Toledo, His lat
­est book
 
of  poems is  
Pale Ramon (Eoland
 Books, 1998), This
 essay is part of a pro
­ject in process called






For a long time I’ve
 
been  intrigued by India and  filled  
with a desire to visit it, a desire that I found strange
 due to the intensity of its nature. As a gay Puertor
­riqueño, I could 
never
 quite rationalize my longings  
for the Indian people and their culture. They weren’t
 normally mine 
except
 as available through main ­
stream (and sometimes pleasant) capitalistic films
 such as A Passage to India or Gandhi, India, as an idea
 and/or a setting, became a text of the fantastic. Was
 I trying
 
to avoid  interrogating my own complex  iden ­
tity by
 
transferring energy into a cultural community  
without personal risks to myself? I’ve witnessed the
 often disturbing cultural transvestism of other schol
­ars who have 
called
 themselves anglophiles, etc., and  
yet I didn’t feel so much as if I wanted to possess
 India; rather, I was like an exile anxious to return to
 his or her home, or at least to the idea of it.




interests in India might prove revelato ­
ry about my work as a scholar and writer, a means by
 which my own development as 
an
 intellectual might  
be made
 
visible. I did not dismiss the possibility that  
perhaps I was remembering a past life spent praying
 on the banks of the ancient and still holy Ganges,
 although I know that the 
river
 is not merely mythic.  
My version of India was a puzzle with too many ini
­tial pieces. In this essay, I recreate the processes that
 led me toward a peculiar and particular insight into
 my own strategies as a mediator between facts and
 fictions, a mediator in words no less mysterious
8




 they stand revealed. Each section works within its own borders. As a  
totality these narratives reclaim pieces of my past in which I struggled to sur
­vive. India
 
was often a concept that gave me refuge.
2.
I grew up with images of India everywhere about me: the Beatles smuggled
 
sitars into the rather provincial world of rock and roll music; writers such as
 Allen Ginsberg sought out gurus and lost their 1950s beat fashion sense; the
 Nehru jacket was popular among my uncles and neighborhood boys I thought
 as cool as James Dean or Sal Mineo — and much closer at hand; reincarnation
 was discussed
 
in suburban living rooms as if it were a redecoration idea; Nation ­
al Geographic specials kept showing dead people floating down the Ganges
 while stressing that this was a different phenomenon than the bodies of Amer
­ican and Vietnamese soldiers floating down televised rivers; and Jonny Quest
 and 
his
 adopted brother, Hadji,1 an Indian orphan who is at. first mistaken for  
an assassin, continued to enjoy their homosocial relationship on the television
 airwaves riding the breath and width of this country. In the 1990s, however,
 India has become the proverbial invisible elephant.
I recently
 
taught the Bhavagad Gita in a course called “Apocalypse: Myths  
and Possibilities.” I was struck by my students’ struggles to talk about this
 important book in intellectual terms, for to them there was nothing very real
 beyond the boundaries of Western Europe, the United States, or MTV. They
 refused to take seriously the existential dilemmas inherent in the Gita\ which
 
choice
 do I make in order to make meaning with cosmic ramifications? How  
is the self related to the
 
greater whole? Is duty more important than one’s  blood  
ties? One student said the book reminded her of Indiana Jones and the Temple
 of Doom, only more boring, without a climax. Instead of dismissing her com
­ments, I encouraged the student to 
map
 out her narrative expectations. This  
led to a class discussion about the Bible and its rather nervous multi-climactic
 stories. This student was shocked even to imagine the book of
 
Revelation as  
anything but revelation. When another student said Revelation reminded her
 of Platoon and Apocalypse Now, the class went into an uproar. It is allowable to
 dismiss other people’s holy book as a 
film,
 but not the Judeo-Christian text of  
social norms as illustrated 
by
 parables that define and disarm social deviations.  
The more I tried to suggest that India might have been (and still is) a “real”
 place, the more my students referred to themselves as American readers.
The class made interesting claims that as students in the Midwest’s rust
 
belt they had no incentive to consider the Gita as even marginal to their lives;
 at the same time they refused to consider the Bible as a text produced in a cul
­ture, or cultures, which might label them as intruders, appropriators, barbar
­ians. If India was not in our image(s), it could.— only as a text — provide an
 example of philosophy at odds with our own definitions of naturalized praxis.
 India was safely removed
 
from our own apocalyptic expectations, and so its cos ­
mic narratives of human destiny were “boring” because we had many more fears
 closer to home. One self-described
 
“religious” student said that Jesus was more  
9
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"oriental” than he was European. The class didn’t have the language at this
 
point in the course to pursue this interesting argument further. A chasm
 opened before them in which their assumptions about "truth” were vulnerable
 to examination. People of Color often know about simultaneous or contradic
­tory truths all too well in 
daily
 dealings with dominant culture.
We live, at the very least, in dual visions/versions of the world in
 
which we  
spend our power. Centrality isn’t a useful paradigm; homogeneity isn’t the most
 friendly
 
of concepts to the "other.” There are real consequences in understand ­
ing that our ideas are just as constructed as those of people perceived to 
be
 dif ­
ferent from us. Our discussion on the Bhavagad Gita took by us a circuitous
 route back towards our own country. Etienne Balibar argues that "theoretical
 racism represents the ideal unity of transformation and fixity, or repetition and
 destiny” (291), a statement that suggests there is real power
 
in  questioning "nat ­
uralized” world views about oneself and others. Xenophobia depends on meta
­narratives to veil the disorder at the heart of the true darkness of constructed
 lives.
3.
Kharman, my best friend in high school, had a variety of dramatic identity
 
crises which led her into marriages, religions, lesbianism, secretarial work; she
 ended up living with my companion and me in Boston. At this time she was a
 punk, leather 
lesbian.
 Such a choice forced her to work usually for doughnut  
shops or as a "temporary” office worker. The United States is not interested in
 assisting anyone who chooses, out of free will, to become a permanent rebel,
 one no longer supported financially and/or emotionally by parents. As long as





 in Boston, Kharman wore a sari to work. She soon  
received a phone call from her temporary 
agency
 that her boss of that day had  
called to say she was very uncomfortable
 
with Kharman's choice of office wear.  
Why was a white woman wearing this outfit? (Multiculturalism is often seen
 as a betrayal of
 
the white race and culture.) Kharman was dismissed ("I was  
fucking fired”), and we took her out to lunch to celebrate the loveliness of this
 woman
 
in her sari. Little did we know, sitting in that Boston  restaurant,  laugh ­
ing at the corporate world, that
 
we were witnessing the birth of the cruel Rea ­
gan era.
4.
In his essay, "Postcolonial Authority and Postmodern Guilt,” Homi Bhabha
 
begins with an anecdote about Roland Barthes in a gay bar in Tangiers. This
 rhetorical strategy gives me permission, in my turn, to share a story about
 Bhabha himself. I was presenting a paper on the difficulties of creating a His
­panic narrator in some of my multigenre projects at the 1994 MLA conference
 in 
San
 Diego. My  friends talked me into attending the Bhabha session despite
10
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their disturbing energy, which seemed more appropriate for a rock concert than
 
for a thoughtful commentary on issues of the contemporary text and the non-
 theoretical world. I often avoid readings and talks by all authors, always pre
­ferring the written word; I like the luxury of rereading, of thinking slowly
 through arguments, of private dialogue with an author. But there I was in a
 public space, flanked by hordes of mostly
 
graduate students — I was one just a  
year earlier — who seemed especially
 
electrified by the presence of Bhabha, the  
celebrity.
I know this 
sounds
 dramatic but I will not censor myself: I felt afraid for  
the intellectual work we need to do in the United States. Aren
'
t we grappling  
with real issues that affect our daily lives? What is truly available to assist us
 with our own struggles in the intellectual spectacles I witnessed in conference
 after conference, spectacles in which scholars could claim a disturbingly specif
­ic genealogy simply by listening to a panel discussion (“I saw Bhabha and he
 said that...” and so on)? Of special interest to me was that the audience was
 a dazzling mix of People of Color and “whites,” men and women, and other less
 physically distinct
 
groups: gays, working-class scholars, writers, and the like. I  
hope I don’t
 
represent myself as some kind of puritan in saying there was a gid ­
diness in the air,  jokes about New Critics flying around. One fri nd said that  
Bhabha
 
was “a stud.” It was unusual to see dear colleagues suddenly enjoy  life;  
it was a brief and limited joy, one without profound slipovers into their daily
 lives.




who spoke before I did, with a terrible and terrifying comment:  
“He just wants to be the new Homi Bhabha.” I looked at the brilliant and
 young scholar and wondered if he knew there was space for only one brilliant
 man from the East. Was it such a terrible thing to have elders you respect pre
­pare the way for 
your
 own work, even if your ideologies aren’t identical? It’s as  
if the Scholar of Color is being forced into one acceptable
 
Western mythic role:  
the Oedipus cycle. Much is gained
 
by dominant discourse shapers if the rest of  
us are indeed ready to kill our elders for our own personal victorious position
­ing as the “new” minority major scholar, as if there 
can
 only be one or two voic ­
es from each convenie t “other” group. This is ridiculous and actually quite
 evil. Many of us are not invested in destroying
 
the work of the very people who  
have opened up theoretical possibilities for
 
us, or whose work parallels, compli ­
cates, 
or
 rejects our own.
After Bhabha’s talk, one of the first persons to ask a question was this very
 same young Indian scholar. I lost the thread of the question 
because
 I was  
shocked by what I was witnessing: many audience members’ eyes burned with
 the fervent hope that blood would be spilled
 
by  either one of these brown men.  
I wanted to stand up and shout: this is not a sport! Of
 
course I just sat there  
helplessly in my chair. The moment
 
passed without incident and soon the ses ­
sion ended. Many people surged forward to thank Bhabha for his useful talk;  
I watched the
 
young scholar  being congratulated by his fellow (white) graduate  
students for daring to challenge Bhabha in public. It was not an intellectual
 challenge but one located in essentialism: will the new brown son kill the
 brown father?
11
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I’m not restricting Bhabha to the 
role
 of either victim or naive sideshow  
freak; such a brilliant and original scholar must be very much aware of the busi
­ness that surrounds being a public intellectual. This awareness of his audiences’
 multiple and contradictory expectations is evidenced in the question-and- answer session that follows the printed version of “Postcolonial Authority and
 Postmodern Guilt.” A man from the audience begins 
his
 “question” in this  
most disturbing manner: “I confess that I found your paper of forbidding dif
­ficulty, as I think many people did” (67). Bhabha politely listens to the long
 question and begins 
his
 own response with these words: “I can’t apologize for  
the fact that you found 
my
 paper completely impenetrable. I did it conscious ­
ly, I had a problem, I worked it out.” This response, while firm, is 
actually polite, for Bhabha goes on to emphasize that his essay “is a work that is an
 aporetic, contingent position, in between a plurality
 
of practices that are differ ­
ent and yet must occupy the same space of adjudication and application.” This
 is a stinging claim that the intellectual, as either writer or reader, cannot (or
 indeed, must not) offer the process of thinking as a monolithic path. The
 Scholar of Color does not fit neatly into prescribed roles, even those 
offered
 by  
those within her or his particular field.




 in historic Western European texts; they’re not the only  
game in town. There also exist multiplicity, contradiction, rivalry, agreement,
 simultaneity. India is no longer over there and the United States is 
no
 longer  
here, although under certain circumstances each country can be geographically  
and culturally
 
apart. Globalism means provocative intercourse between nations  
that are often genealogically
 
linked to colonialism and imperialism.
James Baldwin often writes of the ideological displacements of the “white”
 man by Persons of Color(s) as the latter consciously reposition themselves; he
 works within the very American tradition of self-questioning and cultural
 unpacking, only he expects the word actually to 
affect
 daily life. David Leem-  
ing, the Baldwin biographer, offers the following example of this writer’s talent
 at turning the specific into the cosmic:
[A teacher] asked Baldwin
 
what he had intended in [Another Country}. . . .  
The very shapelessness of [the novel], he said, was a reflection of the “inco
­herence” of life in America. Its characters are on desperate searches for the
 self-knowledge and self-esteem — the identity
 
— without which real love  
is impossible. (200)
These desperate searches threaten dominant structures of power 
because
 ques ­
tioning, in itself, is an act that respects no agreed-upon or established realities.
 In Baldwin’s stories, plays, and essays, movement
 
in space or through society by  
any Person of Color means inevitable change for the (monolithically) white  
male.
I didn’t encounter how naturalized the “white” viewpoint is in our educa
­
tional system until I began to teach about white culture as if it weren’t a
 homogenous phenomenon but rather a site of conflicting images, information,
 and agendas. Indeed, many colleagues commented that one of my graduate
12
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course offerings, Thoreau and Postcolonialism,” was too exotic for graduate
 
students from a steel town. They justified their comments by saying our stu
­dents hadn’t yet grasped even the concept of 
an 
American literature; these were 
protests by professors whose offices 
were
 lined with books by Bhabha, Spivak,  
and Said. Interestingly, graduate students thanked me for offering
 
them a win ­
dow instead of a 
mirror!
 Exhausted by being forced to examine their lives  
without the global contexts that inform life outside of the classroom, these
 working-class students found of great use Bhabha’s examination of “mimetic
 narratives and . . . monumental history” (66); they too, in different ways from
 me, had been excluded from reigning metahistories. The United States, as
 examined in the course, became less united.  Xenophobia — traceable to the
 experiential, the “essential” self and to capitalism’s gobbling up of difference —
 returned us to an intellectual space in which to understand the dangers and
 opportunities in crossing borders of any kind. We had been taught to laugh at
 elders who once believed that they could fall off the planet itself. Now we are
 afraid 
we
 can’t, that we are each other’s ultimate reality, that we can’t plunge  
into eternity.
5.
I found the following poem2 in one of my notebooks as I began editing this
 
essay. I am reminded of how much of my work I keep at home far from a read
­er’s eyes. What catches my attention is 
my
 need to write about India, again. I  
find that the poems I don’t publish, those that I keep locked inside my hand
­writing, tend to 
be
 curious about the  world around me. My poetry books seem  
to focus on “Latino” and “Gay” issues that, of course, are rooted in my identity
struggles. In this poem, “The Station Master Speaks,” I write of observations
 culled from a PBS special 
on
 train rides throughout the world:
A filling moon in a full India, men jump
 
on the train engines, crowds late for funerals,
 the whistle’s sound is a fingerprint,
 the miles have been identified and named:
 now, cars bear the burden of men’s breaths,
 it is a portable scar, past Bombay with
 its 13 million two-footed commuters,
 privilege is having more than 30 seconds
 to decide where to sit (if you can sit),
 the noise of our arrivals and departures
 through Milk Villages, past the largest 
slum
  
in Asia, movement makes us all rich[.]




world is larger than my viewpoint, that even this filmed India helps temper  
any narcissistic ideological impulses I may sometimes value as a poet.
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6.
While my friend José was smashing
 
plantains (platanos) in his Queens kitchen,  
the rest
 
of us sat in  the living room  trying to pretend we couldn’t hear the aston ­
ishingly violent noises coming from the kitchen. Was José really a Buddhist?
 Why? When? Why have so many Puertorriqueño friends with Ph.D.s con
­verted to a religion and philosophy whose Indian roots are at such a distance
 from the Caribbean? Soon the meal was cooked and we all 
sat
 for the late sup ­
per, 
an
 enjoyable reunion. I have sat at so many  other meals with Latinos, who  
almost always automatically cross themselves before eating — including many
 of the Buddhists. Jesus and Buddha are not rivals, or that is my hope. I smiled
 at my friends and ate the Spanish rice and beans, the pollo guisado and
 tostones; they tasted especially delicious as do most meals which fellow exiles
 share.
7.
My original dissertation topic focused on Henry David Thoreau’s constant
 
quoting of Hindi texts and culture in that most “American” of books, Walden. I
 remain curious about the notion of
 
quotation, the human need behind intro ­
ducing someone else’s voice in scholarship that is usually nothing more than a
 monologue disguised as a
 
dialogue; the English  field, in general, seems to honor  
the skilled ventriloquists. I remember sitting in the office of a nationally
 
famous
 professor, one of the few Americanists in my doctoral program, and  
feeling increasingly nervous at the man’s obvious excitement about my propos
­al. Within a few moments, he elected himself my dissertation chair and won
­dered aloud who else would
 
fit in  this “most  original” project. I quickly thanked  
him and as I backed out of the office he declared that I was “a young Sacvan
 Bercovitch.” I wasn’t even a good, middle-aged Rane Ramón 
Arroyo,
 clearly a  
priority. Later that week I changed dissertation t pics without informing this
 professor (who has never talked to me since except for civil comments required
 in the day-to-day interactions in graduate school). Instead, I became a mod
­ernist focusing on the Chicago Renaissance, freed to pursue my own ideas with
 the assistance of the kindest committee.
I share this story because I do often regret I did not pursue the Thoreau
 
book, for I am still fascinated by the necessity of inventing (an) India in order
 to justify or make the
 
American Renaissance  profound to America, to England,  
to Western Europe. I do not regret my narrow escape from the intellectual
 interference of
 
a kind scholar whose enthusiasm frightened me; I also do not  
regret the loss of the potential national exposure through the complex net
­working available to the favored few mentored by the famous. What a curious
 business academia is, for while it rewards rereading of canonical texts, the
 “white” texts never are truly displaced or replaced. “Original” scholarship rarely
 “intrudes” with demands upon dominant texts.
India, for Thoreau, is a stream that
 
feeds Walden Pond: “The pure Walden  
water is mingled with the sacred water of the Ganges” (322). In making India
14
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only sacred, and restrictively so, the land and people become merely philosoph
­
ical
 concepts divorced from the actuality of Indian lives, with their individual  
and collective passions. Thoreau proves to be as much an eloquent capitalist as
 those he denounces in 
his
 writing; the buying and selling of Hindi philosophy  
without worrying about contexts of cultural meaning and distribution is based
 on the model provided
 
by spice and silk traders. Even when Thoreau seemingly  
calls for multiculturalism, or plurality at least, there is a profound 
catch:
 “That  
age will be rich indeed when ... the Vatican shall be
 
filled with Vedas and Zen-  
davestas and Bibles, with Homers and Dantes and Shakespeares. ... By such a
 pile [of 
texts]
 we may hope to scale heaven at last.” Hindi  writing is limited to  
the spiritual; Western culture’s poets exist in the real
 
world. India is effective­
ly erased as a present and ongoing phenomenon, and it gets co-opted by the  
Vatican, which is once again the simple and “rightful” center of human con
­sciousness. I cannot help but recall Gandhi
'
s words, “Almost every  page of the  
Gita advises us not to make a distinction between our own people and others.
 How is this to be done?” (70). He posits the struggle not in the writers but in
 the readers.
8.
Ben Kingsley as Gandhi? And he wins an Oscar? I’
m
 not convinced that  
Western Europe and the United States are in the postcolonial world quite yet,
 or if they are, that Western culture has given up its concept of the master as a
 necessary role. I agree with Satya P. Mohanty that there are many risks that
 may indeed create mechanisms that 
will
 repeat “the colonizer’s judgments”  
(111). Since the so-called First World and Third World are no longer easily
 kept apart, embracing through the magnetism of international business and
 media, there is a strange hybridity in process in a film such as Wild West (1992),
 which features Indian youths who puzzle their own community, already dis
­placed within England, by forming a country and western band and mapping
 cultural spaces not even imagined by
 
other Indians. Not surprisingly, the Indi ­
an “cowboys” (another example of multiplicity) end up in America seeking a  
record contract — Nashville as the Temple of the Golden Buddha with Steel
 Guitar. The American Dream has become an infectious dream, one that cross
­es borders with impunity. It is a series of imperialistic structures whose
 
purpose  
is the maintenance of exploitation. Wild West, despite its gestures toward
 agency, ends up as yet another example of American co-optation. The export
­ed country
 
music returns to America with Indian  youths in tow, youths desper ­
ate to speak
 
popular culture as if it were their “mother” tongue.
American popular culture is not always attractive to People of 
Color.
 This  
obvious fact 
has
 to be stated outright. In order for me to make any claims on  
the series Jonny Quest
 
or on West Side Story, I must perform a series of complex  
readings. In rejecting 
offered
 ideologies on race, class, and gender, I have  
learned to ignore or “detonate” troubling
 
texts. I suspect it has been my hunger  
for an image somewhat like 
me
 that  has led me to find whatever mirror  is avail ­
able. Increasingly I feel like an “historical” Puerto Rican as my students in
 
15
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the net into cyberpueblos. They a e creating new configurations I  
once thought to be science fiction. They have been empowered and are
 empowering themselves to create images and texts that speak to them and of




I especially question myself when as a poet and playwright I refer to India.
 In the very opening scene of 
my
 play, Bed But No Breakfast, Georgia — an  
African-American actress seeking refuge from her urban life at a country inn
 — is surprised to see that she is alone in the mansion. A note directs her to






There are only two things that you 
expect
 out a of bed and breakfast place  
in New England. A bed. A breakfast. The first night and every night.
 
Simpl
e, no? The second morning and every morning. Not too complex?  
Well, I got a bed. 
Bed,
 but no breakfast because the owner of this Colonial  
house has gone to India to search for
 
British antiques from around  the Rev ­
olutionary War. White tourist in a place belonging to brown people. But
 I’m black. Just like every other shadow in this bed but no breakfast place.
 Have you ever noticed how some white people live in such a nice and safe
 world, a la
 
Disney World? I wish my world would revolve  into one big evo ­
lution! One big turn of the
 
wheel of fortune and BANG — no more revul ­
sion, ah, I mean, retribution, ah, I mean, revolution. Oh, I almost said
 revolver. The name of a Beatles album, and the lifestyle of many a broth
­er.
India is used in this monologue as a repository
 
for British culture that is ironi ­
cally to be reified in New England (with the stress on new).
Yet I’ve also
 
participated  in romanticizing India for  my own  meditative pur ­
poses, not necessarily a pardonable theft. In the poem “Breathing Lessons,” I
 look at the phenomenon of the Puerto Rican Buddhists I mentioned earlier.
 There is something unsettling for me about a philosophy based on the release
 of desire when most of us Latinos in the United States are already so poor, so
 empty-handed, 
except
 for our culture and our cultural productions. Desire  
proves to 
be
 an important epistemological system. I write:
Buddha teaches that most beaches
in Puerto Rico are illusions, 
 
that the naked and the dead are
not 
obscene
 but opaque. He longs  
for home. Longing is thinking so
 he takes bigger breaths. In, in, in.
In simplifying Buddhism for my own rhetorical agenda I am opened to the
 
charge of pilfering. I intend to open
 
up dialogue and not close it  the way Gand ­
hi or the PBS series Jewel in the Crown transform “hindoos” into vehicles of
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racism that maintain the status quo. Buddha, in this poem, and India, in my
 
play, are offered as intentionally contested sites of ownership and ideology.
While preparing one of the “final” drafts of this essay, I have learned that
 
“Breathing Lessons” has won a Pushcart Prize. There is reward indeed for pil
­fering other cultures — or perhaps hybridity is being recognized.
9.
There was the actor 
Sabu
 who in the film The Jungle Book was like Hadji of  
Jonny Quest fame, only he was nearly
 
naked and less witty. Sabu was one of the  
rare exciting brown actors on the Hollywood screens of my youth. I did not
 want to imagine myself as someone’s gardener, maid, or chauffeur, or as the fat
 Mexican who was doomed to be killed by
 
the white sheriff. Today I remember  
little about this film; interestingly my mother owns a copy and has lent it to me,
 but I have found innumerable excuses not to watch it again. What do.I fear? I
 don’t 
expect
 the film to survive as some kind of masterpiece. The film contains  
ghosts that have little to do with the story.
No, it’s Sabu’s face and body that survive in 
my
 mind, even if disembodied  
within my scholarship and creative writing. He, in that film, 
possessed
 an  
innocence that actually
 
required Sabu, as actor and character (another example  
of simultaneity), to investigate British colonization for the unnatural creature
 that it was. Sabu, living in the Indian jungle with wild animals, seemed so
 much more natural than when he was forced into proper Western clothing.
 Even as a young audience 
member,
 I knew that the West would win its ideo ­
logical war. Hadn’t I seen the same phenomenon in my own neighborhood,
 even in my own family? Hadn’t 
we
 stopped speaking Spanish in order to “get  
ahead” in Chicago? Didn’t we learn to wince at the cousin who would
 inevitably
 show
 up at a family party in bright (garish?) clothes and in jewelry as  
big as a baby’s fist?




British cultural superiority, which of course engendered American  
cultural superiority; it was reduced to a cast of exotic savages, toothy animals,
 and ungrateful servants. There is nothing innocent about the valorization of
 whiteness in a story or film that is intended for “whites”; Audiences of
 
Color  
have become master intercultural interpreters out of necessity. Sabu was hand
­some, in harmony with nature, and sensitive (so much so that he dies spiritual
­ly with his invaded India). These are of course insights that neither writer nor
 director intended, and they only exist 
because
 reading isn’t an easily controlled  
act. I make no claims of authenticity for Sabu’s represented otherness, for his
 body and mind are controlled by the business of representation. Hollywood
 assures the masses that racism and homophobia (etc.) are not specific individ
­ual trespasses unless the dire acts of a few extremists, that ideas mysteriously
 remain abstract and unsystematized by majority culture. 
Sabu
’s presence  
allowed me, as a young viewer, to claim a space for myself. 
Some
 ideas allow  
potentiality to be more real than actuality. I remember going home, astonished
 that maybe most of the world wasn’t always
 
white; despite Sabu’s ultimate bow ­
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ing to British culture, the actor and the role had freed me to imagine a differ
­
ent version of the film being presented to me as a completed text.
In re-viewing the Jungle Book film for this essay — again and at last
 
— I’m  
struck
 
by the fact that I only remember the beginning and the end of the film  
in great detail. Somehow the “savage” boy supersedes the tamed one, although
 his appearance is brief and melodramatic. The jungle of this movie isn’t as dan
­gerous as the village life. At film’s end, a cobra guards the treasures hidden in
 a ruin, reassuring the viewer that greed is a terrible human sin. Yet 
isn
’t the  
Indian boy’s soul stolen in this story? The lessons are explicit as the once wild
 child returns to the village, saves it through heroic action, and reestablishes the
 patriarchal structure through his heterosexual allegiance to Mother and to
 future wife — but not to the jungle.
10.
In “Passage to India,” Walt Whitman has an ecstatic vision of “[t]he road
 
between Europe and Asia” 
(344),
 which gives him an opportunity to address  
Columbus: “(Ah Genoese thy dream! Thy dream! / Centuries after thou art
 laid in thy grave, / The 
shore
 thou foundest verifies thy dream.)” (344). This  
passage reminds me of the childhood confusion I had in differentiating Amer
­ican Indians from Indians. I was raised to respect Columbus’ obsessive dream
 of reaching the shores of India, China, and Japan; indeed 
his
 discovery of the  
Caribbean islands — including Puerto Rico — became a point of origin for me
 and my family. It has taken time for me to 
stop
 being  protective about Colum ­
bus and those such as Whitman who declared their imperialistic desires for  
“more than India” (349). Will I ever wake up from living inside this Genoese’s
 nightmare? Or have writers and other “historians” preempted my voice long
 before I was even born so that
 
my protestations can  be safely dismissed as polit ­
ical correctness? Can I be so easily dismissed, despite the years of pain and
 some secret joys?
11.
My mother adds a casual footnote to our conversation: “By the way, another of
 
your friends, Samantha, has finally
 
divorced that Indian man. She has stopped  
wearing saris and 
no
 longer cooks curried rice. I’m not sure if she is happy or  
not. She lives in Ohio, not too far away
 
from you.” I don’t know how to react  
or what to say aloud. Is my own mother being racist? It’s hard to imagine this
 
because
 she has suffered so much thro gh the Americanization of her family.  
Can a Puerto Rican feel superior to an Indian? If so, why? What is achieved?
 I felt 
an
 unexpected Foucauldian moment unfold before me: we, the People of  
Color, volunteering to ensure that racial divisions, as taught by dominant cul
­ture, remain intact through our willing surveillance of the “other.” We are
 thereby denying that
 
we ourselves are someone’s “other.”
My mother clarifies her words: “Samantha was too much like a tourist in
 that marriage.” These words don’t dismiss the entire conversation, but they do
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 works. Abandoned by my father, and now forced to face  
a post-Kennedy America on her own, my mother has returned to her 
culture. In her most recent visit, she was concerned if Youngstown, Ohio, was a 
place for
 
Latinos (“Are there Spanish stores there?”), and if religious ceremonies there  
would take place only in English (“Where is the nearest Catholic church that
 has mass in Spanish?”).
The notion of “tourist” to her implies an unwillingness to commit, to live
 
the commitment: our friend married her Indian neighbor as much out of
 curiosity as out of love. This rather 
cruel
 judgment on our part was in fact sup ­
ported by the curiously racist comments that Samantha made now and then.
 She seemed liberated to say terrible
 
things about “dark races” since she was mar ­
ried to “one of them” and so was suddenly an expert in intercultural exchanges.
 But she is also a woman capable of great love and affection, a talent not often
 praised. Mother changes the topic and tells me of her childhood in the Puer
­to Rico lost to her for years. I understand she is 
giving
 me information, but it  
is veiled because our entire conversation has been spoken in English. It keeps
 us at a safe distance from a
 
homesickness that  isn’t just emotional but also intel ­
lectual.
12.
The last of Gandhi’s ashes were quietly released into the Ganges in 1990.
 
According to a National Public Radio report, the ceremony
 
was not only inti ­
mate but practically ignored by the world. There were the faithful who were
 bathing at
 
the banks of the holy river, but they were there for their own enlight ­
enment. How odd, I thought, pieces of Gandhi: the last of his ashes culled from
 his shoulder bone, ribs, skull, or perhaps the left ankle. All gone, all returned
 to the nothingness that is at ground zero in each of our genealogies.
I sat on my windowseat and caught 
my
 breath. It was ridiculous to feel  
such sorrow overcome me. Gandhi had been dead for a long time. The last of
 Gandhi. All that remains now are his deeds and
 his
 advice in writing I had  used  
in my own classrooms. His ashes had never been a particular concern. But they
 made Gandhi’s death final in 
Youngstown,
 Ohio, which of course was absurd,  
but absurd enough to bring tears to the eyes of a stranger without any legal
 right to mourn. The ashes became of the river, even as the 
river
 ignored such  
a profound contribution.
13.
Jonny Quest was one of the few spaces on the television of my youth that a
 
brown face occupied as a major player, 
an
 equal partner (more or less), a secret  
role model for the minority viewer. Hadji was Jonny Quest’s pseudo-brother,
 personal magician, fellow conspirator, caretaker, rival, interpreter, and mystery.
 I was a
 
young, imaginative, independent (I still continue to claim that my only  
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talent is that I’
m
 stubborn), and lonely Puerto Rican boy who was naturally  
attracted to Hadji and his world: 
an
 artist among scientists. The cartoon  
youth, after all, traveled all over 
his
 world as an adopted member of the Quest  
household, holding higher ranking than the beloved family pet, Bandit. I was
 engaged in my own assimilation into American society, a project begun simply
 because my parents decided that I should be born in Chicago in order to be a
 real American instead of merely becoming one through assimilation. Even as a
 child, I sought the means to retain my own Puerto Rican identity at the same
 time as I felt the pressure to establish an intimate relationship with someone
 like the blonde future frat boy Jonny Quest, whose inevitable destiny was to be
 the center of the known and the unknown universe.
It was especially appealing to me that the Quest household was basically
 
masculine, and I had always assumed (needed
 
to assume?) that Hadji and John ­
ny 
were
 lovers, or would become lovers in the future.3 I knew little about Bud ­
dhism then, but these young adventurers seemed like soulmates, bound to each
 other through many past and future lives. Certainly a nervous masculinity was
 a question central to the original series, for in the Jonny Quest movie I recently
 saw on television, and in the new cartoons based on the original, heterosexual
­ity has been emphasized as female companions have come forward in the plot.
 A recent poll in which Race Banyon was voted best cartoon mother, however,
 still reveals a certain anxiety over gender roles. No wonder that I was so attract
­ed to this series; it featured my
 
own unarticulated issues about  being a  boy who  
preferred a male society.
I had 
no
 such models in my own immediate world. Jonny Quest, the car ­
toon, offered me that rare creature: a brown boy
 
peering back from the televi ­
sions 
mirror.
 Im convinced that Freud got it wrong by referring to homosex ­
uals, in the term of his day, as “inverts.” I was actually looking out at the world
 for signs that I wasn’t alone; my interior “self” seemed to be a fixed phenome
­non while the outside world seemed fluid and ever in need of definition. Thus,
 Hadji encouraged me to go into a world never traveled
 
by  any adults in my life,  
or so I believed then. Scholar John Beverly writes, “El socialismo no he podi
­do competir efectivamente con el capitalismo en la producción de una cultura
 
de
 masas” [Socialism has not been able to compete effectively with capitalism  
in the production of mass culture] (59). Mass media has actually afforded me
 the space, quite unintentionally, to rewrite the
 
world in my own image, at least  
some of the time and especially during the vital years of my adolescence.
Viewing Jonny Quest today I wince at the series’ stereotypes of Hadji, which
 
intentionally reify the Hindu as a mystic,
 
Third  World magician among scien ­
tists. Yet I cannot deny the pleasure I found those times when Hadji’s turban
 would turn into a cobra while he played a flute! Somehow I dismissed all the
 stereotypes and was enraptured that a brown person had such power or powers.
 I was similarly attracted to the Hardy Boys (the book series), for example, but
 no character clearly marked as other was featured in any of the mysteries. No,
 it was
 
Jonny Quest and Hadji who filled me with longing for a land of count ­
less Hadjis. How often I’ve dreamt of walking down Calcutta streets, among
 the fabled crowds and dust, and exhaling at last: what it must 
feel
 like to be 
home.
20





the cartoon series, I remember being  interested in the episodes  
in which the two young men traveled, as if motion itself was of value. The
 internet guide to the adventures has an incredibly organized listing of places or
 sites that Jonny and Hadji visited: the Sargasso Sea, the Arctic Ocean, Egypt,
 Mexico, Thailand, the Amazon, Europe, Tibet, unnamed islands in the Pacific
 and the Atlantic. They 
were
 empowered to define these places by their own  
presence: the privilege of scientists and poets. This was a 
lesson
 not lost, on 
me. Today, though, when I see an episode such as “Riddle of the Gold,” I am
 troubled by
 
the absence of history and cultural materiality. Hadji returns to an  
India that has been reduced to an evil maharaja and a revengeful leopard. An
 ahistorical Hadji has succeeded in the Americanization of his soul. His India
 is no longer his home, only a 
site
 of adventure and nothing else.
14.
Hadji is a troubling figure for me. In some ways, I identified
 
with him, and in  
other ways, he remained (and remains) uneroticized. I wasn’t attracted to him
 precisely 
because
 he was too much of a mirror and  it seemed that  the world out ­
side of me was the real mystery. I must ask myself in postcolonial fashion
 whether or not I have been taught not to see him as a sexual agent capable of
 independence from the discourses of whiteness by which he is defined as other.
David Bergman
'
s wise study, Gaiety Transfigured: Gay Self-Representation in  
American Literature, states that “[t]he vampire and the homosexual possess a
 narcissism without a reflection. They fall into the abyss, not to embrace them
­selves, but in a vain 
search
 to grab hold of any image” (45). This notion of  
“grabbing” hints at the hunger there is for identification, a visual (and cultural)
 confirmation of one’s own aspects. Narcissism is a loaded word, one in which
 regulation is thinly disguised. Self-interest is too often seen as asocial and
 somehow disruptive. Transgression then can be located in images of versions
 of oneself that turn out to offer alternative or resistant reflections.




 in the Jonny Quest series:
Jonny’s pal Hadji was created in response to Barbera’s desire to add a dog
 
to the show, which Wildley resisted. When Bandit was added, they real
­ized that now they had a show where the hero
 
would be basically talking to  
his dog. So they added Hadji, another character near to Jonny’s age. Based
 on the Indian actor Sabu, Hadji’s character
 
was one of mystery and magic,  
a counterpoint to Jonny’s more Western persona. (“Jonny Quest Origins”)
This is 
an
 astonishing revelation to me. First of all the Sabu I admired is here  
replicated. Jonny was clearly the intended center of focus, a naturalized one,
 even as Hadji and the dog Bandit were added to supplement Western civiliza
­tion (as if
 
the compass has neutrality). What is the opposite of mystery and  
magic? Scientific process and production? How did this dichotomy between
 left brain and right brain, science and poetry, east and west, become so codi
­fied?
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It turns out that I was misreading my 
beloved
 cartoon series. Bergman  
makes the important
 
observation that “no homosexual is raised as such; he  finds  
no likeness in the family circle. . . . Indeed the family reminds the homosexual
 of his own unlikeness’” (30). I had projected an intramale relationship into a
 seemingly postcolonial pretend family of pretend figures. Hadji could not 
be my sexual hero or model
 
because he was just as bewildered as I was about ing  
a counterpoint to discourses not necessarily his own. Hadji and Jonny 
were boys, then, but I was investing in the future of their sexuality, even as I was
 beginning my own adventures in puberty.
In the past, I have gone home with Latino men 
because
 I didn’t want to be  
accused (or to accuse myself) of rejecting my own brothers. That naive
 response, of seeing a lov r in terms of
 
political identity rather than multiple,  
simultaneous identities and investments, was an honest attempt to own some
­thing of my own past. Two brown bodies in one bed would surely become each
 other’s embassies. I share this because anxieties over identity have larger reper
­cussions than have often been voiced in many autobiographies. As Alberto
 Sandoval Sánchez writes, “Where
 
/ I expect a mirror / there is a  hole” (“A Cho ­
rus Line” 46).
15.
Queer theorists have done much to look at the “naturalization” of sexual iden
­
tity as a complicated and multi-headed monster. While this essay introduces
 same-sex desire as the logical end of my illogical
 
fetishizing of the idea of India  
rather than India itself, it is equally true that I have mapped the poverty of
 images by which I’ve turned “straw into gold,” as I write in the poem, “My
 Transvestite
 
Uncle  Is Missing.” Higher culture is often better guarded and “air ­
brushed” in order to maintain its homogeneity, to keep out the materiality of
 difference. Popular culture is often where “leakage” 
can
 occur, where someone  
like me, a Person of Color who is also gay, can find an intentional or uninten
­tional reflecting pool (Narcissus as role model) and experience the salutary
 shock of not being alone or a unique creature — much like Caliban’s awaken
­ing to his entanglement with the others who turn him into 
an
 other.
But there are newer fictional and nonfictional texts now that have
 addressed the image of India as interconnected with Western Europe’s great
 metanarrative of itself. I’ve included only those texts that have had a direct
 bearing on my own intellectual development, although I’ve since “discovered”
 
text
s such as J. R. Ackerley’s Hindoo Holiday, along with travel diaries by many  
others. Screenwriter and prose writer Ruth Prawer Jhabvala, for example,
 whose filmic England is nostalgic and fuzzy in interesting ways, offers a short
 story ironically 
called 
“Development and Progress,” in which we can hear a cer ­
tain psychic conquering of the conquerors as a British diplomat states:
I fell in
 
love  with the country. There is need for me to go into detail. Oth ­
ers have done so, describing
 
the overwhelming sensual and emotional effect  
India has had on them; and in some cases, how this was enhanced by their
 feeling for a particular person, or persons. (69)
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By keeping the body as an erotic subject that is “naturally” located far from
 
genealogies of cause and effect, sensuality
 
becomes one means by which not to  
diagnose the intrinsic links between the idea of India and the actual India that
 I have yet to experience. By intellectualizing my own visceral “attachments,” I
 have come to 
realize
 that, like many others before me, I was seeking a land in  
which I could participate with body and mind, that there was something in my
 own homeland that was preventing me from integrating my
 
various identities.  
I just have to think of the rather tortured D. H. Lawrence exiled in New Mex
­ico to understand that my own loneliness may perhaps be a systematic 
means by which the Other (a complex marginalized “creature”) is denied a healthy
 reflective image in what the poet Richard Katrovas calls “The Public Mirror.”4
I have since found other 
images
 closer to my own culture(s), from the  
CyberVato to the hermano in a James Dean costume. There are contradictions
 and points of anxiety even in these 
images,
 however. The macho Pachuco fig ­
ure, for
 
instance, has served as the occasion for a narration that “speaks its loca ­
tion as more than local yet makes no claim for universality for its viewpoint 
or language” (Sanchez-Tranquilino 564) — a statement I would complicate with
 Mikhail Bakhtins insight that “one’s own language is 
never
 a single language”  
(66). As I have 
moved
 through time and space on the internet, looked to my  
own past readings of novels and image-producers, and found 
links
 between my  
own personal sexual desire and the public mirrors that regulate my body and
 tongue, I have reread my experiences with Hadji and Jonny Quest as moments
 of personal freedom. I have rewritten the texts given me, an act of resistance
 that has allowed me to exist
 
with body and mind. This has been done without  
permission, when no one was looking. I used to look at the maps at the local
 bookstores, maps that I couldn’t afford. Those maps promised me that the
 world was 
real




Something protective in me stirs when I read Italian poet and filmmaker Pier
 
Paolo Pasolini’s book about his travels to India. He observes, “You
 
would need  
to have the repetitive power of a medieval
 
psalmist  in order to confront the ter ­
rible monotony of India in all of its representations” (90). Perhaps this is a
 fair comment made
 
by a poetic mind about an actual India and not  the virtual India  
I’ve created through media and chance experiences,
 
but I find The Scent of  India 
a disturbing book by
 
a genius. Pasolini’s Marxist  politics vanish in it, and India  
becomes something beyond “salvation.”
There is no doubt that postcolonial India is an amazing phenomenon, and
 I say this as a Westerner only now confronting his own misreadings of the
 stereotypes by which he was instructed to map the world. Allen Ginsberg
 writes in his Indian Journals:
 
M arch 1962-May 1963 of his own cognitive dif ­
ficulties in a land overcrowded with stimuli. I quote at length from a single
 entry to demonstrate the almost feverish writing “required” by Ginsberg even
 at the end of his sojourn:
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May 136 AM the yellow 
sun
 outside balcony thru5 trees Dasaswamedh  
ghat waking up with Richshaw bells — I been in
 
bed several days with kid ­
ney troubles — Hay Ram Ram Hay — sings the Motley-clad-in-yellow-
 and orange Medieval Clown-looking Bhakta. . . . That I’ve seen him often
 each 
day
 for months —  once offered  him some change, thinking him a beg ­
gar, which he refused. (206).
A wise man and a fool seem to wear identical looks for this poet and others.
 
Ginsberg knows this and even asks himself in June 1962, “And when will I ever
 turn my attention (here) to the streets and figures of daily India?” (29). It
 proves a rhetorical question, of course, because Ginsberg does not seek the
 “daily”
 
but the “universal” or the exceptional. One’s habits of attention are pro ­
foundly defined by one’s 
culture. Neither Pasolini’s nor Ginsberg’s “daily” India is what I was seeking in my
 own longing for India. I had found great comfort and intellectual prompting
 in a cartoon figure: Hadji Quest (he was adopted, but he was called only by one
 name). Seeing a brown youth in exciting circumstances inspired me to look —
 or 
create
 — opportunities for myself. I longed  for India because  I hadn’t known  
how to make all the pieces of my life fit
 
together  into a narrative. It is true that  
India isn’t my home, that Puerto Rico isn’t my home, that the United States is
 and isn’t my
 
home. I realize that figuring out the puzzle of India’s centrality  in  
my thoughts has confirmed how complex most things are, even concepts such
 as “essentialism” and “miseducation.”
I no longer feel the imperative to visit India as I once did. Perhaps com
­
prehending the sources of my mystification of this country and its people has
 freed me of that affective “baggage.” I was surprised how colleagues nodded
 and understood the genealogy I’ve traced in this essay.6 Many of
 
them have  
also created their own parallel false places: New York City, Hollywood, France,
 London, Tokyo. The India of my childhood is put away as I look at the world
 as 
an
 adult man, although I still find great wonder in terms such as “India ink.”
India, then, as a subcontinent outside and beyond my individual sorrows,
 made me take quite seriously the task of
 
writing words. I knew from early  
childhood that I was going to be a
 
writer, that the Hadji figure had challenged  
me to see the world. Words written in India ink had to be taken seriously, for
 they
 
had arrived to my hand and eye from a great distance, one that challenged  





The story is examined later; “Calcutta Adventure” introduces the inter ­
stice of Hadji and Jonny. Hadji interests me in that he “learned English and
 judo from an American Marine, and wants to go to America” (“Jonny Quest
 Episodes Guide”). His India is traded for the new lamp of US culture and fra
­ternity, an 
experience
 similar to my own.
2.
 
I received the sensible advice to “gently” inform my readers that I quote  
my own work not as self-advertisement but rather as a deliberate strategy of
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self-examination. The poets I admire have always been aware of the forces that
 
have shaped their lives. Indeed, naming these forces is often what many of us
 consider our “real work.” This naming, then, requires us to examine our own
 texts as we do the writings and images of others.
3.
 
Of course this is just one “reading.” Searching the internet on the sub ­




This is the name of one of his powerful books of poems but also a term  
Ive found useful in thinking of public discourses and their regulatory natures.
5.
 
The spelling throughout this quotation is Ginsberg’s own.
6.
 
An internet search led to a brief biography of the Native American sci ­
entist, Wilfred Denetclaw. The overview states that, “[a]s a young boy, his
 favorite television show was a children’s science-fiction program 
called
 Jonny  
Quest.’ . . . He says that he knows only about ten other people from Indian
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 of Venice premiered on the Lon ­
don stage between 1597 and 1598, Shakespeares
 choice of the dramatic background was certain to
 lend credibility to the plot. Venice was 
"in
 the news”:  
the arrival in London of a Venetian ambassador in
 1596, the loss of a Venetian argosy in the English
 Channel, and the detainment of another at
 Portsmouth in 1597 were current events (Forse 158),
 Moreover, Elizabethan audiences would have imme
­diately associated the city with
 
wealth and power. As 
John Gross aptly states, "The business of Venice was
 business” (58), While other 
republics
 in sixteenth-  
century Italy exploded with violent social conflict,
 converted 
to
 despotic states, or fell under foreign  
rule, Venice focused all of its efforts on mastering the
 wealth of
 
Christendom to preserve stability. In for ­
eign affairs, Venetian diplomacy averted costly wars
 with its neighbors. At home, the constitution was
 protected by
 an
 intricate web of checks, balances, and  
political maneuvering designed to recognize no inter
­est higher than that of the commercial empire
 (Trevor-Roper 108-10), Early modern Europe
 regarded the Venetian system of
 
impersonal capital ­
ism as "the most perfect model of government for any
 mercantile state which aspired to be free, effective,
 and independent” (121), Venice had achieved 
fame and notoriety, and its relevance was not lost on
 Shakespeare, After all, England was the new mer
­chant of the north, John Wheeler, a contemporary
 
of  
Shakespeare and member of the Merchant Adventur
­ers, Englands most powerful mercantile charter,
 painted a vivid picture of 
his
 nation bustling with
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commercial activity in A Treatise of Commerce: “all the world choppeth and
 
chaungeth, runneth and raveth after Martes, Markettes and Marchandising, so
 that all things come into Commerce, and passe into
 
Trafficque ... in all times,  
and in all places” (quoted in Hotchkiss. 130).
Competitive markets make for a dynamic economy, but they also spawn
 
public anxiety. While English commerce took on a life of its own, the nation
 
suffere
d growing pains similar to those suffered by the Italian states earlier.  
Emerging 
cartels,
 monopolies, and syndicates asserted their influence, chal ­
lenging the power of the monarchy. Privilege, once an aristocratic birthright,
 became a commodity as enterprising commoners gained access to wealth and
 real estate. In Parliament, representatives whose voting rights were dependent
 on property
 
rather than noble birth already “filled the benches of the House of  
Commons” (Stone 11). Change was in the air and England’s burgeoning mar
­
kets
 gave rise to a new social class that threatened to disturb the old feudal  
order. The repercussions of commercial expansion provide a compelling con
­text for The Merchant of Venice, which examines the nature of justice. The
 dramas microcosm reflects the dynamics of a society testing the waters of a
 surging market economy but finally swimming against the tides of social
 
change.
 As Shakespeare probes the ideological contradictions inherent in early  
modern capitalist practices, he taps into the public fears of Renaissance Eng
­land, revealing acute political awareness.
Until 1600, one of
 
the earliest texts addressing the subject of business as  
listed in the Stationers’ Register of London is The Merchant of Venice, but two
 books are listed in the following year: Malynes’ Canker of England's Common
­wealth, a treatise on foreign exchange, and Wheeler’s Treatise of Commerce
 (Hotchkiss 101). Wheeler, who rose from humble mariner apprentice to
 wealthy gentleman, sheds light not only on the political climate of 
his
 time  but  
also on Shakespeare’s ambiguous portrayal of Antonio, the merchant of Venice.
 Wheeler reports a rising tide of public hostility against merchants in 1597,
 when Parliament
 
requested royal support against a predatory monopoly  system.  
As trade increased, so did the merchant’s role of importance. Operating under
 the basic tenet of medieval economics that “demand was inelastic and therefore
 the road to profits was through rigid control and limitation of supply,” trading
 companies
 
wielded considerable power: they dictated exorbitant prices for con ­
sumer imports, exploited the native industry by monopolizing raw materials,
 and paid minimal prices to domestic manufacturers (28, 
47).
 This translated  
into gain for the merchant class but into loss for the urban masses, who help
­lessly watched their living standards erode (Ball 190). Ian W. Archer describes
 the conditions in England’s metropolis during the 1590s as “the worst decade
 sixteenth-century Londoners experienced” (11). A taxing war, several plague
 and 
flu
 epidemics, failed harvests, rising unemployment, poverty and crime,  
and massive immigration contributed to civic unrest that culminated in riots
 and libels (2-7). The 1595 declaration of martial law, the hanging of rioters,
 and the city’s appointment of marshals and attendants to restore order indicat
­
ed
 the extent of civic tension and the nervousness of the elite (8). Compound ­
ing these dearth conditions, a rapidly growing population and the influx of gold
 and silver from New World mines into western Europe contributed to high
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inflation in an economy of scarcity (Sacks 46). Trade wars with foreign mer
­
cantile companies had plunged England into economic depression before, so
 when threatened with another mandate in 1597, the queen took radical mea
­sures (Wheeler 40). Heavily indebted to the merchants of the Hanseatic
 League, which controlled the Baltic and North Sea region, she exiled the for
­eign trade company from its London stronghold and terminated its privileges.
 Next, she exacted sizable loans from her own merchants — in addition to
 already 
steep
 custom levies (41-4). But the queens solution ignored larger  
issues. The Holy Roman Empire swiftly retaliated and expelled English mer
­chants from its territories. Moreover, the "enemy”
 
was already within.
Since English trade policies 
were
 patterned after those of the Hanseatic  
League and trading privileges were extorted by
 
bribery or force, the monopoly  
system continued (Hotchkiss 22). Englands commercial monopolies, howev
­er, were not nearly as invidious as the private ones created by the queen to
 reward her favorites. Extensions of monarchical power, noblemen often served
 as royal
 
officials  by collecting revenues — and kickbacks: "practically every arti ­
cle that came into the household had paid tribute on the 
way
 to Essex, Raleigh,  
or some other nobleman” (52). Simon Adams describes a patronage system
 heavily dependent on the profits of trade and serving as "a demonstration of
 political power” (43, 45). Rather than create the conditions for an expanding
 mass consumer market, the system favored those in already privileged positions
 (Ball 16). According to John Guy, the 1597 monopoly debates spawned "some
 of the ugliest Parliamentary scenes” and signaled "unequivocal resentment of
 the economic privileges and abuses promoted by courtiers and 
privy
 councilors  
solely for their private 
gain
” (8). The queen promised an investigation, but by  
1598, she had granted more new monopolies than she had rescinded old ones;
 
worse
 yet, lucrative offices were openly  traded for hard cash on the "black mar ­
ket” at court. Lawrence Stone notes that a few aristocratic and professional
 men carved themselves disproportionate pieces of the economic 
pie,
 "lording it  
in arrogant ease and luxury over an obsequious, cowed, undernourished, and
 illiterate mass upon whose labors they depended” (6). In 1601, the queen was
 forced to respond to public outrage. 
She
 imprisoned a large number of  mer ­
chants, including one John
 
Wheeler and Essex, who was once her "petted dar ­
ling” but now fomented rebellion, and "lost not only her favor but his head”
 (Hotchkiss 54). Hotchkiss dryly comments, "If proof were needed of the fick
­leness of the queen or of the fact that her support of [the merchants] was based
 on temporary expediency rather than national policy, she certainly furnished
 that proof amply” (58). 
As
 a gesture of good will, John Wheeler, Secretary to  
the Society of Merchant Adventurers, hastily drew up the Treatise of Commerce,
 acknowledging a broad range of critics. In his document, he implores discon
­tented fellow members to remain in the organization and obey its 
rules,
 pleads 
with Parliament not to consider the Merchant
 
Adventurers’ Company a harm ­
ful monopoly, reminds the queen that "failure to support the Company would  
endanger the Crown revenue and embarrass the kingdom financially,” and
 appeals to the public to respect merchants in general and the royal Merchant
 Adventurers in particular (65). Though exceedingly diplomatic throughout the
 Treatise, Wheeler touches the delicate matter of reciprocity: just as trade
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depended on royal privilege, so the queen absolutely depended on her mer
­
chants to finance the royal treasury (65). In his 
early
 correspondence with the  
monarch, Sir Walter Gresham, royal merchant and financial agent to the
 Crown, had urged, “keep up your credit, and especially with your own mer
­chants, for it is they must stand
 
by you at all events in your necessity” — a pre ­
cept the queen heeded throughout her reign (quoted in Hotchkiss 41).
Not surprisingly, Wheeler’s Treatise proposes conservative policies rather
 
than reform. But it also suggests a pragmatic author who sincerely believed
 that “innovation” and “free trade” were terms of reproach (Hotchkiss 72). If
 Wheeler’s views strike us as economically unsound today, they reveal enduring
 attitudes toward business in his time. Even 
his
 patriotism reflects the era.  
Since the defeat of the Spanish Armada and the exile of the Hanseatic League,
 England ruled the northern seas and jealously guarded its new power. A
 heightened sense of national identity and increased anti-foreign sentiments
 explain Wheeler’s open animosity towards foreign merchants. Yet he never
 maligns 
his
 Jewish competitors. He mentions Portuguese merchants (the  
Portingale) who traded in spices and drugs but seems to express concern over
 their treatment by the Spanish (337). If Wheeler had referred to Marranos,
 Jewish merchants who had been expelled from the Iberian peninsula only to
 meet with the same fate in England, it could have provided a valuable new per
­spective from within the merchant community. Perhaps most notable is
 Wheeler’s conception of the scope of commerce. He debunks conventional
 notions of what is marketable (“not only that which Nature bringeth forth”),
 and advises people to employ “the 
quickness
 and industry of their spirits” as  
well as “the labor and travail of their hands ... so they may draw from thence
 either commodity or pleasure, or at leastwise thereby supply, help, and furnish
 their several wants, and necessities” (quoted in Hotchkiss 316). Finally, he pro
­poses that “all that a man worketh with his hands and discourseth in his spirit
 is nothing else
 
but merchandise” (quoted in 317). The idea of large-scale invis­
ible markets, Lars Engle reminds us,
 
was more disconcerting than reassuring to  
early modern Britons: “prior to Adam Smith, the market had little of its con ­
temporary ideological valence as a normalizer or harmonizer of needs and
 capacities” (2). While guilds, magistrates, and the church had regulated a mar
­ketplace where goods
 
were “presented, not represented,” an ever widening com ­
modity exchange defied
 
traditional definition and  control (Agnew 30). Driving  
on pure ambition and obeying only the rules of profit, emerging markets pro
­liferated at an alarming rate. Jean-Christophe Agnew further emphasizes that
 the term “commodity” in the late sixteenth century “still signified, above all, a
 profit or advantage” (78). Predating Wheeler’s commercial worldview by sev
­eral years, Shakespeare’s Merchant reflects a realistic early modern market econ
­omy and a 
society
 confronting the challenges of commercial expansion.  
Because the drama probes issues of worth, price, and value, Engle considers it
 “a local window on the larger economy of which it is part,” complete with its
 stabilities and pitfalls (1). In Shakespeare’s model of Venice, all the world’s a
 market. However, the exchange of some “things that come into commerce” was
 deemed highly inappropriate in Renaissance culture. After all, socially valued
 concepts 
like
 faith, friendship, justice, loyalty, political power, and sexuality  
ought not be “for sale” as they are here.
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Antonio, the merchant of Venice, has acquired some wealth with risky mar
­
itime ventures. To procure social clout, he nurtures a friendship with Bassanio,
 a nobleman as well as resident spendthrift and
 
playboy who, in turn, uses Anto ­
nio to keep him in pocket money. In order to repay Antonio and permanently
 remedy his low 
cash
 flow, Bassanio is shoppi g for a rich wife. Enter Portia,  
the beautiful,
 
witty, and most eligible heiress of Belmont,  who appens to be in  
the market for a husband but who wants to keep her autonomy in the bargain.
 Alas, without funds, 
Bassanio
 cannot properly court Portia. When he offers  
Antonio a new deal, to invest in his marriage venture, Antonio lacks immedi
­ate cash. His capital is at sea, and his credit in the Christian community
 appears to have been exhausted. He thus agrees to sign a “merry” bond for a
 pound of
 his
 flesh with the Jewish moneylender Shylock. The much abused  
Shylock is in the market for some respect and, given the opportunity, power
 over those who torment him. Meanwhile, Shylock
'
s daughter sells her soul  
when she
 
robs her father to elope and  trade her Jewish faith for a Christian  hus ­
band. Even Shylock
'
s servant is shopping for new employment with a better  
benefits package, climbing the socioeconomic ladder much like the rest of
 Venice, which thrives more on account of personal profit than on Christian
 charity.




 day in court. Bereft of his daughter and personal possessions, and  
seemingly stuck with a bad loan, he insists on a trial but finds himself at the
 “mercy” of Portia, who is disguised as the presiding judge. The resourceful
 “judge” amends Bassanio’s reckless endangerment of Antonio’s life and relieves
 her “dear bought husband” of his debt to protect her own assets. She then
 seizes Shylock’s estate to be divided between Antonio and the Venetian coffers
 and finally makes the alien plaintiff beg for his life. Though pardoned by the
 doge, the Jew is forced to denounce his religion, his very soul, and to disappear
 quietly. Even the merchant makes a humble and lonely exit. He owes 
his
 life  
as well as his livelihood to Portia, who now reveals her identity — and the
 remarkable news that three of 
his
 ships have returned to port. Despite the  
impending celebration of three weddings, The Merchant ends on a discordant
 note.
As Anne Barton observes, “The solitude of Antonio at the end of Act V is
 
without the tragic overtones of Shylock’s last appearance but it suggests a link
 between the two arch-enemies after all: both are voices somehow missing in
 the final chord” (253). This may not be the only link. While other characters
 in the play are “blessed” with wealth — that is, are born to it, marry into it or
 steal it — Shylock and Antonio work for their money, specializing in high-risk
 professions and generating tax revenues. Their fates hinge on the forces of
 volatile markets and the political whims of the nobility. Nevertheless, as mem
­
bers
 of a rapidly growing commercial class whose economic successes could  
realign the social order, Antonio and Shylock pose a threat to the status quo;
 their fortunes could be lethal to aristocratic power, especially if they 
were
 to  
collaborate in a venture. In Venice, the Rialto commercial center depended not
 only on merchants but, “in particular, on Jewish moneylenders who financed
 
ship
 cargoes” (Kline 20). Italian methods of business organization such as tern-
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porary partnerships had spread throughout sixteenth-century western Europe
 
(Ball 193). In England, the formation of joint-stock companies permitted 
any­one with capital to invest (Knights 52). Better yet, the financial arrangements
 of partnerships neatly concealed interest since the purchase of stock was “by
 
its  
very nature not a loan, but a special form of association” (Postan 19). It would
 be in Portia
'
s interest to keep the merchant and the usurer disassociated.  
Hence, she fans the fires of Antonio’s and Shylock’s personal hatred and tight
­ens the reins on their profits and potential clout. Shylock certainly bears the
 brunt of her preemptive strike, but Antonio, too, suffers an economic setback.
 The effects of the trial are devastating for both as they become pawns in a sys
­tem that exploits the fruits of their labor without sharing the risks. Predictably,
 they react like abused dogs
 
who,  blind with rage and afraid to turn against their  
master, attack each other. Shylock is called a cur, a dog, and a wolf until he
 finally snaps at Antonio: “Thou call’dst
 me
 dog before thou hadst a cause, /  But  
since I 
am
 a dog, beware my fangs” (3.3.6-7). Divided by hatred and effective­
ly silenced, the merchant and the moneylender are firmly kept in “their place”:
 on the Rialto. Tragically, they play into the hands of the Venetian elite and unwittingly contribute to their own misfortune.




the play,  but  the merchant’s precarious social  position is not as clear  
to twentieth-century audiences. In fact, critics tend to cast Antonio in a glow
­ing light. Avraham Oz describes him as “Venice’s prince of merchants, who
 retains 
his
 gloomy dignity even in court” (93), Anne Barton sees an  “indulgent”  
friend and a “reflective” gentleman (251, 252), and John Gross considers him
 the better half of “two extreme
 
versions of Economic Man, one benevolent, the  
other malign”: Jekyll-Antonio embodies “the fantasy that you can enjoy the
 benefits of economic enterprise, and confer
 
them on your society, without being  
competitive and self-assertive”; by contrast, “Hyde-Shylock is the capitalist as
 total
 
predator, conferring good on no one except himself. T ey are two aspects  
of the same phenomenon; and a tremendous amount of the play’s energy is
 spent keeping them apart” (54). Unfortunately, the dichotomy of “good” and
 “evil” fails to account for the complexity of Shylock’s and the inconsistencies in
 Antonio’s character. Dressed like a prince, the merchant strains to
 
project  mag ­
nanimity, but he is no gentleman. Ronald Berger notes that in England
 between 1559 and 1602 expenditures on
 
luxuries and lavish dress not only con ­
tributed to the aristocracy’s financial crisis but increasingly blurred the lines
 between social classes (28). Stone confirms that “conspicuous consumption”
 served a crucial social function: to acquire and maintain status (185). Both
 Bassanio and Antonio are highly fashionable — and deeply in debt. Yet, as L.
 C. Knights points out, “ostentation on the part of the new rich is always a mat
­ter of derision” (102). Unlike Lord Bassanio,
 
Antonio has no blue blood cours ­
ing through 
his
 veins (1.1.68, 73). He is addressed and introduced only as  
“signior,” a courtesy title equivalent to “Mr.” His predicament is noteworthy
 because wealth meant social mobility and “membership in the upper class of
 merchants or the landed Gentry” (Forse 11). So far, Antonio has been unable
 to turn 
his
 wealth into land and the status such an investment would confer.  
Moreover, his ventures have not afforded him to acquire a gentleman’s title,
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which indicates that he is not as independently wealthy as he would have us
 
believe. Such a title, after all, and marriage to an aristocratic heiress 
could
 well  
lead to “the financial equivalent of a baron,. . . the usual reward for such entre
­preneurial activity” (Stone 192).
According to M. M. Postan, there was hardly
 
an English “merchant of sub ­
stance” who did not invest in real estate, “be it
 
buying, selling, pledging, or let ­
ting it” (15). John Wheeler, whose mercantile capital transformed him into a
 gentleman landowner, serves as a shining example of a commoner who seized
 the economic opportunities of early modern England. So does Shakespeare,
 whose popular wares on the stage afforded him 125 acres of land in 1602 and
 one of
 
the largest estates in his native Stratford in 1605 (Laroque 58). Cer ­
tainly, he was no stranger to the 
perks
 and pressures of competitive markets.  
Initially “tarred with the feathers of the upstart crow,” Shakespeare outwitted
 the university wits and
 
built a reputation as a talented writer; his self-fashioned  
image marked the “first step on the literary and social road of upward mobili
­ty” (Bate 18). Bate stresses that before Shakespeare “invented the profession of
 dramatist,” writers could not sustain a living 
by
 their craft alone and depended  
on aristocratic or court patronage, which appears to have been Shakespeare’s
 “plan of action” (17). Under the protection of the queen, a patron of the arts,
 the theater proved to be a most lucrative business venture. According to Forse,
 it represented “one of the few avenues of free enterprise open to Elizabethans
 of modest means,” offering unique opportunities, relatively few regulations, and
 enormous earnings (14). Shakespeare found a market niche where he could
 turn his “artistic skills into commodities subject to the demands of profit” and
 ranked in the top five percent income bracket of his time (47, 237). François
 Laroque adds that the actor and
 
playwright  had a “taste for wealth” and a “keen  
eye for profit,” and “mercilessly pursued any defaulting debtors” (58). In 1598,
 Shakespeare applied for a coat of arms, renewing
 
his father’s earlier  failed effort  
to raise the family’s social status. This time, the petition was granted; in recog
­nition of “good and loyal service” rendered to the Crown, Shakespeare, the
 grandson of a farmer, officially
 
became a gentleman (59).
Since the acquisition of property was a common means to sociopolitical
 ascent, Shakespeare’s Antonio is no “merchant of
 
substance” — yet. Banking  
on the hope that his ships will come in, he is poised to make a lateral social
 move, but for now, he remains a commoner. As Engle writes, the fact that
 Antonio is legally “bound” to and incarcerated for Bassanio’s loan firmly estab
­lishes his lower rank: “In England until the mid-seventeenth century a noble
­man could not be arrested for debt,” but nobles 
could
 pledge their servants and  
social inferiors as sureties (85-6). Significantly, the noble Bassanio does not
 borrow
 
directly from Shylock but  uses a socially inferior middleman to distance  
himself from the transaction. Further reflecting 
his
 lower social status, Anto ­
nio’s behavior does not exemplify
 
the qualities of a gentleman. While Bassanio  
is characterized by
 
idleness and a penchant for gambling, both sure signs of an  
aristocrat, Antonio frets over
 his
 business, suggesting lack of refinement. Stone  
writes that “active personal occupation in a trade or profession was generally
 thought to be humiliating” (39). In the Venetian pecking order, Antonio ranks
 somewhere between 
Bassanio
 and Shylock, explaining his “extraordinary vio-
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lence in repudiating Shylock’s attempts to draw parallels between them” (Engle
 
87). His “reflective” affectations become even more suspicious in view of
 
his  
tirades against Shylock, who notes with some satisfaction: “Why, look you how
 you storm!” (1.3.137). The merchant is an emotional tinderbox, revealing a
 choleric nature behind a melancholy mask. He even admits to playing a “sad





with his allusion to the  “standing pond” (1.1.88-99). Antonio may not  
be as deep as he is dull; when his complaints of “want-wit 
sadness
” invite the  
barbs of a motley 
crew
 of friends who beg for a round of repartee, he remains  
silent. Gratiano’s quip that silence is not always golden but sometimes the sign
 of a 
fool
 may be understood more fully in the context of medieval stereot pes  
about merchants. As Richard Grassby puts it, the “learned merchant was an
 exception” (351). Benjamin Kedar’s account of a thirteenth-century dispute
 between a Christian merchant and a Jew shows that the average merchant was
 not known for his intellect or refined sensibilities; a century later, Boccaccio’s
 Decameron did little to improve 
his
 reputation; and in 1604, Thomas Middle ­
ton boldly satirized merchants in Michaelmas Term (Kedar 40). Shakespeare’s
 development of the merchant is less pointed, but Antonio is hardly an
 admirable character.
Throughout the play, the merchant’s 
efforts
 to gain social recognition or  
respect are thwarted. Bassanio admits to owing Antonio “the most in money
 and in love,” yet does not hesitate to use him as human collateral and then
 abandon him. When the bond matures at the end of three months, Bassanio
 has had no apparent contact with his incarcerated “friend.” Even in court, Por
­tia’s rhetorical question, “Which is the merchant here? and which the Jew?”
 (4.1.174) serves to insult Antonio, whose dress would plainly distinguish him
 from a Jew. His submissive mumblings in the final scene, “Sweet lady,
 
you have  
given me life and living!” (5.1.286), punctuate 
his
 humiliation. Still, the mer ­
chant fails to elicit pity; for all his feigned disinterest in profit, everything he
 does illustrates that profit is his 
goal
 (Gross 53). Audiences often mistake the  
title of the 
play
 to refer to Shylock, partly because he is the more compelling  
character, but also because Antonio manages to deflect “
any
 taint of the count ­
ing house. . . . Yet a merchant is what he is, on the grand scale” (53). Terry
 Eagleton notes that his melancholia is, in 
fact,
 “an appropriate neurosis for a  
profit-based society, discarding the use values of objects in order to plunder
 them for substance with which to nourish itself” (41). Early on, Antonio
 boasts to Shylock that his ventures will make “thrice three times the value of
 this bond” (1.3.159), and that his treasure-laden “argosies,” 
an
 allusion to the  
quest for the golden fleece, are due from Tripoli, Mexico, England, Lisbon,
 Barbary, and India (3.2.268-9). Though Mexico is a poetic stretch since the
 Spanish-American markets would have been closed to Venice (Gross 53),
 Antonio’s ambition, no doubt, is of global and mythic proportion. Marc Shell
 proposes that the merchant’s lack
 
of marine insurance, a common precaution in  
Venice as well as in English seaports, illustrates overconfidence and lack of wis
­dom (54).
Occasionally, Shakespeare’s dramatic setting slips from Venice to England.
 
Gratiano’s reference to “that
 
royal merchant” (3.2.239) brings to mind the Eliz ­
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abethan milieu and Wheeler’s defense of the royal Merchant Adventurers. The
 
term “ventures,” used conspicuously throughout
 
the  play, originally denoted the  
financial and physical risks associated with early maritime expeditions. Then
 again, it also connotes unscrupulous speculation 
or 
the acquisition of fortune  by  
guile. Considering that, in 1597, English merchants were treading on thin
 political ice, Antonio’s appearance on the stage as a figure of suspicion should
 come as no surprise. Critics pay little attention to the contradictions inherent
 in Shakespeare’s merchant. Anticipating Polonius’s advice in Hamlet, Antonio
 loudly proclaims neither to “lend nor borrow” yet quickly breaks his “custom”
 on both counts, paying mere lip service to an aphorism Elizabethan audiences
 already dismissed as laughable. A
 
grumbling Shylock informs us that Antonio,  
too, lends money — albeit “gratis.” Christian merchants throughout Europe
 did lend money indeed but avoided any stipulation of interest 
by
 making out  
the bond for a sum including both principal and interest. According to Walter
 Cohen, the “very contrast between the two occupations may be seen as a false
 dichotomy,” and he notes that merchants 
were,
 in fact, the “leading usurers”  
(768, 769). Stone writes that interest was forbidden only in theory, “which
 meant in practice a rate of 12 per cent or more” (183). More importantly,
 Antonio’s debts extend beyond Shylock. His desperate letter to Belmont
 reveals that other creditors “grow cruel” as well (3.2.316), a fact Tubal confirms
 in 
his
 comment that “divers of Antonio’s creditors” are looking for him  
(3.1.113). Having exhausted his credit in the Christian community, the mer
­chant had no choice but to borrow from a Jew to accommodate the nobleman.
 “Indulgence” of Bassanio therefore is no 
sign
 of martyrdom but a crucial means  
to gain aristocratic patronage. Shylock’s early comment, “How like a fawning
 publican he looks!” (1.3.41), suggests mercenary motives. To twentieth-centu
­ry audiences, the idea of lobbying or investing in a public relations campaign
 presents no ethical dilemma. Nonetheless, it presented a moral one to Eliza
­bethans, who were fleeced by the merchant companies on a regular basis and
 increasingly protested cronyism and bribery. T. E. Hartley notes that “wining
 and dining” of English officials by individuals wishing to solicit information or
 to promote their own interests was, in 
fact,
 common practice (171). As a case  
in point, Francis Bacon, distinguished member of Parliament under Elizabeth
 I and lord chancellor under James I, retired in disgrace when the House of
 Lords found him guilty of accepting bribes.




usurer’s image of thrift. Shylock takes  pride in his “well-won” thrift:  
“And thrift is blessing if men steal it not” (1.3.90). Even 
his
 use of language is  
economical. The business of moneylending, of course, involves riot only inter
­est but also the cost of bad loans. When Shylock
 
insists on a trial and declares  
that usury is “the means whereby I live” (4.1.377), more than revenge is
 involved: both 
his
 reputation and livelihood are at stake. He could ill afford to  
be thought generous and would have to command a healthy dose of respect to
 be effectual. Yet, admirable qualities like thrift and respect take on sinister con
­notations in Shylock and finally spell greed and terror, Machiavellian traits
 reminiscent of Marlowe’s Barabas. The Christian characters almost never refer
 to Shylock by his name but as a Jew, a “
devil,
” an “evil soul,” a “villain with a
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smiling cheek,” and "rotten at the heart” (1.3.98, 99, 100, 101) as if the terms
 
were
 synonymous. Their language not only relegates him to a subhuman level  
but clinches an image that sets the tone for the rest of the play. Precluding jus
­
tic
e, it serves to justify the Venetians’ foul treatment of Shylock, who protests  





 were nearly absent from English history for centuries at a  
time, caricatures of 
Jews
 as phantoms of evil had long been staples of national  
folklore and literature: cannibalism, poisoning, ritual murder, and sorcery were
 imagined evils ascribed to Jews (Gross 
27).
 In the theater, Marlowe’s Jew of  
Malta (1589) had rekindled old hatreds. On the political scene, the sensation
­al trial and execution of Roderigo Lopez, a Marrano Jew and court physician
 implicated by Essex in a plot to poison the queen, exacerbated public preju
­dices. Historians suspect that Elizabeth herself never believed the charges
 against Lopez
 
but  yielded to political pressure (32). Despite Lopez’s professed  
innocence, he was hanged, drawn, and quartered at Tyburn in 1594 while a sav
­age mob jeered and laughed amid chants of
 
"He’s a Jew!” (33). James Forse  
marvels at Shakespeare’s method of allusion to people and events in the Lopez
 affair and his stunning "layering and accumulating of 
clues
” (152). Perhaps, as  
Forse suggests, Shakespeare aimed for "belly laughs, not sympathy” (157), and
 perhaps he wrote for "prosperity,” unlike Jonson, whose literary goal was "pos
­terity” (47). But if Shakespeare slings allusions with verve, it also allows more
 freedom to tell a story. After all, James Shapiro reminds us, plays are fiction
 and 
"in
 the hands of a talented dramatist, the less easily  definable the social and  
psychological currents a play explores, the greater
 
its potential  to haunt and dis ­
turb” (121). Unlike Dekker’s Shoemakers Holiday, which Paul Seaver describes
 as "an antidote to a grim season in a grim time” (87) and which appealed to 
an "idealized notion of the monarchy as a buffer against social conflict” (Beving
­ton 101), Shakespeare offers no utopian ending. Instead, he leaves social and
 economic antagonisms unbalanced. Critics such as Jean Howard lament that
 Shakespeare’s drama "encodes the ideologies of the aristocracy” (7), but The
 
Merchant
 hardly brims with geniality  toward the elite. It is a cautionary  tale in  
the guise of comedy as it exposes the willingness of the monarch to use occa
­sional force against foreigners to maintain a monopoly on political power.
 Surely, neither Dekker nor Shakespeare could afford to offend the master of the
 revels, much less the queen herself. But
 
while Dekker presented "an amalgam  
of all that popular taste demanded,” Shakespeare delved below
 
the surface, tak ­
ing "popular elements and transform[ing] them to 
his
 own purposes” (Knights  
195). His allusions to a trial clouded in political intrigue and ending in a grue
­some spectacle, and 
his
 development of a fictional Jew who commands more  
respect than the Christian characters, are fraught with ambiguity. At times, we
 cannot help but think that the bard-turned-businessman, whom Forse
 describes as "a skinflint, a man who drove shrewd and sharp deals with those
 who borrowed money from him” (11), might have sided with Shylock.
While Elizabethan audiences loved to hate a Jewish loan 
shark,
 Moshe  
Lazar argues that history does not corroborate the diabolical image "superim
­posed on the real living Jew living in
 
the shadow of the church” (49). He attrib ­
utes the "metamorphosis of Jews into devils and gargoyle-like creatures” to the
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emergence of Christianity (40). Refusing to compete with Judaism in the same
 
monotheistic faith, the early Christian church drew a battle line between the
 new congregation (ecclesia) and the old (synagoga), declaring the former
 supreme and the latter satanic (40, 55). This confrontation is manifest in the
 iconography of
 
the medieval church throughout Europe (54). Once the Jew  
was
 
branded a “Christ-killer” and  the Adversary himself,  hisfictional image was  
disseminated by the church via its "mass media,” that is, sermons, plays, and
 visual arts: “The final canned
 
product of the mythical Jew was now marketable,  
under a concise dehumanizing label [and] formed 
an
 integral part of the "liter ­
ature of the illiterate’” (49). Theological anti-Jewish doctrine hence served as a
 blueprint for the Jew’s portrayal on the 
stage
 as a bloodthirsty villain who  
“deserved” contempt. Joseph Shatzmiller’s research in the legal archives of
 England, France, Germany, and Spain on medieval moneylending practices
 calls for a revised picture of the stereotype mass-marketed by the church and
 immortalized in 
early
 modern drama. Case documents reveal that Jews in liti ­
gation with deadbeat Christian clients generally had the Christian courts and
 public on their side, suggesting that alien moneylenders provided reliable ser
­vices (7). Schatzmiller further dispels the popular misconception that money-
 lending was a “depraved” profession; it was a highly competitive trade where
 Jews 
vied
 with Christian pawnbrokers and usurers: “there was no monopoly or  
cartel at work” (2). Having blazed the trade routes of international commerce,
 Jewish merchants had long lost their predominant position to Christian mar
­itime contenders and now survived “by exception and privilege rather than by
 right,” ultimately confined to petty moneylending as other occupations became
 closed to them (Lopez and Raymond 103). Under such conditions, the “cut
­throat” Jew of popular literature surely
 
would have lost business to a competi ­
tor whose reputation was less disturbing to Christian clients (Schatzmiller 2).
Shakespeare’s Merchant neatly exposes the gap between Christian rhetoric
 
and practices, as well as the moral contradictions inherent in
 
that necessary evil:  
usury. To profit was divine as long as the 
deal
 remained behind the scenes, but  
to trade money as a commodity openly, that is, to breed “barren metal,” was
 deemed “unnatural” (Jones 9). Illustrating this paradox, Antonio’s and Bas-
 sanio’s already overextended credit in the Christian community does not keep
 them from tapping a Jew
 
for cash. And while Shylock takes the risk  of accom ­
modating them, Antonio and Bassanio continue to insult him. Although
 moneylending laws in England had 
actually
 been relaxed since 1571, resulting  
in what Knights calls a “usurer’s heyday” (110), Norman Jones points out that
 despite the dynamic transformation of financial markets, a static conception of
 credit failed to produce a viable theory to explain and regulate current practices
 (3). Churches and governments debated credit not in terms of 
economics
 but  
“theological ethics,” wrestling with the issue as a m ral one (13). Parliamen
­tary debates and anti-usury tracts notwithstanding, the Crown represented “the
 greatest debtor in England,” as Elizabeth routinely relied on forced loans from
 her
 
merchants, demanding  access to a domestic money market  in which she was  
the only buyer (52-3). Credit, no doubt,
 
was an indispensable part of conduct ­
ing business and formed the financial basis of trade. Europe’s rapidly growing
 markets depended on credit to such an extent that it led to a revival of public
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banking in the Mediterranean region and to its introduction in northern
 
Europe (Ball 63). In 1584, Venice established the Banco 
di
 Rialto as other  
major centers of trade followed suit, a development that must have been com
­mon knowledge in Renaissance Europe. Lazar proposes that news of yet
 another monopoly such as the banking industry
 
caused alarm in the population  
(56). Confronted with the impersonal nature of powerful institutions, human
 fears tend to project themselves on more accessible collectivities. Historically,
 the adaptability of the “wandering Jew” to Christian cultures periodically
 resulted in intense political backlash; already vilified in myth, Jews became
 chronic scapegoats in times of economic uncertainty (56). In London specifi
­cally, Ian Archer writes,
 
xenophobia reigned: “aliens were blamed for problems  
the causes of which lay elsewhere,” 
allowing
 the elite to escape criticism and  
strengthening the causes of the guilds (140). Populist 
measures
 against early  
modern capitalism found expression in campaigns and sermons against
 “usurers, brokers, badgers, hucksters, and such like locusts that eat up the poor
 and cause the markets to be inhaunced” (quoted in Archer 
53).
 In the 1590s,  
the potential for anti-alien riots reached such alarming levels that city officials
 channeled public fury into “harassment of
 
aliens and foreigners in parliament  
and the law courts” to keep the populace from stoning
 
them in the streets (140,  
259).
Few topics in the economic history of
 
Renaissance Europe yield evidence  
as 
copiously
 as credit, and “the  bulk of the evidence consists of records of debts”  
(Postan 3). In England, the most commonly recorded debt was the bond or
 “obligation,” which included a predetermined penalty clause and constituted
 the highest form of documentary evidence recognized under common law:
 “The obligor could not deny or explain away any statement contained in it”
 (33). A bond could result in a “judgment,” a formal acknowledgment by the
 debtor that should he fail to pay, “execution could henceforth be had against his
 lands, goods, and person” (35). The legal jargon in The 
Merchant
 corresponds  
to the terminology of English common law as Shylock insists on Antonio’s
 bond and its predetermined penalty clause. In view of this, Shylock’s “threat”
 at first is no more than a pun. Had he wanted to kill Antonio, he could have
 done so more efficiently in the streets of Venice than in a Christian court.
As Cohen notes, such a stipulation, after all, “is hardly what
 
one would expect from  
homo economicus” (769). Not until the court scene does Portia manipulate
 Shylock into rephrasing his demand for justice into a formal statement of intent
 to 
kill
 (Engle 95). In his address to the doge, Shylock adopts another strategy  
and
 
touches a  dicey issue: he reminds the Venetians that they own “many a pur ­
chas’ d slave” (4.1.90), human chattel fully sanctioned by the republic. Having  
“bought” Antonio’s pound of 
flesh
 under  the same contract law, Shylock  argues  
that it is rightfully his: “If you deny 
me,
 fie upon your law!” (101). Shell  
explains that under Roman law, from
 
which Christian contract law  derived, life  
was indeed commensurate with money, and debtors could be sold as slaves or
 
execut
ed for lack of funds (65-7). At first sight, Shylock seems to pose a  
rhetorical question: if slaves are commodities, then why be so squeamish over
 a “mere”
 
pound of flesh? But while he is convicted for insisting on the letter of  
the law, his modest proposal may well aim to expose the Christians’ own
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appalling practice of trading in human lives. L. C. Knights reports that slave
 
trafficking was carried on mainly by interlopers engaging in “one-sided” trade
 or plunder (50). Notably, one of Antonio’s argosies is returning from Barbary,
 the North African coastal region including Morocco and notorious in the six
­teenth century for piracy and slavery. Yet, Barbara Sebek observes, “Antonio
 remains squarely in Venice,” distancing himself from barbaric commodity
 exchange and deflecting attention from the Christian economic community’s
 “unsavory features” (185, 194). Imperialistic early modern Europe held inco
­herent views on the issue of slavery. The English monarch officially con
­demned such “detestable” practices as “would call down the Vengeance of
 Heaven upon the Undertakers” (quoted in Greenblatt 
23).
 At the same time,  
she not only invested in the voyages of John Hawkins, who sold African slaves,
 to the New World, but even loaned him her ships (23). Slavery provided func
­tional value that
 
was irreconcilable with social values, but while it raised moral  
concerns, those concerns competed with “
cold
 calculations of profit and loss”  
(Epstein 226).
While subsidizing merchants to exploit the riches of other nations, includ
­
ing their inhabitants, Renaissance policy
 
makers realized that global commerce  
inevitably effected change that was as much cultural as it was economic.
 According to Russ McDonald, the extent of the slave import in Shakespeare’s
 England was significant, causing sufficient concern for the queen to issue sev
­eral edicts against “the great number of Negroes and Blackamoors . . . carried
 into the realm” (273). As Stephen Greenblatt confirms, the idea that foreign
 influences could somehow “pollute” Englishness, whatever
 
that meant, spawned  
anxiety (24). The Merchant, too, reflects fear and confusion over cultural dif
­ference. While busily profiting from slavery, the Venetians self-righteously
 insist on casting cultural “others” in inferior roles instead. Portia, aware of her
 own status as a commodity, aggressively negotiates the conditions for her mar
­riage contract, but recoils from the very idea of exchanging vows with Moroc
­co. His dark “complexion” and boasts of sexual prowess relegate him to an
 uncivilized role, posing what Sebek calls “muted threats of intercultural sexual
 commerce” (193). While the aristocratic Portia rejects such exchange, her ser
­vant Launcelot exploits it. Having impregnated a Moorish slave in Portia’s
 household, he then ridicules the woman’s lack of chastity (3.5.35). The por
­trayal of both Portia’s exotic suitor and her slave in purely sexual, even promis
­cuous terms, serves to denigrate and call into question their worth as persons.
 Camille
 
Wells Slights writes that “the profitability  of slave labor created a need  
to rationalize the dehumanization of black-skinned Africans,” and she hints at
 a tentative connection between England’s Merchant Adventurers and the slave
 trade (381, 385). John Wheeler’s references to slavery
 
in the Treatise, however,  
would indicate that he did not want to be associated with such practices; in a
 revealing passage, Wheeler condemns certain “cunning merchants” who “make
 traffic of the skins and blood of other men,... persuade and induce men to suf
­fer themselves to be bought and sold, and [make] merchandize of men’s souls”
 (quoted in Hotchkiss 316-17). Whether heartfelt conviction or the rhetoric of
 a desperate man trying to appease the queen and the public, Wheeler’s com
­ments do suggest that human
 
bondage presented a moral issue. Engle wonders  
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about the “lack of any rebuttal to Shylocks 
speech
 about slavery,’ particularly  
since
 
it “forces attention to questions about the moral rights of persons and how  
such rights interact with property rights and with luck in birth” (101-2). The
 “tawny” Jew offers a new perspective from someone forced to the margin of
 society, a voice of reason pointing to the hypocrisies in the lives of
 
both the  
drama’s denizens and its 
early
 modern audiences. Though he remains “irre-  
ducibly alien,” Shylock represents 
one
 of the few dramatic characters who,  
according to Greenblatt, have “a surprising instability in the Elizabethan imag
­ination and may appear for brief, intense moments as powerful models to be
 admired and emulated before they resume their place as emblems of
 
despised  
otherness” (24). When we consider that Shakespeare was familiar with the
 essays of Montaigne, who, 
on
 the brink of the Enlightenment, stood at a criti ­
cal distance from the 
mores
 of his time and openly  denounced Europe’s cultur ­
al myopia (Pinciss and Lockyer 20), Shylock’s speech deserves closer analysis.
Regardless of Shylock’s intent, the Christian court hardly represents the
 
spirit of the law as Portia comes “perilously close to promoting private law’”
 (Eagleton 37). The fact that the 
doge
 is caught sympathizing  with the defen ­
dant before the trial, that Portia impersonates a member of the judiciary who
 could not be more partial, and that the defendant gets to amend the verdict
 makes for delightful comedy on one hand. But
 
when we examine the personal  
and political motivations of the characters, the Christian victory seems hollow.
 Rather than idealize Venice, as Richard Mackenney fears (232), Shakespeare
 deflates the myth of Venice as a paragon of civic virtue as well as the myth of
 Christian compassion and sympathy. Surely, Portia’s disparaging comments
 about the state of corruption and Bassanio’s cynical insights about the law do
 not reflect well on the republic. Here, justice means punishment, which hovers
 somewhere between retribution and vengeance. Portia’s comment in the trial
 scene, “The Jew shall have all justice . . . / He shall have nothing but the penal
­ty” (4.1.321-2), strongly suggests that her final judgment was predetermined.
 And when the “judge” pontificates on the quality of mercy, it is difficult to
 ignore the pun on merces (Latin for reward or gain), which defines her goal of
 procuring a marriage contract. Eagleton considers Portia’s mercy “a lavishly
 gratuitous gesture” as she “disregards the 
precise
 exchanges of credit and debt,  
crime and punishment” and
 
then expects the same cavalier treatment from Shy ­
lock, a social outcast “whose sole protection is the 
law
” (41). The victimized,  
however, “need a fixed contract” and “would be foolish to rely on the generosi
­ty of their oppressors,” who control the rules of the game and have the power
 “to dispense with exact justice from time to time.” As Shylock deconstructs
 Venetian law, he is “triumphantly vindicated” (37) despite losing 
his
 case; “he  
has forced the Christians into outdoing his own 'inhuman legalism.” If  any ­
thing, the courtroom scene turns a glaring spotlight on the interconnectedness
 of economics with politics and the judiciary. Shakespeare
 
unmasks and satirizes  
Venetian jurisprudence, which seems founded neither on ancient virtues nor on
 law and order. Clearly, the law is not blind to social difference, as Antonio’s
 incarceration for 
Bassanio
 illustrates, nor is it blind to racial and cultural dif ­
ference, as evident in the sensational court scene (Engle 86). Aside from dis
­covering a separate clause for aliens in Venetian civic law, the “judge” panders
 to 
racial
 hatred when she allows hecklers like Gratiano to work the crowd. This  
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not only creates the conditions to convict the
 
Jew with the full backing of the  
public, which feels “good” that the Jew is made to suffer, but ruthlessly pre
­cludes justice. Eagleton notes that Portia’s “ingenious quibbling would be ruled
 out of order in a modern court” (37). Even in a utilitarian sense, Portia’s solu
­tion fails to set Venice on a moral course for the future. The treatment of jus
­tice in The Merchant sharply contrasts with the kind of justice dispensed in the
 social microcosm of Twelfth Night, which provides a safety net even for unre
­lenting 
offenders.
 Puritan or not, the abusive Malvolio is his own worst enemy,  
and when
 
his peers scheme against him, we  feel that he deserves it. Lady Olivia  
nonetheless intervenes, ameliorates the grievances of her
 
mean-spirited servant,  
and continues her support even after he threatens revenge. The implication
 that Malvolio’s humiliation has been punishment enough is echoed by the
 duke, who invites him back. Conversely, Shylock in The Merchant leaves the
 stage a broken man: “I pray you give me leave from hence, / I am not well”
 (4.1.395-6). When the doge says, “Get thee gone, but do it” 
(398),
 Shylock  
refuses to be the traditional comic senex described 
by
 Jonathan Bate (127).  
While the Jew is singled out and punished, usury will surely continue behind
 the scenes, leading Shell to conclude that “the aristocratic court of Portia can
­not long exist without a day of reckoning in the court of tragedy” (83).
Avraham Oz examines the prophetic qualities of The 
Merchant
 in view of  
history as Shylock’s disappearance in 
act
 4 symbolizes the fate of Shylock’s tribe  
throughout Europe up to and including the haunting events of the twentieth
 century (5). Seen through the lens of economics, Jews “served for simultane
­ously upholding and denigrating necessary, yet ideologically abominable early
 capitalist practices” that were antithetical, at least theoretically, to communally
 oriented Renaissance
 
values (8-9). The capitalist resources of Jews nonetheless  
sustained the aristocracy in times of economic instability (11). The age of
 Shakespeare ushered in a transitory period of a new monetary system where
 “profit and credit are shaking the constancy and regular course of traditional
 possession” (27-8). Portia’s heartfelt sigh, “O, these naughty times / Puts
bars between the owners and their rights” (3.2.18-19), reveals her worst fear: a col
­lapse of the oligarchy. Her medieval worldview of wealth as a finite commod
­ity explains Portia’s determination to keep Shylock and Antonio in inferior
 roles: to bankroll the good life at Belmont. Portia correctly identifies Antonio
 as a threat to the aristocracy. His citizenship combined with potential land
­holdings could soon allow him to demand a greater say in government opera
­tions. Shylock’s alien status precludes 
any 
such rights. Furthermore, Jews were 
restricted from access to guilds, training, and even markets. Shylock’s portray
­al as a perceived danger in the Christian economic community is all the more
 vexing when we consider that in the early 1600s, as usury lost some of its stig
­ma, London’s wealthiest merchants abandoned the hazards of overseas trading
 and turned exclusively to the business of moneylending (Stone 532). Norman
 Jones reports a “new attitude toward usury crystallizing in England’s con
­sciousness” as “fewer and fewer people were willing to condemn merchants and
 usurers in the same breath” (173).
While other characters in The 
Merchant
 depict Shylock in Machiavellian  
terms, it is Portia who reveals herself as quite the Ideal Princess. 
She
 boldly  
seizes her moment of power, practices deceit, duplicity, hypocrisy, and intimi-
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dation, and strikes fear into the hearts of Shylock, Antonio, and Bassanio.
 
Even the doge is ineffectual as he yields to the "councilor” who tweaks the law
 to serve her purpose. Here, the setting of the play offers another rich histori
­cal parallel. Myths of the
 
Venetian polity’s stability  aside, the  uniqueness of the  
Italian commercial giant "lay in its apparent immunity to rebellion in a world
 of conflict” (Mackenney 232-4). In medieval Venice, an inner ring of self
­elected 
councilors
 reserved the power to reinterpret laws; if a law failed to  
advance their goal, they consulted again and could mobilize, even against the
 doge, the Council of Ten (Trevor-Roper 120). By the fifteenth century, the
 
doge
 had been reduced to a mere figurehead: ""seven doges had been assassi ­
nated, nine had been blinded and exiled, twelve had abdicated, one had been
 sentenced to death and beheaded, two had been deposed. But after that... all
 is peace in the republic” (108, 118). In the sixteenth century, a constitutional
 amendment restricted the authority of the Council of Ten, but the role of the
 Doge remained 
largely
 ceremonial. Unlike the Venetian Council of Ten, Eng ­
land’s late-Elizabethan privy council of ten was dealing with no mere figure
­head. The monarch reigned supreme and, along with her 
councilors,
 formed  
the center of government; Parliament played an advisory role and was called
 upon 
to
 levy taxes and grant subsidies (Epstein 3). The queen maintained a  
tacitly symbiotic relationship with her governing 
elite
 to address public griev ­
ances and contain civic tensions; solidarity of the 
elite
 was ""key to political sta ­
bility
 
in the 1590s” (Guy 10). Like Venice, the government of the corporation  
of London was oligarchic, its function to preserve 
law
 and order (Mackenney  
235). According to Archer, ""Executive power lay with the court of (26) aider
­men,” 24 of whom belonged to the Merchant Adventurers’ Company and held
 considerable judicial power, interpreting the constitution to their advantage and
 governing the city for their own profit (18). Not to 
be
 outdone, assize judges  
sat alongside privy 
councilors
 and remolded criminal law to punish offenses  
against private property as public crimes (Guy 10). 
As
 the establishment felt  
itself ""increasingly beleaguered” by plebeian forces, it ""considered intolerance to
 be a virtue and named it "justice”’ (Archer 18-19). If the queen was ""frugal in
 her distribution of knighthoods,” she was downright stingy in the creation of
 new 
peerages,
 granting fewer titles than either her father or her successor  
(Stone 97). At a
 
time of rapid changes in  landownership, her conservatism  pre ­
dictably created ""an ever-widening breach between title and status on the 
one hand and power and wealth on the other” (98). Even when mortality thinned
 the ranks of the privy council to fewer than half its original members, she
 refused to replace them (Guy 4). Paul E. J. Hammer proposes that the queen
 feared being dictated by her male subjects; unable to dominate them in the
 fashion of a king, she hence "chose to divide and rule” (77). At the same time,
 she did not tolerate divisive politics by her courtiers or members of the privy
 council, as Essex 
came
 to find out.
Although Portia and Shylock may seem to inhabit different worlds, they
 share dangerous common ground after all: both lack
 
political power. In patri ­
archal Venice, where government, law, religion, and business deny her partici
­pation as a citizen, the 
heiress
 is as vulnerable as the alien. Portia inherited her  
father’s estate by default, not right, and the existence of a brother would have
 nixed her
 
good fortune. Considering  her narrow  choices, it  is difficult  to blame  
43
Editors: Vol. 4, no. 1 (1999): Full Issue
Published by eGrove, 2020
Anne M. Gogela 37
Portia
 
for taking  care of herself in a world where every institution  is against her,  
where she is referred to as a “golden fleece,” and where her husband puts a
 wager of 1,000 ducats on their first male 
child.
 Tempting though it may be for  
twentieth-century audiences to cheer Portia’s subversive resourcefulness, Jean
 Howard cautions that Portia’s role on the Elizabethan stage merely served to
 perpetuate the silent assumption that women are “universally prone to decep
­tion and impersonation” (60-1). While
 
this leaves Portia in a dilemma, it makes  
the result of her actions no less disturbing. By choosing injustice over disrup
­tive change, she is guilty of feeding the very system she aims to subvert. Por
­tia carefully weighs her opportunity costs, forces Shylock to sell 
his
 soul, yet  
makes a cozy deal to keep hers: “How little
 
is the cost I have  bestowed / In pur ­
chasing the semblance of my 
soul
” (3.4.19-20). Firmly entrenched at Belmont  
and insisting on her upper-class privilege, the heiress washes herself of hard-
 won bargains and “well-won thrift.” Gross observes that “[t]he most solid
 money in
 
the  play is Portia’s. It is old  money, clean  money”; nevertheless, some ­
body must have 
amassed
 the family fortune, if not her “ever-virtuous father,”  
then perhaps 
one
 of his less virtuous forebears (50). Portia likes to reap the  
benefits of trade but is a reluctant capitalist who refuses to share the exchange
 with 
anyone
 else. Unable to fathom a world where all players may pursue their  
own economic interests, unimpeded in their trade, and where their choices lead
 to the best outcome for society as a whole, Portia keeps a cool eye on her own
 interests by preventing others from rising above their station. Alas, her hand in
 Venetian affairs could not be more visible — nor detrimental. Shylock and
 Antonio may seem like small fish in the canal, but they form crucial economic
 links: Venice 
needs
 merchants and moneylenders. At worst, Shylock’s crippled  
capacity to finance struggling entrepreneurs such as Antonio could destroy
 both. At
 
best, it will shift supply and demand, boost inflation, and spawn pub ­
lic unrest. Rather than allow and encourage risk-takers to succeed in their
 trade, Portia’s contract with Venice is bound to harm every member in the eco
­nomic chain — including her own class, which utterly depends on revenue. In
 spite of herself, she creates the perfect conditions for a major economic crisis
 leading to social upheaval that will tip the scales of political power. But Portia
 cannot prevent the evolution of commercial markets, which, set in motion, will
 continue to expand and threaten the established order. Even those who cheat
 shamelessly are bit players in a larger scheme of commerce where the Shylocks
 and the
 
Antonios can only temporarily be stripped of their  resources. From the  
standpoint of the late twentieth century, as corporate 
mergers
 and downsizing  
raise new questions about the ethics of discarding human potential, Shake
­speare’s The Merchant of Venice offers insightful commentary on Renaissance
 worldviews and enduring conflicts between economics and 
ethics.
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textualities on two levels: one,  
in the temperament of its collaborative authorship;
 and two, in its engagement of what I will call interi
­or tropes of activism.1 This is a shocking statement,
 especially considering the well-documented sexism of
 Autobiography's subject, Malcolm X,2 which at the
 very best
 
reflects immaturity and his untimely death,3  
and which at worst reflects 
his
 participation in the  
maintenance of a system of gender oppression that
 undermined his own revolutionary practice. Cultural
 criticism of Autobiography rarely anticipates connec
­tions between the text and Black women
'
s political  
realities; thus, this essay operates on a leap of
 
faith,  
and its central aim is to contribute to a re-figuration
 of how Autobiography is read, understood, and
 engaged. It argues that Autobiography is inflected
 with and earns from the contributions Black women
 have made to Black resistance and living. As a leap
 of faith, it asks, even invites, the reader momentarily
 to . suspend familiar critical readings of 
 
Autobiography  
for the possibility of engaging an/other under
­explored textuality that I believe firmly undergirds




 to use Autobiography as my text of cri ­
tique may raise concern 
because
 the text has been  
long understood as unreliable, heavily constructed,
 and controversial. Malcolm's most noted biographer,
 Bruce Perry, for example, argues that the transforma
­tions in his life were not nearly as dramatic as por
­trayed in Autobiographyy and that the text is largely
48





 be correct, but it  is equally true that the convention of  
autobiography itself depends on dramatization and exaggeration.
In using Autobiography, I 
am
 working  with a text that has many gaps, that  
is. neither highly reliable nor comprehensive. Yet it serves my purposes here
 well, because even in its indeterminacy, ambiguity, and playfulness, it is still the
 most stable and referential signifier of Malcolm as a cultural sign. It is, quite
 honestly and somewhat unfortunately, the work by
 
which most people “know”  
Malcolm, and therefore it is worthy of attention. Furthermore, the text is a
 “lieu de memoire,” a literal 
site
 of memory in African-American historical,  





s Beloved, Autobiography has and is a life of its own, a life that is timely and  
timeless, extending beyond its writer(s), subjects, or moment. The text is not
 only a cultural commodity but, literally, an icon.5 For these reasons, I will
 largely refer to Autobiography itself as my
 
subject, and where direct references to  
Malcolm offer greater elegance, I still refer to the persona of Malcolm as pre
­sented by this text.
Autobiography, Collaboration, and Girlfriends on a Sitting Porch
One way that Black feminist textualities manifest themselves in Autobiography
 
is via the particular form of the narrative — an autobiography written as a col
­laboration — and the dynamic coupling that the text facilitates between (even
 demands of) Malcolm X and Alex Haley. Noted scholars of the genre have
 successfully argued that it is inventive, is a making of a self as much as the pre
­sentation of a made self.6 An autobiographical text is, according to Albert
 Stone, overdetermined, for it is an “occasion,... [a] performance” (164), or an
 occasion to
 
and for performance. Autobiography, then, holds the potential to be  
transgressive, especially in its invitation to 
play




this play, Julia Swindells notes, is the genre’s mediation “between  
subject and author” (1), a mediation through which autobiography confers a
 mask.8 This autobiographical mediation is often textually embodied in 
one person or persona, with the mask
 
as a layer over the body  of the author-subject.  
Yet with Autobiography, a collaboration between Haley and Malcolm, the
 masked persona is not readily attributable to either collaborator. The collabo
­rative relationship here heightens the genre’s performative and ludic qualities.
 Hence, Swindells’ suggestion of a mediation between subject and author liter
­ally and materially exists and is manifested in the negotiations between Mal
­colm’s self and (public) persona and Haley’s self and (public) persona. This
 negotiation is phenomenal, especially considering the contemporary public pro
­files of both men. Albert-Stone, who has most thoroughly explored collabora
­tive autobiographies, argues that the resultant text of collaboration exists in a
 place “in-between two minds” and
 
is a blurring of the autobiographical process ­
es of
 
self-authentication and self-identification, because the “self” in question  
is not materially singular (154-5). In fact, it is hard to name definitively all the
 bodies that constitute this particular collaborative negotiation: Malcolm’s and
49
Editors: Vol. 4, no. 1 (1999): Full Issue
Published by eGrove, 2020
Kevin Everod Quashie 43
Alex’s public personae, their private, personal, non-public selves, and, most sig
­
nificantly, the persona of the text that they create but 
do
 not ultimately or  
entirely control. These various personae participate in the negotiation of the
 text: Malcolm tells Alex that “[n]othing can be in this book’s manuscript that
 I didn’t say and nothing can be left out that I want 
in
” (387), which seemingly  
declares Autobiography to 
be
 Malcolm’s text. But, as Stone points out, “Haley  
won an equally significant concession: ‘I asked 
for
 — and he gave — his per ­
mission that at the end of the book I could write comments of my own about
 him which would not be subject to his review’” (Stone 160). Negotiations like
 these, so evident under
 
Autobiography's surfaces, lead Stone correctly to reject  
Malcolm’s assertion that “a writer is
 
what I want, not an interpreter” (456), call­
ing the distinction “illusory” (A. Stone 160).
Stone’s comments are in reference to passages from the Epilogue written by
 
Haley after Malcolm’s death. The Epilogue is the most revelatory section of
 Autobiography but is also deceptive 
because
 it aims to put a face on the writer,  
Haley, and thereby to maintain the authenticity of the text’s singular voice.
 Readers are encouraged to think of Malcolm’s voice as prominent and distinct
 (and distinguishable) from Haley’s, and also to attribute the shifts in textual
 voice exclusively to Malcolm’s maturation, to his growing pains. As John Edgar
 Wideman argues, “the peculiar absence of [certain] . . . narrative strategies . . .
 presents a ‘talking head,’ first-person narration recorded from the fixed per­spective of a single 
video
 camera” (104). What Haley achieves is a deception,  
with “little fuss . . . [and] a quiet mastery of the medium,” that allows him to
 disappear as author, to be seamlessly 
self-effaced
 from the text (104, 106).
The Epilogue, as Wideman notes, introduces “the process of constructing
 the book . . . [and] the relationship between writer and subject” (105). In 
one way, the Epilogue reminds us that the text is a
 
collaboration and  thus confounds  
the gesture of singularity that is so central to an autobiography’s veracity and
 power; still, the Epilogue affirms that singularity 
by
 assuring the reader that,  
except for these 74 pages, the rest of the text is brother
 
Malcolm’s. In this way,  
the Epilogue is an indeterminate, multiple textuality and. in its indeterminacy
 perhaps best represents the
 
playful and roaming quality of Malcolm’s and Alex’s  
collaborative voice.
It is in this voice, a voice that characterizes the dynamic and collaborative
 
relationship between Malcolm and Alex, that a Black feminist textuality
 emerges. On the basis of this collaboration, I want to read Malcolm and 
Alex as two men engaging a Black feminist and womanist practice of sharing, talk
­ing, and creating story, like girlfriends on a sitting porch,9 
like
 Pheoby and  
Janie in Zora Neale Hurston’s Their Eyes Were Watching God. I am using the
 term “girlfriends” in order to invoke a signal trope in Black
 
women’s writings:  
particular and material friendships that exist between women and that hint at
 a larger tradition of being girls with and for 
each
 other. This model of friend ­
ship foregrounds issues of self and other in a dialectic where 
each
 woman iden ­
tifies with and as the other. The identification is a loving, dynamic process of
 political, psychic, and physical engagement and urgency.10 There is evidence in
 Autobiography that the relationship between 
Alex
 and Malcolm was like this:  
dynamic, volatile, a collaboration as a journey of love, with each man becoming
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more intimately committed to the others life. Autobiography is created in a
 
space of earned mutuality in which two men learn from 
each
 other and shape  
their actions and 
needs
 in relation to the other. Theirs is, as Stone writes, an  
intricate interaction . . . [in which] Malcolm’s passionate desire to historicize
 his existence ... is not bypassed but actually sharpened by Haley’s psychologi
­cal probings” (161).
I am claiming this relationship as Black feminist 
because
 images of the par ­
ticular camaraderie I am describing are especially prevalent in the works of
 Black women. In offering this reading, I am suggesting that there are strong
 resonances of Black women’s cultural and political productions readily accessi
­ble in Black traditions. These resonances are often unattributed specifically to
 Black women and hence engaged without conscious intent of "acting in a Black
 woman way.” It is possible, then, that two men such as Alex and Malcolm
 could engage a trope of Black feminism — girlfriending each other — that
 
they  
encountered in and adapted from Black culture in 
general.This claim requir s a
 
bit of explanation, and is made clearer  in Alice Walk ­
er’s essay, "In Search of Our Mothers’ Gardens,” which explores the seeming
 invisibility of Black women’s artistry in spite of other evidence of their talents.
 Walker argues that, historically, Black women were "artist[s] who left [their]
 mark in the only materials [they] 
could
 afford” and, "more often than not  
anonymously, handed on the creative spark, the seed of the flower they them
­selves never hoped to see: or 
like
 a sealed letter they could not plainly read”  
(238,
 
239). Walker notes the anonymity that is inherent in Black women’s cre­
ative processes, where proper acknowledgment for either process or product is
 rarely made or
 
even possible.11 And yet the  impact of these processes and prod ­
ucts, and hence of Black
 
women as cultural producers, is undeniable: in talk ­
ing about her mother’s garden work, Walker writes,
Whatever she planted grew as if by magic, and her fame as a grower of
 
flowers spread over three counties. Because of her creativity with her flow
­ers, even my memories of poverty are seen through a screen of blooms. . . .
 
She
 has handed down respect for the possibilities — and the will to grasp  
them. . . . For her, so hindered and intruded upon in so many ways, being
 an artist has still been a daily part of her life. This ability to hold on, even
 in very simple ways, is work black
 
women have done for a very long time.  
(241-2)
Walker’s mother, a woman "who literally covered the holes in our walls with
 
sunflowers” (242), is a consummate artist, 
one
 whose response to living in  
oppressed conditions is to hold on and to create. Hers is a creative apolit
­ical response, one that Walker identifies as a
 
womanist  way of living.
The quiet quality that Walker identifies in her mother’s (and other Black
 women’s) production partly contributes to the invisibility that production
 
has in  
public spaces. The creative process is interiorized yet yields exterior and pub
­lic results. Walker describes the creativity as "that muzzled and often mutilat
­ed, but vibrant, creative spirit that the black woman has inherited, and that
 pops out in wild and unlikely places to this day” (239). Coupled with the char
­
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acteristic quietness is the 
largely
 unassuming way in which this tradition of cre ­
ation is passed from Black woman to Black children, female and male. Walker
 explains that
no song or poem will bear 
my
 mother’s name. Yet so many of the stories  
that I write, that
 we
 all write, are my mother’s stories. Only recently did I  
fully realize this: that through years of listening to my mother’s stories of
 her life, I have absorbed not only the stories themselves, but something of
 the manner in
 
which she spoke, something of the urgency that involves the  
knowledge that her stories — like her — must be recorded. (240)
These stories, which came from her
 
mother’s “lips as naturally as breathing,” are  
fairly common gestures of survival and liberation that are part of the immense
 contribution of Black women to their communities and to history. Walker’s use
 of “absorb” reflects the unassuming 
way
 in which this transfer of ideology  
occurs, and she emphasizes that it was not just the stories but also the “manner”
 that was transmitted to her; not just the “what” but also the “how” of it. Walk
­er’s exploration of her mother’s garden offers a framework for understanding
 some of
 
the dynamics of the textual and ideological contributions that Black  
women make to Black culture. Ironically, while this pooling of Black cultural
 resources makes Black women’s contributions widely accessible, it also serves
 symbolically to separate Black
 
women from their contributions: that is, while  
Black women’s work and thoughts are highly influential in public spaces, it is
 mostly Black male voices and bodies that are rendered visible in those same
 spaces 
(for
 example, in “the Black Church” or the Civil Rights Movement).  
Hence, Black women’s ideological presence in Black culture often manifests
 itself in hidden or submerged textualities. My argument, then, engages this
 notion of an abundant pool of Black women’s cultural and political contribu
­tions — a reservoir that is Black public domain and can be accessed sub- and
 unconsciously — to assert the influence of Black women’s “gardens” on the
 rhetorical designs of Autobiography, most specifically in the relationship
 between
 
Alex and Malcolm. In fact, Haley is noted for a  predisposition toward  
Black women’s culture, having grown up in the company of
 his
 grandmother  
and other women, and for a gift of and interest in inhabiting a persona.12
The relationship between Alex and Malcolm is a striking one: these two
 
Black men were public figures in their own right, 
each
 significantly different  
from the other in politics and interests. Yet their task, the production of a text,
 necessitated a coming together, so that 
each
 man had to become interested in  
the other. “Who is this man, this man Malcolm,” Haley must have asked,
 
with  
a piqued and imaginative heart still beating from their Playboy interview a few
 years earlier. Considering Malcolm’s deep interest in Black people, he must
 also have wondered, “This man, the one who writes for Readers Digest and
 Playboy, who is he?” Historically, not much has been made of the relationship
 between the 
two
 men: Perry’s Malcolm: The  Life of a  Man Who Changed Black  
America fails to address the nature of their relationship, while Mary Seibert
 McCauley’s Alex Haley, A Southern Griot: A Literary Biography summarizes the
 plot of Autobiography without discussing the relationship between her subject
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and Malcolm. Such oversights are in fact very common. Most of the reviews
 
Autobiography and later interviews with Haley give the collaboration moder
­
ate
 treatment at best. The oversight is best represented by  I. F. Stone’s lengthy  
review Qi Autobiography
 
for the New  York Review of  Books’, his only comment on  
Haley reads, “From tape-recorded conversations, a Negro writer, Alex Haley,
 put together the Autobiography;
 
he did his job with sensitivity and devotion” (4).  
The outstanding exception of the twenty
 
reviews I read is  Truman Nelson 's for  
The Nation,
 
which acknowledges the import and revelatory quality of Autobiog ­
raphy's Epilogue. Additionally, biographical pieces on Haley tend to privilege
 his
 
work on  Roots; in fact, Haley was not acknowledged on the cover of the first  
edition of Autobiography, for though he
 
was a writer of some repute, he  was not  
the public figure that Malcolm was at the time of the text’s publication.13
The relationship between
 
Alex and  Malcolm began when  Alex interviewed  
Malcolm for Playboy magazine in 1962. Prior to that interview, Haley was lit
­tle more than a struggling writer. He had been 
assigned
 to a specially created  
journalist post while in service with the Coast Guard, where he wrote sea sto
­ries and had a few small publishing successes. In 1959, upon retiring from the
 Guard, Haley started freelancing 
his
 essays and in early 1962 scored big with  
an interview of jazz great Miles Davis for Playboy, a piece that led to the Mal
­colm X interview a few months later. An editor at Doubleday, having read the
 interview, approached Haley about writing a book on Malcolm, and though
 Malcolm was initially reluctant, he changed 
his
 mind two days later. After get ­
ting the blessing and approval of the Honorable Elijah Muhammad, Malcolm
 and Alex agreed to terms — Malcolm noting that the book would be dedicat
­ed to Muhammad and all funds would go to the Nation of Islam, while outlin
­ing what time he 
could
 commit. These negotiations and the first few interview  
sessions
 were 
businesslike, dispassionate, even as both men were dazzled by and  
anxious about 
each
 other. In spite of the absence of critical attention to their  
relationship, it is clear that the two men did develop a relationship with each
 other; this relationship would be a critical one, for it cemented Malcolm’s lega
­cy as a historical 
figure
 and catapulted Alex to the ranks of major American  
writers.
The nature and quality
 
of this relationship,  both  in what  is presented in the  
(literal) margins of the text and in what I can actively and reasonably imagine,
 calls to mind two sisterfriends on the porch, sharing and
 
weaving the magic of  
story, the 
way
 Black women talk with each other as girlfriends. The production  
of the text necessitated a kind of trust and love and tenderness between these
 two men that is not commonly imagined or
 
represented in interactions between  
heterosexual Black
 
men. At one point in the text, Malcolm comments on trust  
and gender in a way that bears significance here:
I [Haley] somehow raised the subject of women. Suddenly, between sips of
 
coffee and further scribbling and doodling, he vented his criticisms and
 skepticisms of
 
women. “You never can fully trust any woman,” he said.  
“I’ve got the only one I ever met whom I would trust seventy-five per cent.
 ... I don’t completely trust anyone,” he went on, “not even myself. I have
 seen too many men destroy themselves. . . . You I trust about twenty-five
 percent.” (389)
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The small amount of trust he initially ascribes to Haley develops into a sweet
 
relationship that Haley later describes as a “mutual camaraderie that, although
 it
 
was never verbally expressed, was a warm one” (399). In fact, Malcolm later  
revises 
his
 assessment of Haley, cementing their (unarticulated) brothership:
One call that I [Haley] 
never 
will forget came at close to four A.M., wak ­
ing me; he must have just gotten up in Los Angeles. His voice said, “
Alex Haley?” I said, sleepily, “Yes? Oh, hey, Malcolm!” His voice said, “I trust  you seventy per cent” — and then he hung up. I lay a short time thinking
 about him and I went back to sleep feeling warmed by that call, as I still am
 warmed to remember 
it.
 Neither of us ever mentioned it. (400)
This warmth, as Haley repeatedly describes it, is the sharing of story, and like
 
Betty Shabazz’s speeches and books that have served to remember and memo
­rialize her husband, Haley’s Epilogue serves to remember and celebrate a man
 he knew and loved. And Haley did love him, learned to love and admire him
 not only as a public figure — the Malcolm who was 
an
 icon of Black national ­
ist power for Black America, or the face of fear for so much of white America
 — but especially as Malcolm, a brother man sitting across the way, or on the
 other end of the telephone, whose precious steps toward liberation
 
were  warm ­
ing, scary, funny ... and a mirror to Haley’s own living. 
As
 Malcolm’s love and  
trust for Haley grew, 
one
 can be sure that Haley’s love and trust for Malcolm  
also grew. The successful co-authorship is reflective of a Black feminist aspect
 of the text; it is the product of one Black man 
loving
 and talking with anoth ­
er, developing a trust that matches the trust (and mistrust) he had of his own
 wife.
The presence of this Black feminist textuality is not uncomplicated, for it
 
exists alongside Malcolm’s comments on trust and gender, which vividly reflect
 his and perhaps Alex’s sexism, and it partially results in the limited representa
­tion of Betty in
 
the text. In fact, this situation is emblematic of how Black fem ­
inist textualities manifest themselves in Autobiography: as if corroborating
 Walker’s account of the invisibility of Black women’s cultural contributions, the
 presence of Black feminist 
gestures
 in the text often coincides  with and runs up  
against manifestations of sexism that serve to erase and violate the gestures
 themselves. A central example of this tendency can be seen in the text’s depic
­tion of Malcolm’s mother, Louise Little, and in the function she serves in the
 development of the relationship between Malcolm and Haley. In the epilogue,
 Haley tells us that a previously
 
hesitant and uncooperative Malcolm unexpect ­
edly opened up when asked about his mother:
Then one night, Malcolm X arrived nearly out on
 his
 feet from fatigue. For  
two hours, he paced the floor delivering a tirade against Negro leaders who
 were attacking Elijah
 
Muhammad and himself. I don’t know what  gave me  
the inspiration to say once when he paused for breath, “I wonder if you’d
 tell me something about your mother?”
Abruptly he quit pacing, and the
 
look he shot at  me made me sense that  
somehow the chance question had hit him. When I look back at it now, I
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believe I must have caught him so physically weak that his defenses were
 
vulnerable.




over the stove, trying to stretch whatever we had to eat.  
We stayed so hungry that we were dizzy. I remember the color of dresses
  she used to wear — they were a kind of faded-out gray. . . And he kept
 on talking until dawn, so tired that the big feet would often almost stum
­ble in their pacing. From this stream-of-consciousness reminiscing, I final
­
ly
 got out of  him the foundation for this book’s beginning chapters. . . .  
After that night, he never again hesitated to tell
 
me even the most intimate  
details of his personal life . . . (390)
This moment is crucial because it introduces Louise Little’s politics of survival
 
as resonant in Malcolm’s memory and perhaps influential in his own political
 development, but also because it is this memory that triggers the sharing that
 cemented a dynamic collaborative relationship between Haley and Malcolm.
 In one way, the text that we have is 
largely
 the result of Malcolm’s memory of  
his mother, since it is she who facilitates the relationship between her son and  
Haley. Malcolm later on realizes the power of this memory and its influence
 on his politics:




had closed about our  mother. I simply didn’t feel the prob ­
lem [his mother’s being in a mental hospital] could be solved, so I had to
 shut it
 
out. I had built up subconscious defenses. The white man does this.  
He shuts out of his mind, and he builds up subconscious defenses against
 anything he doesn’t
 
want to face up to. I’ve just become aware how closed  
my mind was now that I’ve opened it up again. That’s 
one
 of the charac ­
teristics I don’t like about myself. If I meet a problem I feel I can’t solve, I
 shut it out. I make believe that it doesn’t exist. But it exists.” (393)
What is most stunning about all this is the indelible presence Louise Little has
 
in Autobiography and her simultaneous absence from many parts of the text.
 Her influence is far-reaching: the text later narrates Malcolm’s efforts with his
 siblings to remove his mother from a mental institution as another signal
 moment in his life; moreover, during Malcolm’s outrageous “harlemite” days,
 “[t]he only thing that brought [him] down to earth was the visit to the state
 hospital” where 
his
 mother was (79). One wonders if the picture we do get of  
Louise Little, marginal as it is, is not further evidence of the collaborative
 nature of the text, especially considering Haley’s interest in women and their
 influence on the lives of the children they raise; it seems that Haley teases out
 this memory via his questions to Malcolm. Still, it is ironic at best, and damn
­ing at worst, that Louise Little’s contributions to Alex’s and Malcolm’s textual
 reverie become a barely present backdrop in the landscape that is Autobiogra
­phy.14




’s proclamation of the revolutionary potential in Black men loving  
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each other,15 then the liberation of this revolutionary act is undercut by what is
 
presumably the merged and perhaps subconscious sexism of the Haley-Mal
­colm collaboration. Their homosocial connection, because it lacks a commit
­ment to feminist practice, also serves to affirm sexism, particularly the erasure
 of women from textual spaces that they,
 
women, help to make possible. This is  
one of the tensions of Autobiography.
I would argue that it is in (or because of) the volatile 
play
 of making this  
autobiography that some of the hidden textualities of Black feminism surface.
 In the merging of Alex’s voice with Malcolm’s; in the revealing of previously
 untold secrets — wishes, fears, longings, revealed layer by layer as 
sweet
 furtive ­
ness; in the coming together that makes closene s a dangerous but inevitable
 thing, each man eventually whispering “you mine, you mine” 
like
 characters in  
Beloved; in the voyeurism where each man’s wanting to look in on another Black
 man’s public living becomes 
his
 wanting to become that other living — in all of  
this we see pieces of the made-up, written-down journey that becomes Autobi
­ography. Within the dynamic of self-making and collaboration is a third space,
 where yet other voices exist and can be heard, including Black feminist textu
­alities . . . and where we confront the unbelievable truth that part of what is
 appealing about Autobiography is rooted in Black women’s ways of living.
Journey, Activism, and Interiority
Bearing in mind that 
any
 comment about the content of Autobiography is  
informed by this collaborative dynamic, I want to explore the formulation of a
 self’s journey that the narrative foregrounds. Malcolm X’s status as an African-
 American cultural icon is determined largely by his autobiography’s engage
­ment of personal self as the location of public political rhetoric. The narrative
 creates a persona that is public
 
but that also possesses an unusual sense of being  
real and common, familiar and unsettled. This sense of realness enhanced Mal
­colm’s appeal during his life and is the source of 
his
 posthumous persistence as  
a folk hero, including his cultural resurgence in the 90s. In her essay, “Sitting
 at the Feet of the Messenger: Remembering Malcolm
 
X,” bell hooks describes  
this realness as Malcolm’s power to engage 
his
 readers/audience through his  
own committed and personal engagement with issues of racial self-love: “His
 awakening to critical consciousness . . . stimulated our awakening. As readers
 we witnessed
 
his struggles to throw off the yoke of racism, following him through  
various stages of self-recovery. . . . Most readers of The Autobiography are moved
 by his quest for self-realization” (Yearning 79; emphasis added). Like many
 readers, hooks identifies Autobiography's presentation of Malcolm as open
­
ly
 struggling, an openness that is often uncharacteristic of leaders of such  
prominence.
The “quest for self-realization” that hooks describes is commonly the sub
­
ject of autobiography, a genre that
 
frequently dramatizes an individual’s journey  
to a point of completion. But Malcolm’s autobiography resists a trajectory of
 completion. Paul John Eakin asserts that the text undercuts the construct of
 the “autobiographical fiction of the completed self” (156),16 highlighting a
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familiar claim of critical discourse about Malcolm X: that he was a person
 
whose life and politics resisted easy, codification. Even in the face of attempts
 to define his positions narrowly — including the well-known CBS news story
 “The Hate that Hate Produced”
 
— Malcolm 's life retained an elusive quality.17  
This elusiveness, central to the rhetorical success and social popularity of
 
his  
autobiography, is manifested as a negotiation of multiplicity
 
and fragmentation,  
a manifestation that I interpret as evidence of another borrowing from Black
 feminist contributions to political paradigms.
The specific contributions of Black women to the Black emancipatory tra
­
ditions I want to explore here can be cumulatively termed interior tropes of
 activism. I want to be quite clear that I 
am
 not suggesting that Black womens  
only contributions to liberation ideology involve the interior. In 
fact,
 I think it  
is more accurate to suggest that Black feminisms have proposed that the inte
­rior and exterior be merged in the struggle for self-decolonization and libera
­tion, that they are mutually supportive of 
each
 other, are necessary counterparts.  
Neither does this merged interior and exterior landscape, dynamic, and multi
­ple in itself, foreclose a sense of the specific 
experience
 of interiority as distinct  
from exteriority. The result, then, is a radical and multivalent reformulation of
 the self, with an abundance of surfaces (as in a diamond18) on which acts of
 decolonization can occur.
Significantly, Black women activists have helped to reconceptualize libera
­
tion as a highly
 
personal process.19 Personal transformation, writers such as  
Patricia Hill Collins,
 
Audre Lorde, and Angela  Davis tell us, is not only a vehi ­
cle that facilitates (mass) liberation; it is also liberation itself.20 In the foreword
 to Body & Soul: The Black Womans Guide to
 
Physical Health and Emotional Well-  
Being, Davis and June Jordan offer a comment that highlights this view of lib ­
eration:




problems that have always been taboo. This means we must  
go beyond the Civil Rights framework that privileges men over women and
 the public sphere over the private, (xi)
It was Farah Jasmine Griffin, in
 
her essay “Textual Healing,” who reminded me  
of Davis’s and Jordan’s foreword; in fact, Griffin offers an insightful reading of
 this passage. “Note the movement,” she writes,
from individual bodies to psyches to communities. The imagined black
 
woman reader posited in this foreword is one who sees herself as part of a
 community in struggle. Davis and Jordan encourage readers to challenge
 the sexism that causes them to believe that issues of emotional and physi
­cal well-being are “private” and therefore not political. According to Davis
 and Jordan, attention to the taboo, to the private, leads to radical redefini
­tion of wellness and health. (523)
Griffin, along with Davis,
 
Jordan, and others, is working to reconsider libera ­
tion as multifaceted, so as to acknowledge and engage the various levels of indi-
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working to suggest the fusion of these locales of liberation. This mul ­
tivalent liberation construct is particular to writings by contemporary Black
 women and is evident historically in Black women's cultural responses and liv
­ing: the blues of Nina Simone, the actions of Sojourner Truth, the stories and
 garden of Walker’s mother. In her essay, “Slave Codes and Liner Notes,”
 Michelle 
Russell
 helps to make this point clear in relation to blues singer  
Simone: “In the 1960s, Nina Simone used her music to revive our roots, to
 internationalize the terms of our self-determination, and to develop the cultur
­al dimension of armed struggle” (136). While Simone’s songs, including
 “Washerwoman Blues” and “One More Sunday in Savannah,” “cultivated our
 folk memory,” they also challenged common ways of perceiving spheres of
 influence as binaries (private and public, individual and collective, personal and
 political). Like Billie Holiday singing “Strange Fruit” or Sojourner Truth bar
­ing her upper arm before the women’s convention in Akron, Ohio, Simone’s
 words refuse to privilege any one sphere or act of liberation, and instead sug
­gest 
responses
 that are specific and multiple, particular and communal.
This 
view
 of liberation is significant because it is an alternative to con ­
structions that
 
dominate Black male contributions to liberation  ideology. In his  
“Introduction” to Reading Black, Reading Feminist, Henry Louis Gates, Jr. hints
 at some of these differences between Black masculine and Black feminine con
­ceptions of the world. He argues that Black feminists have “never been
 obsessed with arriving at any singular self-image; or legislating who may or may
 not speak on the subject. . . . [R]ather than attempt to construct a monolith of
 "the’ black woman’s experience, black feminists have sought to chart the multi
­plicity
 
of experiences and perspectives” (8). Gates, in summarizing a point that  
Black women have articulated many times before, quotes Mary Helen Wash
­ington, in particular, to hone his comment; of the Black
 
feminist literary  tradi ­
tion, Washington argues,




 there are no women dismembering the bodies or  
crushing the skulls of either women or men; and few, if any, women in the
 literature of black women succeed in heroic quests without the support of
 other women or men in their communities. Women talk to other women
 in this tradition. (Quoted in Gates 7)
Washington here is signifying on Ralph Ellison, Richard Wright, and other
 
Black male writers who seemed primarily to be locked in battles of selfhood
 (narrowly equated with manhood) with white America.
These contemporary literary distinctions are readily applicable to the larg
­
er world of Black liberation and cultural production. That
 
is, historically, Black  
women’s experiences and liberation theories — as represented in song, oratory,
 text, folklore, or the covering of holes in a wall with sunflowers — have served
 not only to refocus the attention of
 
liberation on the Black self (individually  
and communally) but also to permit and 
engage
 multiplicity in the identity for-  
mation/negotiation process. Situated at the invisibilizing intersection of race
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and gender — where “all the women are white and all the Blacks are men” —
 
Black women have formulated emancipatory trajectories that resist exclusion
 and monolithism (a good example being Walker’s articulation of “womanism”).
One impact of Black women’s contribution to liberation is the reclamation
 
of healing for the domain of revolution and decolonization.21 Contemporary
 critic bell hooks provides a useful comment: “decolonization refers to breaking
 with the ways our reality is defined and shaped by the dominant culture and
 asserting our understanding of. . . reality of our own experience. . . . Healing
 occurs through testimony through gathering together everything available to
 you and reconciling. . . . [H]ealing takes 
place
 within us as we speak the truth  
of ourselves” {Sisters 2, 17, 19). Here hooks describes a decolonization process
 that legitimizes self and healing. Decolonization as healing, she suggests,
 directs the mediating force of truth toward overcoming the implied and
 imposed fragmentation of self that is concomitant with oppression. This medi
­ation, a kind of “shifting,”
 
is often described  in Black narratives as a journey. In  
the context of Black feminist emphases on the value of interior landscapes in
 revolutionary processes, then, the journey is in part a medi(t)ation, an interior
 travel.
Meditation and mediation are integral parts of the journey trope in Black
 
narrative. In Black women activists’ records of
 
their experiences, the journey  
has been redefined to account for what Patricia Hill Collins calls “the interior
 space of activism” (Black Feminist
 
Thought 142). In this redefinition, “interior”  
and “exterior” activism are at the same time distinct and merged spheres, like
 contiguous surfaces that also partially overlap, creating a third space. Again, I
 am not suggesting that Black women have engaged activism only on interior
 self-scapes. In 
fact,
 Black women from Celia, the slave who until recently was  
the last woman executed in Florida (1746, for helping to set the master’s house
 on fire), to Sojourner Truth, Maria Stewart, Ida B. Wells-Barnett, Fannie Lou
 Hamer, Angela Davis, and Maxine Waters have historically been “exterior” or
 public activists. The binary of private and public does not work as a descrip
­tion of the experiences or theoretical formualtions of Black women, whose lives
 are both invisible and hypervisible.22 What I am asserting here is a claim that
 Davis herself makes: 
because
 of manifestations of class, gender and race, what  
our 
society 
knows of Black women —  what has been published or documented  
or permitted to become “public” and part of the record of official histories — is
 often only a small representation of what Black women are thinking, feeling,
 and doing on the inside.23 Alice
 
Walker makes a parallel claim in her essay on 
her mother. Black women’s emphasis, whatever the impetus, on the interior as
 a creative and productive space has radical implications for liberation politics,
 for it resists patriarchical overemphasis on the exterior and the public by com
­plicating the spheres of influence, and it also introduces healing into the
 rhetoric of liberation. The Black feminist liberation
 
ideologies that I am speak ­
ing of
 
here construct the journey as a radical, shifting, dynamic process, one  
that offers many possibilites for liberation. It is not a journey with a mythic
 end, a singular hero, and a mass of followers. Instead, this journey conceptual
­izes change as always possible, always imminent, and always changing,
Collins, in Black
 
Feminist Thought, articulates the specificity of the journey  
trope in Black feminine expression:
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While the theme of the journey also appears in the work of Black men,
 
African-American women writers and musicians explore this journey
 toward freedom in ways that are characteristically female. Black women’s
 journeys, though at times embracing political and social issues, basically
 take personal and psychological forms and rarely reflect the freedom of
 movement of Black men who hop “trains,” “hit the road,” or in other
 
ways  
physically travel in order to find that elusive sphere of freedom from racial
 oppression. Instead, Black womens journeys often involve “the transformation
 of silence into language and action." (105, citing Audre Lorde; emphasis
 added)
Not to be missed in Collins’s articulation is Lorde’s model of transforming
 
silence into action. Collins, Lorde, and others place considerable emphasis on
 the movement from silence, an 
experience
 that is especially acute among Black  
women, to articulation in text and action. The silence here is both literal and
 figurative (for example, think of Walker’s mother and her garden) and always
 exists alongside the particularly strong voice that most Black women literally
 and figuratively possess in Black and non-Black communities.24 Within this
 Black feminist journey construct, freedom, on one important level, is deter
­mined by the attainment and engagement of (literal and figurative) voice.
 Coming-to-voice is the achievement of consciousness and reveals possibilities
 for freedom; that is, “consciousness . .. [is] a sphere of freedom” (103) and self-
 knowledge is an instigator of change.25
In revising the
 
journey to liberation and citing healing as an essential ele­
ment of freedom from economic, social, and psychological oppression,26 Black
 feminists have asserted the personal not only as political and revolutionary
 
but  
also as theoretical. If healing is as much a personal concern of Black liberation
 as it is a collective 
one,
 then the personal is also in conversation  with the theo ­
retical (insofar as theory implies a collective quality). In effect, as Barbara
 Christian argues in her essay, “The Highs and 
Lows
 of Black Feminist Criti ­
cism,” Eurocentric models of thought that present and validate theory as
 removed and depersonalized fail to capture and reflect the lives of marginalized
 people; theory exists in dynamic relation to individual life ways and to the lan
­guages of people on the margins.27
Aspects of the journey as fashioned by Black
 
feminist cultural productions  
— specifically the personal self as a site of decolonizing change — form a
 framework of tropes of interiorization that aids one’s reading of Autobiography.
 The text calls to mind bell hooks’ mantra in Sisters of the Yams, “revolution
 begins in the self.”28 The collaborative presentation of Malcolm’s 
life
 in Auto ­
biography suggests that the personal is a political, philosophical, and revolu
­tionary rhetoric (in the sense that rhetoric is a process of constructing
 
meaning,  
identity, and context). This rhetoric destabilizes truth as unitary and mono
­lithic and argues that it is only
 
in negotiating truths through constant personal  
shifts — what Amiri Baraka described as “groping” and “stumbling” (33) —
 that liberation is possible. These personal changes or shifts become a central
 site of Autobiography's effectiveness, reemphasizing the notion of personal
 change as a mode of revolution.29
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The text narrates a journey through three tropes of interior activism: recla
­
mation of the body, negotiation of fragmented reality, and silence in/as
 activism.
The Body as a Knowing Place
In Black feminist
 
reclamation of the self as an epic and revolutionary landscape  
resides a concomitant reclamation of the body as a legitimate source of know
­ing. Historian and theorist Paula Giddings effectively explains the intricate
 damage that the Cartesian division and hierarchization of body and mind in
 Western
 
ideology perpetrate and perpetuate in the  lives of Black women in par ­
ticular, who are marked as “body” along both race and gender lines.30 Black
 feminist thought questions this presentation of body and mind as distinct and
 
separa
te. Instead, Black feminists such as Audre Lorde, who envisions the  
erotic as psychic and political power, present body and mind as mutually
 informing. Patricia
 
Williams reminds us of the political urgency of this recla ­
mation work, for it was a body-mind dichotomy that informed theories of will
 and anti-will in relation
 
to Black American slaves (219-20); that is, Blacks were  
viewed in white philosophical and
 
legal discourses as without will and therefore  
without agency. For these reasons, refuting a dichotomous construct of body





writers construct images of bodies as sites of knowing,  
starting as 
early
 as the 1800s, with religious leaders such as Jarena Lee and  
Rebecca Cox Jackson.32 Whole histories are written upon these bodies and  
must be engaged if liberation is to occur. The body, then, is a source of libera
­tion.33 In The Autobiography of Malcolm X, Malcolm’s physical body is repeat
­edly presented as a site of the
 
philosophical; his experience of transformation is  
in fact often written on his body, reinforcing the idea that the personal physi
­cal landscape is a site of ideology, philosophy, and hence of power. Examples
 include his tales of “conking” his hair; the description of the Muslim rules of
 eating; his ablution after his release from prison; 
his
 beard as a prominent fea ­
ture of his face after his return from Mecca (a change that is noted both in his
 narration and in the Epilogue); and his skin color, which he only minimally





 Malcolm’s physical self— his height, his hair and skin color, his  
gait, his bodily aura — often impressed itself upon others; for example, his abil
­ity to be soft in demeanor contradicted and challenged the “popular” image of
 him as hard, aggressive, and unapproachable.34
Malcolm’s personal, physical self becomes a site for political and philo
­
sophical rhetoric. At the end of the chapter titled “Homeboy” and an extensive
 narration of 
his
 experiences of conking, the text offers this comment:
[W]hen I [Malcolm] say all of this I’m talking first of all about myself —
 
because you can’t show me any Negro
 
who ever conked more faithfully than  
I did. I’m speaking from personal 
experience
 when I say of any  black man  
who conks today, or any white-wigged black woman, that if they gave the
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brains in their heads just half as much attention as they do their hair, they
 
would be a thousand times better off. (55)
Not
 
only is hair a political site but the text claims Malcolm’s personal experience  
as a political one. It presents Malcolm as unafraid
 
to engage his own self—  his  
body and 
his
 experiences — in this political statement. This is a quintessential  
characteristic of his text: it easily shifts between individual and communal,
 between the “personal” and the “political.”
In one of the central emotional moments of the text, when Malcolm’s
 
betrayal by the Nation of Islam and specifically Elijah Muhammad
 
is described,  
Autobiography articulates the crisis as a body-experience: “My [Malcolm’s] head
 felt like it was bleeding inside. I felt like my brain was damaged” (303). The
 words and metaphor
 
used  here are very much body-centered and are eerily sim ­
ilar to images of wounding and
 
other forms of bodily mutilation that Jarena  Lee  
and Rebecca Cox Jackson describe in their works.35 In using the 
physical
 as  
rhetorical construct, the text, like its Black feminist counterparts, asserts that
 the personal is political and also rhetorical. Furthermore, the conversion that
 is (re)presented in Autobiography occurs on psychic/spiritual/emotional, intel-
 lectual/mental, and physical levels, in an intersection of wounding and healing




parallel Black feminist claim at work here — the idea of Black  
women’s multiple sensibility. “Ella Surrey”36 in John Langston Gwaltney’s
 Drylongso says, “Black women have always had to live two lives, one for them
 and one for ourselves” (240). This comment highlights the potential for frag
­mentation that Collins describes: “Black women’s lives are a series of negotia
­tions that aim to reconcile the contradictions separating our own internally
 defined images of self as African-American women with our objectification as
 the Other” (Black Feminist Thought 94). The sense of a bifurcated (yet symbi
­otic) interior consciousness that addresses both internal and external “selves” is
 central to Black feminist thought and reality and is readily present in Gates’s
 argument cited above about Black women’s literature.37 Autobiography's use of
 the physical
 
as a  metaphor seems to engage  this duality of consciousness, for the  
physical is both personal 
(in
 that there are ways in which what is experienced  
physically is only knowable by the self) and public (via, for example, the body
 as political). The ways in which Malcolm’s personality often contradicted the
 expectations of others seem to reflect this intersection of personal and public
 physical selves. When change is written on the physical (on
 
the body), the body  
becomes both symbolic space and material/existential space, a literal body
 politic. This formulation of
 
the body reflects the negotiation of selves refer ­
enced in Collins’s comment on fragmentation and self-image.
The negotiation of fragmentation, necessary in part because of the separa
­
tion of interior self from exterior, is central
 
to decolonization. In the text,  Mal ­
colm’s philosophy 
encourages
 Black people to shift their gaze from an exterior  
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and white one to an interior Black one. The interior self of his philosophy
 
seems to have two parts, just as it does in “Ella Surrey’s” construction: an inter
­nal self (as in the individual, personal self) and an external self (as in the col
­lective Black masses). The recognition and engagement of these divisions,
 which at
 
the same time are also overlappings, result  in a construction of the self  
that is multiple and radical, individual and collective. Consider the 
way
 that  
Autobiography speaks of the ghetto in the following passage from chapter 15:
The American black man [sic] should be focusing his every effort toward
 
building his own businesses, and decent homes for himself. As other eth
­nic groups have done,
 
let black people, wherever possible, however possible,  
patronize their own kind, and start in those ways to build up the black race's
 
abili
ty to do for itself That’s the only  way the American black man is ever  
going to get respect. One thing the white man never can give the black
 man
 
is self-respect! The black man can never become independent  and  rec ­
ognized as a human being who is truly equal with other
 
human  beings until  
he has what they have, and until he is doing for himself what others are
 doing for themselves.
The black man in the ghettoes, for instance, has to start self-correcting
 
his own material, moral and spiritual defects and evils. (275-6; emphasis
 added except in the first case)
“Self-respect” is equated here with “building [one’s] own 
businesses
 and  
homes.” The easy movement between signs of economic success (business),
 psychic and 
physical
 safety (homes), and psychic well-being (self-respect), as  
well as the use of singular nominatives (for example, “black man”) to represent
 a larger group, reveals the fluidity of the boundaries between
 
terms such as “per ­
sonal” and “political,” “private” and “public,” “interior” and “exterior,” and even
 “individual” and “collective.” The expansiveness and fluidity of the self here —
 evident also in Malcolm’s commentary on conking — reminds me of a similar
 expansiveness suggested in Toni
 
Morrison’s characterization of Beloved as mul ­
tiple selves.
But here also lies one of the uneasy tensions of my project: the ideas here
 
suggest a monolithic Black response (even as the language can be teased to
 reveal a multiplicity), which is counter to Black feminists’ contributions to
 Black liberation ideologies. The only
 
resolution to this tension may come later  
in the essay,
 
when I consider  the text’s changing ideology as a  “changing same,”  
a trope that is in fact Black feminist. Nonetheless, the notion of “self first” in
 this passage is a tenet of masculine-centered Black nationalist ideology. Even
 as Malcolm broadened 
his
 philosophy to include committed white people as  
allies, he still maintained the need for Black
 
people to organize (at least in the  
beginning) separately because it was a way to
 
“instill within black men  the racial  
dignity, the incentive, and the confidence that the black race 
needs
 today to get  
up off its knees, and to get on its feet, and get rid of its scars, and
 
to take a stand  
for itself” (374). 
As
 an ideological stance, “self first” (as articulated in Black  
nationalisms) was crucial to decolonization politics, yet it also reveals the sec
­ond tension of this passage and my critical investigation: “self first” here is
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equated
 
with “Black first,” excluding gender as important to or coexistent  with  
Black liberation, and demanding
 
that  Black women who might want  to support  
such an ideology self-fragment. In fact, the presentation of
 
this male self as  
fluid — its easy movement from individual to communal — is arguably a cen
­tral manifestation of sexism and the patriarchical trajectory of Black national
­ist
 
politics, because the Black male self is universalized in a  process that  renders  
Black selfhood synonymous with Black manhood. The difficulty with critical
­
ly
 reading this passage is not only a problem of Malcolm’s unrevised sexism at  
work even as Autobiography is engaging ways of formulating the self that I
 understand to be Black
 
feminist; it is also a result of my attempt to liberate the  
text. This passage, then, is a microcosm of the whole tenor of my
 
argument, in  
which Autobiography's maleness undercuts the radical multiplicity
 
of the self (as  
a site of collective and individual
 
change) that can  be inferred  from this passage  
and others like it
 
via a Black  feminist critical frame.
Silence as Activism
Another example of the ambiguity of boundaries of “self” is evident on Mal
­
colm’s trip to Mecca, itself an interior exploration of
 
a Black selfscape. This  
journey, full of
 
confrontations, experiences of inadequacy, and Malcolm’s own  
ignorance (of 
languages
 and customs), is fruitful because of its personal,  
exploratory nature. Yet this
 
journey is also an important marker in Malcolm’s  
public/political life. In this way, it becomes another metaphor for the shifting
 rhetoric of the personal as political and philosophical.
Lorde’s characterization of a progression from “silence to language and
 
action” serves as a useful frame for the Malcolm
 
who emerges after his journey  
to Mecca.38 The trip, a signal moment of
 
conversion or transformation, was  
healing,
 
like the application of a salve to a deep and  festering wound. The con ­
tinuity suggested in Lorde’s model of revolutionary transformation parallels
 Malcolm’s journey, which moves him from meditation (silence) to renaming (in
 language) and action.
The ultimate chapter of the narrative, “1965,” is lyrical, prophetic, and
 
panoramic; it gives readers the
 
best narrative view of Malcolm “in action” (post ­
Mecca). The chapter’s title firmly cements
 
Malcolm’s ideology in the  Black lib ­
eration movement, and the year reference identifies him with a decade of
 change. In this chapter, Malcolm reflects on the high esteem he once held for
 Elijah Muhammad and 
claims
 that it is “dangerous . . . for people to hold any 
human being in such esteem, especially to consider anyone some sort
 
of 'divine ­
ly guided’ and ‘protected’ person” (365). His soul- and self-searching in Mecca  
encouraged him to hold his own self
 
in high esteem, which is parallel to the  
self-respect
 
articulated in  his nationalist  and  economic  ideologies. He describes  
his experience of feeling “like a complete human being” in Mecca (365), sug
­gesting a reconciliation of previous fragmentation. What Autobiography codi
­fies in this chapter
 
is an example of self-definition as described in Collins’s text,  
calling to mind her notion that “
consciousness
 . . . [is] a sphere of freedom”  
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point of his contention with the notion of civil rights; when he says that Black
 
people want human rights (not civil rights), he is making a distinction between
 civil rights as legal, political, and social freedoms, and his own desire/struggle
 for comprehensive human liberation including but not limited to the legal and
 political freedoms of
 
civil rights. Like many Black women before him, Mal ­
colm realized that liberation would be limited unless it was achieved by,  
through, and in the decolonized and decolonizing self.
Yet the chapter “1965” hardly provides the “action” that my interpretation
 
of Lorde suggests. Likewise, late in 
his
 life, Malcolm describes (and Haley  
confirms) criticisms that he was not doing anything. This perceived “inaction”
 might be best understood in the context of a comment that Malcolm makes
 about meditation: speaking to Haley about 
his
 prison life, Malcolm says, “In  
the hectic 
pace
 of the world, today, there is no time for meditation, or for deep  
thought. A prisoner has that time he can put to good use” (391). Malcolms
 appreciation of meditation suggests a connection between the external
 
volatili ­
ty of 1965 and internal volatility. Not only is the correlation between exterior
 and interior radical and resonant with Black feminist political ideologies, there
 is a further reenvisioning of stillness 
here,
 of the quiet but moving interior also  
described
 
in Black womens works. Malcolms embrace of meditation  resists the  
masculinist definition of liberation as only exterior action and validates the
 (interior) turmoil that 
came
 after his break from the Nation of Islam. Writer  
Marita Bonner provides a description of
 
feminine stillness that is relevant to  
the point I am making here:
So — being a woman
 
— you can wait. You must sit quietly without a chip.  
Not sodden — and weighted as if your feet were cast in the iron of 
your soul. Not wasting strength in enervating gestures  as if two hundred years  of bonds and whips had really tricked you into nervous uncertainty. But
 quiet; quiet. Like Buddha — who brown like I 
am
 — sat entirely at ease,  
entirely sure of himself; motionless and knowing. . . . Motionless on the
 outside. But inside? (7)
Bonner
'
s description, which is echoed by many Black women thinkers/writers  
(including Zora Neale Hurston, whose women characters are often at a very
 active standstill,39 and Toni Morrison, whose evocative use of “quiet as it’s kept”
 opens The Bluest Eye), also speaks to Malcolm’s stillness. Motionless on the
 outside, but inside? Autobiography gives us a view of the inside, a view of the
 motion and action of the inside, of Malcolm doing the quiet and revolutionary
 work of self.40
Black feminisms’ stress on self-definition and the negotiation of fragment
­
ed selves stresses meditative action as an integral part of the journey to libera
­tion. Again, the interior space of self is acknowledged as having a significant
 role in individual and collective decolonization. While autobiography as a
 genre possesses an inherent meditative quality, there are other examples of this
 characteristic that are particular to Autobiography. For example, the narrative
 collaboration, designed to read like an unpolished and transcribed oral history,
 conveys a strong sense of interiority and
 
reflection, foregrounded in the journey  
to Mecca, especially its unsettling aspects.
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The rhetorical quality
 
of Autobiography that I am highlighting here is actu ­
ally two merged concepts: mediation and meditation. Mediation is character
­istic of African-American discourse, as Gates claims in The Signifying Monkey.
 Gates asserts that communication and knowledge are the result of the interplay
 between figures (or constructs) of discourse (see especially 44-88), a claim that
 resonates with hooks’s notion of the "mediation of truth” cited earlier. Medita
­tion is an African-American narrative and cultural trope, as my colleague Ruth
 Ellen Kocher has noted.41 While meditation commonly implies interiority,
 mediation suggests exteriority, but neither term is exclusively representative of
 a
 
particular sphere. The meditation on  figures of discourse is concomitant with  
mediating those figures toward relevant meaning and can 
occur
 on any of the  
surfaces of the self. It is in this sense that
 
I consider Autobiography's rhetoric as  
a mediation of the insights of meditation.
Haley describes two complaints that other Blacks had about Malcolm X:
 
that he only talked and did not do, and that he
 
was "himself too confused to be  
seriously followed any
 
longer” (420). I think these criticisms reflect Malcolm’s  
search for self as a search for truth. In 
fact,
 mediation of meditation is inher ­
ent in the form of Autobiography: it is a story constructed from memory and
 meant as a reflection on a past; and it is told to and recorded by a writer who
 also may
 
be engaged in his own process of mediating meditation.42
At
 
Malcolm’s death, the doctor announces that  ""the man you knew as Mal ­
colm X is now dead.” What is striking about this wording is that it reflects not
 only the shifting nature of Malcolm’s self but also how a man who was so per
­sonal still could be so symbolically distant: the man we knew as Malcolm X.43
 The comment might reveal that the Malcolm we know, though perhaps a
 rhetorical construction, is much more the Messiah-in-the-making than the
 Messiah-already-made (if he is 
any
 Messiah at all).44 Theologian James Cone,  
in a statement about Martin Luther King, Jr. and Malcolm X, argues that ""it is
 important to emphasize that . . . Malcolm . . . [was] not a 
messiah.
 [He  
showed] us what ordinary
 
people can accomplish through intelligence and sin ­
cere commitment to the cause of justice and freedom” (315). 
As
 presented in  
Autobiography, Malcolm seemed ""bent on discovering and expanding himself to
 his fullest limits” (Demarest 187; emphasis added), stimulating us to acknowl
­edge and engage our own ordinary power for extraordinary change. His auto
­biography, constructed to mirror 
his
 emergent persona, not only reveals ""the  
intensely social character of. . . interior lives” (A. Davis, Women 200) but also
 exhibits Collins’s ""interior space of activism”; it performs a Black feminist
 weaving of the interior of selfhood, the power of self-definition, and the quest
 for social emancipation.
The Failure of 
an
 Autobiography?
One of the failures, then, of Autobiography is that it maintained sexist and patri-
 
archical views of women in conjunction with its unconscious engagement of
 Black feminist emancipatory traditions. Angela Davis attempts to recontextu
­alize how we understand Malcolm X in relation to this issue. Davis cites Patri-
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cia Robinson as “contending] that after Malcolm
'
s disillusionment with the  
Nation of Islam, he
 
began to turn toward and to listen to Black women in a way  
that had not been possible as long as he functioned under the ideological tute
­lage of a man [Elijah Muhammad] . . . whose political/religious vision and
 whose personal life were thoroughly shaped by male supremacy” (“Meditations”
 36-7). Davis continues, “because Malcolm was in the process of articulating
 the
 
pitfalls and limitations of nationalism, I want to suggest that implied in that  
critical revisiting of Black nationalist philosophy might be a similar revisiting
 of the male supremacist ramifications of Black
 
nationalism” (39). The basis for 
Davis’s plausible though generous meditation on Malcolm is his shifting and
 personal political ideology: “even at a mature 
stage
 of development of his  
philosophical position, Malcolm did not hesitate to reexamine his ideas and
 consider the possibility of radical shifts in that position” (40). 
She
 writes her  
meditation to contest the “one-dimensional iconization of Malcolm 
X,
 because  
the iconization tends to close out possibilities of exploring other implications
 of Malcolm’s legacy that are not heroic, nationalist, and masculinist” (41). And
 yet even outside of spaces of iconization, it is starkly evident in Autobiography
 that gender is not engaged in an emancipatory 
way
 for men or women; as  
Collins argues, the women in the text are presented in negative and constrict-
 ing/constricted ways (as Eves or Madonnas). Collins describes the women in
 Autobiography as weak, fragile, untrustworthy, sacrificing and sacrificial con
­structions that reflect an authorial “conflation of Blackness, masculinity, and
 political astuteness” (“Learning” 76). Further, if I am correct to assert that the
 text’s ideological strategies are intimately connected to Black women’s emanci
­patory
 
traditions, then the textual manifestations that Collins outlines serve as  
an erasure of the very people who were a critical source of the narrative’s power.
As noted earlier, what is further problematic about the text — and also
 
serves to mirror its interesting “silence” about gender — is its literal erasure of
 Malcolm’s mother from the story. Collins notes that the mother’s self is sub
­sumed
 
by the heroic description of Malcolm’s father (62). Hilton Als, in a cre­
ative and moving (though sometimes compromising) essay, explores this erasure
 further, giving textual life to the ghostly presence of Malcolm’s Grenadian,
 almost-white mother. Als’s essay “Philosopher or Dog” is a ponderous musing
 on who Mrs. Louise Little was, a woman “who exists in The Autobiography to
 give birth to Malcolm, go mad, and look nearly colorless” (90).45 “Who is this
 woman?” Als asks, a question that all readers should ask.




presence (as absence) of his mother but by his mother’s connection to her  
white father: “Earl and Malcolm attached themselves to Louise’s male, non
­colored half. Louise did not have to meet her father. Earl and Malcolm lived
 him by competing with his ghost at every turn” (92). This leads me to think
 that there 
may
 have been an issue of homosociality — as a site of male power  
struggle46 — at the center of Louise’s presence in both men’s lives and her era
­sure from the narrative of Malcolm’s life. In 
fact,
 the tender and dynamic rela ­
tionship between Haley and Malcolm that I described earlier results in part
 from Malcolm’s own static and limited relationship with his mother (whose
 memory brings the two men together) and his wife, Betty (who only has five
 per cent on Haley, and is also 
erased
 from the text).
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Though Autobiography engages Black feminist strategies and situates
 
Louise Little as a pivotal force, it also erases her; she is most present in the Epi
­logue written by Haley. Malcolm’s half-sister Ella, equally powerful and cen
­tral in 
his
 life — funding his trip to Mecca, for example — fares a little better  
in the text but still lacks a textual presence adequate to the role she played in
 his journey of self-realization. In their (mis)representations in the narrative —
 the shallow deification of his mother and the limiting image of Ella as a "good
 wife”47 — these 
two
 dynamic women are practically erased, lumped with the  
sexist and static imagery of women generally in Autobiography.48 I say 
"
practi ­
cally” erased not only because Louise and Ella are written (about) in the text to
 some degree and not simply erased wholesale but also (and more importantly)
 because they are present in the very philosophy of the narrative, which draws
 heavily on the liberation acts and theories of Black women. These two women
 highlight both the feminine presence that is left out of the content of the nar
­
rati
ve and the writers’ sexism that is left unrevised.
As Autobiography taps into the reservoir of liberation ideologies present in
 Black communities and Black cultural production, it (perhaps) unconsciously
 engages specific Black feminist contributions to such ideologies. Like the
 memory of Louise Little stretching food that offers Malcolm another response
 to seemingly impossible situations, Black women’s traditions and practices as
 Haley and Malcolm experienced and engaged them feed Autobiography.
Epilogue
I have attempted here to unlock the unconscious of the text, to make evident
 
the Black feminist textualities that undergird Autobiography and our reading of
 it. But I want to close on a more personal note. In his essay, Wideman
 observes, “For me writing about Malcolm is entering a space of myth and
 mourning” (102). In rereading this comment, I am reminded of the passion
 that hooks, West, Davis, and others exhibit as they write about Malcolm. I am
 reminded of my own passion, and of a later comment that Wideman makes:
 that
 
we fashion and imagine Malcolm “in our own image” (116).49 In my own  
image: for me, writing about
 
Malcolm is also entering a space of myth. He is,  
for me, shimmering and brilliant, black and beautiful. He is like a river, send
­ing silver water drops, like
 
little bits of velvet  to kiss my ankles. I love him, love  
all of me that he so 
captivates
 but also reveals; I too am engaged in a “you mine,  
you mine” reverie with Malcolm.
I also want him to be better, want for his politics better to reflect a libera
­
tion ideology that I have come to understand as healing. I will take him with
 me on this journey through Black feminist practices. The two of us, together,
 will see what it means for us to become Black men committed to feminism.
 Because he is mine, and I am his, and we both want to live.
This is the journey I take in reading Autobiography.
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I am indebted to Keith Miller and Myriam Chancy for their critical feedback
 
on early versions of this paper and to Paul Jorgensen for his research assistance.
 I am also indebted to Eugenia DeLamotte, who has generously provided sus
­tained and necessary feedback on all versions of this paper. Finally, I dedicate
 this essay to Monique Savage, whose six-year conversation with me is a core
 reason this work is being done, and to Esther Pemberton, my spirit’s guide.
1.
 
There has been much debate over the terms “Black feminist” and “wom-  
anist.” Collins’s essay, “What’s in a Name?” is a useful summary of the various
 positions, although Collins herself seems to favor “Black feminism” if her 1989
 book
 
title is any indication. Many African-American  women theologians have  
taken up the issue (including Katie Cannon and Cheryl Gilkes). For me, the
 struggle is that even as I make specific and extensive reference to Alice Walker
 and to her definition of “womanism,” I also engage Collins from her signal
 Black
 
Feminist Thought. Even as in my daily  life I may switch between the two  
terms and also use “womanism” to specify a spiritual component, I choose for
 sake of clarity in the essay to use “Black
 
feminist/feminism” to speak about the  
specific experiences and cultural productions of Black women. When I do use
 the term “womanism” here, it will be meant as a particular reference to Walk
­er’s definition, in contradistinction (not
 
contradiction) to my use of “Black fem ­
inism.” For me, as for Collins and others, the heterogeneity of
 
terms is only  
reflective of the dynamism of studies about Black women.
2.
 
Key to my argument is the idea of Autobiography as a collaborative text.  
In this way, I hesitate during the essay to speak of Malcolm X, and instead
 mostly speak of Malcolm’s and Alex (Haley)’s collaboration. Haley’s life does
 not have the same well-documented markers of sexism, even as he is account
­able, though differently than Malcolm, for the 
way
 the text (re)presents gender.
3.
 As
 Angel  Davis generously claims in her essay, “Meditations on the  
Legacy of Malcolm X.”
4.
 
In all fairness to Malcolm’s legacy, Perry’s biography seems intent on  
every page to unearth a previously untold truth.
5.
 
The Autobiography of Malcolm X was a phenomenon, selling over six mil ­
lion US copies in its first ten years; it
 
was also widely translated international ­
ly. Evidence of its incredible life exists in the numerous resurgence of Malcolm
 X-ism, most
 
recently in Spike Lee’s film version of the text. My use of “lieu de  
memoire,” as well as my suggestion that the text is an icon, is indebted to
 O’Meally and Fabre, who argue that sites of memory exist
 
when “individual or  
group memory selects certain landmarks of the past — places, artworks, dates;
 persons, public or private, well known or obscure, real or imagined — and
 invests them with symbolic and political significance. ... [A lieu] de memoire
 (site of memory) ... is material, symbolic, and functional” (7). This formula




Particularly, I am referring to Andrews; Marcus,  Autol biographical Dis ­
courses and “The Face of Autobiography”; Olney; and A. Stone. I 
am
 also  
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thinking of Bakhtins account of the novel as a mixed form (heteroglossia),
 
which resonates with autobiographical form.
7.
 
See Marcus, “The Face of Autobiography,” especially 14-15.
8.
 
See de Man, to whom Marcus’s essay referred me.
9.
 
In a biocritical essay on Haley, M. Davis also uses the description of  
“porch-sitters,” but this time to describe Haley’s affinity for Black women’s cul
­ture. 
She
 writes: “As a child, Haley listened to women storytellers reminiscent  
of Zora Neale Hurston’s porch-sitters: his maternal grandmother, his aunts,
 and other female relatives” (203).
10.
 
Some central references for this idea are Canaan’s poem “Girlfriends”;  
Walker’s definition of “womanism”; Collins,
 
Black Feminist Thought; hooks, Sis ­
ters', or Toni Morrison’s Sula. It is the idea of being
 
“in the company of my sis ­
ters” that I 
am
 borrowing from Boyd.
11.
 
Walker’s argument (as  well as my own) is not necessarily asserting indi ­
vidual recognition
 
for Black women as much as decrying the individual and col ­
lective 
erasure
 of Black women’s contributions — of their brilliance — as a  
result of the intersection of racial and gender hierarchies. I want to be espe
­cially clear here, as there is much evidence that rightly suggests a dynamic
 interaction between individual and communal in Black
 
communities, a dynam ­





See M. Davis, especially 202-3.
13.
 
See Johnson (especially 113) and Baye.
14.
 
Perry’s biography raises many questions about the representation of  
Louise Little. It would be too distracting here to engage his claims, but I will
 say that as much as Perry and others note that autobiography (especially this
 one) is 
an
 art of exaggeration, biography seems to be the art of revision and dis ­
covery. Both genres are differently unreliable.
15.
 
Riggs, in Tongues Untied, famously  proclaimed that “Black men loving  
Black men is the revolutionary act.” I think Riggs is echoing Beam, who
 
wrote,  
“Black men loving Black men is the revolutionary act of the eighties” (240).
16.
 
Eakin also argues that Malcolm’s original intent was to compose a  more  
traditional conversion narrative of a completed self, a critical trajectory that
 Demarest also supports. While this argument is contested and contestable, it
 is not fundamental to my central arguments 
here.17.
 
Amiri Baraka writes, “Malcolm is also ... a figure of ideological devel ­
opment and change” (18). Baraka goes on to describe “Malcolm’s very ideo
­logical movement [as] . . . groping and seeking, [a] stumbling and continuous
 rising from confusion to partial clarity and on” (33). Furthermore, Wood, in
 
his  
moving essay, writes, “Malcolm, in the end, gave us no coherent ideology, but
 he did leave us a 
site
 for Black political discourse” (15).
18.
 
I am called to use  this image  in  remembering Toni Morrison’s comment  
to Gloria Naylor in a Southern Review interview: “You work with one facet of
 a
 
prism,  you know, just one side, or maybe this side, and it has millions of sides,  
and then you read a book
 
and there is somebody who is a black woman who has  
this sensibility and this power and this talent and she’s over here writing about
 that side of this huge sort of
 
diamond thing that I see ... all of these planes  
and all of these facets. But it’s all one diamond, it’s all one diamond. . . . This
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I am making a distinction in using the word "personal” as opposed to  
"individual.” In emphasizing the self, Black women thinkers have not rejected
 the intricate interdependency of communal and individual in Black American
 life; in 
fact,
 the idea of the personal embraces the communal.
20.
 
This subtle difference is evident in Black feminist writers who empha ­
size healing as essential to decolonization. This emphasis on the personal,
 which also highlights the interior of the self as an active and liberating space, is
 a fundamental idea of feminism. Black feminists, responding to attacks on
 race, gender and class, have aimed even more radically to 
describe
 the interior  
as a place of serious activism. Patricia Hill Collins’s Black Feminist Thought is
 a critical text in this regard, as is Lorde’s Sister Outsider, which aims to return
 the spiritual to the political (see especially the chapter, ""Uses of the Erotic”).
21.
 
The earlier passage cited from Body & Soul makes this connection.
22.
 
Hurtado successfully articulates how the binary of private-public used  
so effectively in white feminist discourses becomes irrelevant for women of
 Color: ""Yet the public/private distinction is relevant only for the white middle
 and upper classes since historically the American state has intervened con
­stantly in the private lives and domestic arrangements of the working class.
 Women of Color have not had the benefit of the economic conditions that
 underlie the public/private distinction. Instead the political consciousness of
 women of Color stems from an awareness that the public is personally political.
 Welfare programs and policies have discouraged family life, sterilization pro
­grams have restructured reproduction rights, government has drafted and
 armed disproportionate numbers of people of Color to fight its wars overseas,
 and locally, police forces and the criminal justice system arrest and incarcerate
 disproportionate numbers of people of Color. There is 
no
 such thing as a pri ­
vate sphere 
for
 people of Color except that which they manage to create and  
protect in an otherwise hostile environment” (849). See also Mohanty, who
 works from Hurtado’s points to delineate 
differences
 between mainstream fem ­








This seeming contradiction, a parallel to the issue of invisibility and  
hypervisibility, is discussed at length in hooks, Talking.
25.
 
Many Black feminist writers, critics, and scholars have noted this trope  
of the individual and psychic self as a landscape of collective or even national
 change, what I am referring to as an ""epic landscape.” For further reading, see
 McDowell; Tate; hooks, Sisters and Talking; Christian, Black Feminist Criticism;
 and Mohanty, Russo and Torres, especially Mohanty’s introduction.
26.
 
Not only is this intersection explored in contemporary texts such as  
hooks, Sisters*, White; Walker; Anzaldua and Moraga; and Anzaldua. It is also
 explored via blues songs (see Russell’s "Slave Codes”), slave narratives (for
 example, Harriet Jacobs’ Incidents in the
 
Life of Slave Girl), and early speeches  
and manifestos by Sojourner Truth, Ida B. Wells-Barnett, and Anna Julia
 Cooper.
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27
. 
Though this argument is commonly made today, it was first and most  
widely used by
 
women of color in feminist movements during the 1970s. See  
the essays in section 7 of Anzaldua (especially Barbara Christian’s “The Race
 for Theory”), and Anzaldua and Moraga, especially 23. Gwaltney offers an






Langston Hughes’s poem “Good Morning Revolution” also famously  
personalizes revolution as “the very best friend / I ever had.”
29.
 
West claims that  Malcolm’s philosophy was one of “psychic conversion  
that attempted to 
engage
 rage and self-love” (132). It is interesting to think of  
this conversion in a spiritual sense, much
 
like the conversions that Rebecca Cox  
Jackson and Jarena Lee described in their spiritual narratives in the 1800s.
 Both Jackson and Lee not only experienced conversions that were liberating
 personally — affirming their right to preach — but also engaged those conver
­sions rhetorically to challenge sexism in the Black religious hierarchy and
 racism in general. 
To
 a lesser extent, Elaw also exhibits this trope of spiritual  
and personal conversion as philosophical and revolutionary rhetorical impera
­tive. hooks helps to facilitate my connection; of Malcolm’s autobiography she
 writes, “Like nineteenth-century slave narratives, [Malcolm’s] story stands as a
 living testimony of the movement from slavery to freedom” (Yearning
 
79). It is  
this sense of conversion — of the possibility of physical, political and psychic
 transformation — that contributes to Malcolm’s contemporary appeal. Anoth
­
er
 dilemma of my attempt to link Malcolm X to Black feminist traditions is  
that many of these traditions 
were
 engaged temporally  before his life but writ ­
ten about mainly after his life in the 
explosion
 of Black women’s studies in the  
1970s. I am trying, then, in this essay to connect Black women’s political ide
­ologies from before and after Malcolm’s life to the rhetoric in Autobiography.
30.
 
Also see Crenshaw. This reclamation of the  body  as a source of knowl ­
edge is a major part of what
 
women of color have been working for in the past  
twenty years and is readily evident in contemporary fiction.
31.
 
The work that Judith Butler, Hélène Cixous, Kaja Silverman, Trinh T.  
Minh-ha, bell hooks, and others have done to question how well we can know
 the actual body (which is historically imbedded
 
in sign systems that move it far ­
ther and farther from being readily accessible and knowable) is important here
 also. In the context of Black women’s experiences, then, the critique of the
 body-mind construct combines two related insights: 
one,
 that is it important  
to reclaim the body as a source of knowledge perhaps on a par with the mind,
 and to reject that body and mind exist distinctly; two, that it is also important,
 especially in relation to the notion of a fused body-mind consciousness, to
 question how knowable (and in what ways) this fused consciousness is, which
 means asking if it is really “consciousness.” Griffin offers a useful commentary:
 “healing does not pre-suppose notions of a coherent and whole subject. The
 body is not a given concrete one can call on or return to in order to recover a
 truer self’ . . . [H]ealing does not deny the construction of bodies, but instead
 suggests that they can be constructed differently, for different ends” (524).
 Grosz’s work, particularly her notion of body volatility, is important here.
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Lee and Jackson described incidents of  psychic conversion that were 
events of the body as well as acts of spirit, and in this 
way
 both women were 
asserting that the body could kno .
33.
 
Two wonderful narrative examples of bodies as historical texts are  
Sethe in Morrisons Beloved
 




See the example described  in the sometimes disconcerting introduction  
to the text by Handler. The power of Malcolm’s physical self (as perceived by
 others) recalls the way that Sojourner Truth engaged her body as a 
site
 for lib ­
eration. Her provocative gesture of baring her upper arm during her ‘Ain’t I a
 Woman” speech is an excellent example not only of the degradation that Black
 women’s bodies endured but also of
 
the physical body as a location of philo ­
sophical, discourse (though this engagement of the body was sometimes a
 response to detrimental and oppressive constructions of her physicality).
35.
 
In her narrative, Jackson dreams that she is being slaughtered, which is  
an allegory of her liberation efforts. She writes, “the 
skin
 and blood covered me 
like a veil from my head to my lap” (94). There are many other examples of
 mutilation in her work, and to a lesser extent in Lee’s and Elaw’s narratives of
 the same time period.
36.
 
I put her name in quotation marks because it is a name that Gwaltney  
gives to her in his ethnographic
 




Again, hooks, Sisters; Collins, Black Feminist  Thought; Tate; Christian,  








See particularly her story “Sweat.”
40.
 
Benson’s excellent reading of Autobiography in the context of a defini ­
tion of rhetoric as knowing,
 
being, and doing supports my reading of Malcolm’s  
perceived inaction as action in fact.
41.
 
From personal conversation, April 1997.
42.
 
The issues of self-definition and authorship are complicated here: the  
text is a palimpsest of 
sorts,
 with Haley’s voices, Malcolm’s voices (personal,  
political, contrived, authentic), and Malcolm’s life all vying for space on the
 page within a process of memory-making. This has been the subject of much
 scholarship. Demarest convincingly argues that dual authorship encouraged
 Malcolm to be less polemical, to use the text as a statement not of a particular
 political self (reality) but (as much as possible) of his own self (184-6). Eakin,
 however, would attribute this less to co-authorship than to the “tumultuous . .
 . and steadily 
accelerated” pace of Malcolm’s life between 1963 and 1965 (156).  
To engage Demarest’s argument completely would mean exploring other texts
 about Malcolm’s life, which I am not able to do in this essay. Nonetheless, the
 factors that Demarest and Eakin describe contribute to Autobiography's presen
­tation of the achievement of clarity through uncertainty. Furthermore, the
 issue of collaborative authorship affects how one can interpret features such as
 the chapter titles and the shifts in the register of the language. For two impor
­
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tant essays that look at Haley’s role in constructing the text in relation to con
­
cepts of Black autobiography, see Rampersad and
 
Wideman, who offers a bril ­
liant and complete investigation of “the art
 
of autobiography” in the dual  autho ­
rial relationship. Also see A. Stone.
43.
 
Racism, particularly in the way that it informed media representation  
of Black leaders, also affected the 
way
 Malcolm was perceived as a “symbol” by  
whites and (differently) by Blacks.
44.
 
My use of “construction” here is in response to some critics, particular ­
ly
 
Benson and Perry, who have asserted that there are a number of inconsisten ­
cies between Autobiography and other (more reliable) accounts of Malcolm’s life.
 This, they conclude, reveals the high level of
 
rhetorical play in Autobiography  
and is an attempt to manipulate the reader of the text. I am not attempting
 here to claim Autobiography as a “clean” representation of Malcolm’s life;
 instead, I am interested in the rhetorical play — if that is what it is — that he
 and Haley
 
chose to use. That  is, if certain constructions in the narrative (which  
I am suggesting were accounts of real lived experiences of struggle) 
were
 really 
engagements of pathos, then it is still interesting to explore what it means that
 Malcolm and Haley chose pathos as a central mode of expression for their nar
­rative. Furthermore, I do think that the inconsistencies might also be an
 attempt to mirror the reality of our lived lives, which are often riddled with
 contradictions and incongruities.
45.
 
The description of Louise Little as “almost white” reaffirms Collins’s  
comment cited earlier that the text 
conflates
 Blackness, masculinity, and polit ­
ical astuteness. It is also itself a commentary on the (historical) 
role
 of color as  
a gendered construct in Black America.
46.
 
Though she fails to address race effectively, Sedgwick offers a wonder ­
ful explication of her notion of homosociality; see in particular her chapter on
 Henry James (“Beast in the Closet”). Also see Rubin and Irigaray.
47.
 
I am grateful to Nicole Lanson, whose careful reading of these pages  
suggested key areas of emphasis.
48.
 
The chapters “Detroit Red,” “Minister Malcolm X,” and "El-Hajj  
Malik El Shabazz” contain an abundance of this imagery.
49.
 
This phrase is also the title of Wood’s edited collection, where Wide ­
man’s essay is published.
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For if the King
 
like not the Comedie,  
Why then belike he likes it not perdie.
—Hamlet First Folio 3.2.269-70
metal . . . app. related in some way to
 
ϻϵαλλάΰ to seek after, explore.
—OED 2, M: 667
As Great Shapesphere puns it.
—James Joyce, Finnegans Wake
 
295.3-4
“Do you like me, 
Kat ?
” asks Henry V. “Pardonnez-  
moi, I cannot tell vat is "like me’” (Henry V 5.2.106-
 7). So culminates an extensive logic of “likeness” in
 the Henriad1 Deflecting likeness throughout his
 career, 
because
 he can brook no likeness if his rule is  
to be 
absolute,
 Henry V finally confronts, in Kate’s  
French body and halting English
 
tongue, the absolute 
consequences of the politics as well as the logic of
 likeness. How can one like the king when no one is
 like the king? Did not the king, after all, destroy his
 likenesses, Falstaff and Hotspur? History will only
 too bitterly prove that the king has no likeness when
 Henry VI ascends the throne. The king, in fact, has
 no likeness but himself: the king is so different, and
 practices such difference, that no one can tell, as Fal
­staff already understood, what is “
like
 [him]” (1  
Henry IV 2.5.228)2




Henry V (1599), the logic of likeness will play itself
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out again, though this time with more thrilling as they are also more terrifying
 
consequences. “Is it not like
 
the King?”  Marcellus asks Horatio when the ghost  
appears, and Horatio replies, “As thou art to thyself” (1.1.57-8; emphasis
 added). But Hamlet says, only a short while later, “A was a man, take him 
for all in all, / I shall not look upon his like again” (1.2.186-7; emphasis added).
 And his lament can hardly fail to trouble us the more because we have just
 heard him scorn “my uncle, / My father’s brother, ... no more like my father /
 Than I to Hercules” (1.2.151-3; emphasis added). Whether too much or too
 little, like(ness), from the beginning, stalks the characters’ talk
 
— and thus our  
response as well.3




 the thesis and the argument that I wish to pursue in this essay —  
namely, that one discourse for explaining the  tragedy of Hamlet is that of the
 crisis of likeness, of which the
 
psychopathology most revulsive, as it is also most  
recurrent in Western culture’s self-representation, is incest. I argue, in particu
­lar, that Hamlet fears most uncontrollably his likeness not with his father, nor
 with Claudius, nor Horatio, nor Laertes, nor Fortinbras, nor Rosencrantz, nor
 Guildenstern, nor the players, nor Osric, nor Polonius, nor Ophelia, nor Yorick,
 but rather
 
— and it is, after this list, precisely obvious who comes next — with  
his mother, Gertrude.4 Hamlet is, indeed, as others have shown, like all these  
other characters in the play in some particular or particulars; but it is the like
­ness with Gertrude that
 
he fears the most, not only the likeness with her bespo ­
ken by his and her sexual desires but also the likeness bespoken by his and her
 identities. Incest is not only copulation, incest is also copying. And how if
 Hamlet should be a copy of Gertrude? How if he should desire 
his
 father as  
she did? How if he should desire Claudius, as she does? (The homoerotic per
­vades this world, saturated as it may be with the heteroerotic.) How if he
 desired King Hamlet’s death (Oedipus’ conundrum) as she did? How stands it
 then in Denmark? How stands it then
 
with Hamlet? How, to be blunt, stands  
it?
I take it that at least part of Hamlet’s crisis, and at least one reason for his
 
(in)famous hesitation, is the question of succession: “A little more than kin and
 less than kind” (1.2.65), and never king. Hamlet is less than kind toward
 Claudius because Claudius has made him more than kin, usurping the place of
 
his
 father as well as the place of his mother’s husband, and thus interposed  him ­
self between Hamlet and Hamlet.5 (I 
will
 ignore, for reasons that I think are  
obvious, the distinction between Old Hamlet and Hamlet — Ophelia is my
 witness [cf. Garber 299; Calderwood 94]: “And with a look so piteous in pur
­port / As if he had been loosed out of hell / To speak of horrors, he comes before
 me” [2.1.83-5; emphasis added].) As long as Claudius reigns (“He that hath
 killed 
my
 king and whored my mother, / Popped in between th’election and my  
hopes” [5.2.65-6]), Hamlet cannot succeed to his (father’s) throne. The
 sequence kin > kind cries out the missing graph. And if
 
Hamlet is not to be  
{kiny kind
,
) king, then whom is Hamlet (to) (be) like?6
The answer is as strange to him as it is to us, at least at first. In the polit
­ical logic on which the play insists, he is like Gertrude. He is like Gertrude
 because, blocked from the succession, he is in the feminine position (“Must,
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like
 a whore, unpack  my  heart with words I  And fall a-cursing like a very drab,  
/ A scullion” [2.2.563-5; cf. Adelman 274]). Hamlet (t-h-[e] m-a-l-e)7 is
 marked feminine (cf. Leverenz; see also Parker, Shakespeare 263). And
 
it is from  
the feminine position that he must 
act
 for almost the rest of his life. Castrat ­
ed and defective (the misogynist’s icon of the despised female [“frailty, thy
 name is woman” (1.2.146)]), Hamlet lacks the Phallus. But, more, he is the site
 of the
 
lack of the Phallus (at least  in the  patriarchal  imaginary) — madness (thy  
name is woman).8 Little wonder he does not like himself, he is not like him
­self: “For he was likely, had he been put on / To have proved most royally”
 (5.2.341-2; emphasis added). But what “he” would have been put on? — this
 he 
or
 that (s)he, that is the question.9
The case I 
am
 making can be illustrated in a number of places in the play,  
but the following cross-section of act 1 will perhaps be most helpful (emphasis
 added throughout).
MARCELLUS Look where it comes again.
BARNARDO In the same figure like the King that’s dead.
BARNARDO Looks it not like the King? — Mark it, Horatio.
 
HORATIO Most like. It harrows me with fear and 
wonder. (1.1.38-9, 41-2)
Marcellus Is it not like the King?
Horatio As thou art to thy self. (57-8)
HAMLET A was a man. Take him for all in all,
I 
shall
 not look upon his like again.
HORATIO My Lord, I think I saw him yesternight.
Hamlet Saw? Who? (1.2.186-9)
HORATIO A figure like your father,
 
Armed at all points exactly, cap-a-pie.,
 Appears
The apparition comes. I knew
 
your father;
These hands are not more like. (199-201, 211-12)
HORATIO It would have much amazed you.
HAMLET Very like, very like (234-5)
This sample may serve as a guide. It registers the insistence in the play on the
 
almost independent agency of like(ness).
If we take this 
sample
 as a  guide, we will find  that the  play charges the word  
like
 
with a sometimes almost unbearable predictivity (and productivity):
HORATIO If your mind dislike anything, obey it. I
 
will  forestall their repair  
hither, and say you are not fit. (5.2.155-6; emphasis 
added)
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I am arguing that only when 
we
 have paused, if just a (heart)beat, over the  
words ‘if your mind dislike,” can 
we
 begin to take the measure of what follows:
HAMLET Notawhit. We defy augury. There's a special providence in the
 
fall of a sparrow. If it be now, ’tis not to come. If it be not to come, it will
 be now. If it 
be
 not now, yet it will come. The readiness is all. Since no  
man has aught of what he leaves, what is’t to leave betimes? (157-61)
We hear, now, how “their repair hither” will actually pair Hamlet, and spare him
 
(even a sparrow), with the likeness in which he will leave this life, as . ready as a
 man can be (“Since no man has aught [but also: has sought]10 of what he
 leaves, what is’t to leave betimes?”), foil now (192), likeness even, to Laertes
 (“This likes me well,” Hamlet says of his foil [203; emphasis added]) in that
 “foolery . . . such a kind of gain-giving as would perhaps trouble a woman”
 (153-4), which he feels “about [his] heart — but it is no matter” (150-51), since
 he is now about to cross the woman, the mat(t)er, out,11 resume his likeness,
 assume the Phallus, and its awful price, death:
HAMLET Was’t Hamlet wronged Laertes? Never Hamlet.
If Hamlet from himself be ta’en away,
And when he’s not himself does wrong Laertes,
Then Hamlet does it not, Hamlet 
denies
 it.
Who does it then? His madness. If’t be so,
Hamlet is of the faction that is wronged.
His madness is poor Hamlet’s enemy. (170-6)
If Hamlet now from himself is not taken away — if he is coincident
 
with him ­
self now, if he is one with himself, if his madness is gone, if he is like himself
 (in the Symbolic with the reign of the Phallus) — then, clearly, such sanity, at
 least here, is prologue to murder and, perhaps, worse.12 Laertes responds: “I
 do receive your offered love like love, / And will not
 
wrong it” (188-9; empha ­
sis added). The depth of Laertes’ hatred presumably we must measure by the
 likes of the fissure opened in his love 
by
 like (ness). The treachery of like (ness)  
perhaps nowhere in poetry receives more vivid likening; and post-modernism’s
 agony over representation of all 
sorts
 is perhaps nowhere more tersely repre ­
sented in early modern literature: love like love is not love.13
Like derives from a root meaning “form” or “shape” and in Anglo-Saxon
 
means “body” (Dutch, Danish, and Swedish instances of the word mean
“corpse”).14 I think it would be difficult to exaggerate how important this his
­tory is to the tragedy of Hamlet:15 in a different body (a son’s), Hamlet is
 nonetheless insufficiently different from his father or 
his
 mother, too like them  
(especially his mother), to enter into his patrimony or his matrimony; separa
­tion in Hamlet and for Hamlet has failed, and thus incest, the scandal of
 (con)fusion (failure of separation), haunts him throughout the play.16 Thus, to
 take 
one
 easily overlooked example, the name Claudius contains the Latin root  
claud- (“shut,” “close”)17 which produces claudicare, “to limp” (Skeat 93; Ayto
 118). Oedipus, the clubfoot (who limps [Sophocles 14 and 123-4]), shadows
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Hamlet (t-h-[e]-l-a-m-e) in the uncle, Claudius, who commits incest (so Ham
­
let calls it [1.2.157; 1.5.83]) with his mother, Gertrude. Everywhere Hamlet is
 surrounded with too much likeness:18
King Claudius Thy loving father, Hamlet.
HAMLET My mother. Father and mother is man and wife, man and wife
 
is one flesh, and so my mother. (4.3.52-4)
Madness,
 
then (or, at least,  its simulation), is his one recourse to difference. But  
he is precisely not mad in the closet scene with his mother (though she thinks
 he is), where likeness, specifically the body, overwhelms him, confuses him, and
 destines him to meet his double in Laertes.19 Here, in a likeness of the Oedi-
 pal crisis, a pseudo-Oedipus, in effect, Hamlet
 
kills the wrong  father (the irony,  
Lacan might say, of assuming the Phallus and its simulacrum of authority)
 while himself playing father to 
his
 mother with his Ham(i)let(ic) lecture to her  
of, and
 
from, the Symbolic: “O, throw away the worser part of it,  / And  live the  
purer with the other half!” (3.4.148-9). Father, husband, son — Hamlet is all
 and yet none.
The logic of likeness is fierce and intractable. To be like is to be different
 
(enough) to mark the space across which likeness can synapse: too much dif
­ference and the space is chasmic, no communication at all obtains; too little
 difference and the space is chaosmic, (con)fusion threatens to overwhelm com
­munication. Nowhere in art is this terrifying logic more palpable and threat
­ening than in theater, for theater is the space of likeness — without likeness
 theater is impossible.20





I’ ll have these players
Play something like the murder of my father . . . (2.2.571-2; emphasis
 
added)King Claudius What do you call the play?
HAMLET The
 
Mousetrap. Marry, how? Tropically. This play is the image  
of a murder done in Vienna. (3.2.216-18; emphasis added)
The
 
play within  the play is the incest of the play (the  play playing with  its own),  
the perverse doubling that foregrounds drama’s perpetual disruption of the
 boundaries between self and other, male and female, inner and outer, et cetera.
 More than the 
specular
 mise en abîme of postmodernism, this moment, when  
the tropical is the trapical, tropes as it traps the founding anxiety of Western
 thought, not that all knowledge is mimetic (hence derivative, secondary, belat
­ed — Plato’s grievance [cf. Parker, Shakespeare 180]) but that it is anamnesic, a
 recalling of the always-already
 
forgotten (Plato’s Socratic reverie).21 For this is  
what is trapped and troped in the play within the play,
 
where the mouse that is  
trapped is not Claudius, not Claudius at all (cf. Adelman 275-6; Parker, Mar
­
gins
 265), but rather her whom Hamlet calls Claudius’ "mouse,” his mother  
Gertrude (3.4.167) — that soft, round, furry thing.22 And, just so, Hamlet
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knew already but had “forgotten” that the guilty mouse was his mother:
 
“Madam, how like you this play? / Queen Gertrude The 
lady
 protests too  
much, methinks” (3.2.209-10; emphasis added). "The Queen, the Queens to
 blame” — Adelman (275) is exactly
 
right. So what more does Hamlet need?
Ofknowledge, nothing, of course. But
 
knowledge is not  enough. If knowl ­
edge were enough, who of us would not be (thin)king (cf. 2.2.244-5)? No,
 Hamlet needs difference (Garber 316). Which is to say, identity. He needs to
 I.D. the culprit else his own I.D. will never become 
an
 I.23 And so he waits for  
Claudius, to conclaud his trap. And at the moment of closure, he observes, "if
 the King like not the Comedie, / Why then belike he likes it not perdie”
 (3.2.269-70; emphasis added). The misprision is exact: it is not a "comedie”
 (rather a "tragedy” [3.2.133]), but it is (an invitation) to come die (I retain the
 first folio’s spelling of comedie) and so the king likes it not ("I like him not, nor
 stands it safe with us” [3.3.1; emphasis added]). The king likes it not 
because it be-likes the king. Hamlet’s hesitation is not a problem of knowledge, then,
 it is a problem of I.D.-ing, of becoming able, finally, to say, "This is I, / Ham
­let the Dane!” (5.1.243-4) — which amounts to saying (let us not flinch from
 admitting it): "I did it, I am to blame.”24 Every child bereaved of a parent
 "knows,” at some level, that s/he killed that parent (herein, for me, lies the
 genius of Cavell’s reading of The Mousetrap [179-91]); and (dis)owning that
 "knowledge” (which is false but feels, all the same, very real) can be so great a
 burden that the child does not, cannot, survive it: "How stand I then, / That
 have a father kill’d, a mother stain’d” (4.4.9.46-7).25 Indeed, how does Hamlet
 stand?26
Laertes, on the other
 
hand, I take it, has had an  I.D. all along —  he is Polo-  
nius’ (and his [absent] mother’s) son, Ophelia’s brother: he is the one who r-e-
 l-a-t-e-s:
POLONIUS This above all — to thine own self be true,
And it must follow, as the night the day,
Thou canst not then be false to 
any
 man. (1.3.78-80)
It is his role to relate (within the Symbolic) in just that way
 
that defines Ham ­
let’s failure to relate:
KING Claudius Laertes, was your father dear to you?
Or are you like the painting of a sorrow,
 
A face without a heart?
Laertes
 
Why ask you this?
KING Claudius Not that I think
 
you did not love your father . . .  
(4.7.89-93; emphasis added)
Of course not; of course Laertes loved his father; there can be no question, et
 
cetera. But that, of
 
course, really is not the question. The question really is,  
how is it that Laertes a-l-t-e-r-(e)-s Hamlet’s ego? how is it that Laertes’ I.D.
 alters Hamlet’s I? We may 
answer
 this question with Girard, with Serres, with  
Lacan, with Fineman, with Adelman, with Freud, with Cavell, with Parker,
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with Irigaray, with Garber, with Lévi-Strauss, and perhaps with others who
 
have addressed themselves in our recent cultural critique to the crisis of
 
dou ­
bling. But fundamental to any answer we may offer will be the play’s prior
 insight that the subject is not a subject 
except
 as anOther — “HAMLET I dare 
not confess that, lest I should compare with him in excellence. But to know a
 man well were to know himself” (5.2.102.30-32)27 — even as the subject can
­not speak without an (H)oratio (“speech”) other to it:
HAMLET O God, Horatio, what a wounded name,
 
Things standing thus unknown, shall live behind me!
If thou didst ever hold 
me
 in thy heart,
Absent thee from felicity a while,
And in this harsh world draw thy breath in
 
pain
To tell my story. (286-91)
Everywhere Hamlet turns, he confronts the reality
 
of incest,  which is hard ­
ly reducible to mere copulation — incest  is also copying (fusion and confusion).  
And to grasp the import of incest as copying in Hamlet, it is necessary finally
 to confront one of the scandals of the play, or its indulgence in puns — “We
 must speak by the card, or equivocation will undo us” (5.1.126-7).28 A pun is
 incestuous, the copulation of signifiers that should remain separate, producing
 a word containing imperfect copies of other words (Shoaf, Milton 60-71).
 Moreover, says Dr. Johnson:
A quibble [that
 
is, pun] is to Shakespeare what luminous vapours are to the  
traveller; he follows it at all adventures, it is sure to lead him out of his way,  
and sure to engulf him in the mire. It has some malignant power over his
 mind, and its fascinations are irresistible. Whatever be the dignity or pro
­fundity of his disquisition, whether he be enlarging knowledge or exalting
 affection, whether he be amusing attention with incidents or enchaining it
 in suspense, let but a quibble spring up before him, and he leaves 
his
 work  
unfinished. A quibble is the golden apple for which e will always turn
 aside from his career, or stoop from his elevation. A quibble, poor and bar
­ren as it
 
is, gave him such delight, that  he was content  to purchase it, by the  
sacrifice of reason, propriety, and truth. A quibble was to him the fatal
 Cleopatra 
for
 which he lost the world, and was content to lose it. (21-2)
In many respects, this is an extraordinarily important 
piece
 of criticism (and not  
just of Shakespeare), but for my purposes what matters most in it is the demo
­nizing of “quibbles” that culminates in the (predictable) demonizing of the
 woman (Cleopatra). You just know a pun has got to be (a) female:
HAMLET Do you think I meant country matters?
OPHELIA I think nothing, my
 
lord.
HAMLET That’s a fair thought to lie between maids’ legs.




OPHELIA You are merry, my lord. (3.2.105-10)
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Hardly the least famous pun
 
in English literature, "country matters” will do just  
nicely to make the point (“thing”): a pun 
like
 “c(o)unt(ry) mat(t)ers” is a no  
thing29 (a “cunt mother” and a “mother cunt”) —
 
that is to say, irreducibly plur ­
al (“ce sexe qui n’en est pas un”), its lips are bilabial, twofold, geminated, dou
­ble.30 A pun like “c(o)unt(ry) mat(t)ers” scandalizes the Phallus, the realm of
 the Symbolic,
 
which likes things hard and fast. And so Hamlet puns. This m-  
e-t-a-l (H) a-m-l-e-t, “as great Shapesphere puns it,”
 
who finds Ophelia “met ­
tle more attractive” (3.2.99), puns remorselessly
 
throughout the play, even unto  
the very end — “The rest is silence” (5.2.300)—- and precisely scandalizes those
 who serve the Symbolic (and in turn are 
served
 by it):
King Claudius How fares our cousin Hamlet?
HAMLET Excellent, i’faith, of the chameleon’s dish. I eat the air,
 
promise-crammed. You cannot 
feed
 capons so.
KING Claudius I have nothing with this answer, Hamlet, These words are
 not mine.
HAMLET No, nor mine now. [To POLONIUS] My lord, you
 
played once i’th’  
university, you say.
POLONIUS That I did my lord, and was accounted a good actor.
 
HAMLET And what did you enact?
POLONIUS I did enact Julius Caesar. I was killed i’th’ Capitol. Brutus
 
killed me.
HAMLET It was a brute part of him to 
kill
 so capital a calf there.  
(3.2.84-96; emphasis added)
“These words are not mine.” Indeed. That is the question. Whose are the
 
words?31 some “c-H-A-M-E-L-eon’s”? The words “my desire” can be uttered
 by any one of hundreds of millions of speakers of English. And shall I labor
 under the illusion that my desire is special? Why, of course I shall. So does
 everyone. So does Hamlet. Which, of course, is why he is (apparently) 
mad. To make words one’s own is to appropriate them to meanings so idiotic (as
 
well  
as idiolectal) as to sound mad:
POLONIUS What is the matter, my lord?
HAMLET Between who?
POLONIUS I mean the matter you 
read,
 my lord. (2.2.193-5)
But then madness has a
 
way of sounding different:
POLONIUS Though this be madness, yet there is method in’
t.
 — Will you  
walk out of the air, my lord?
HAMLET Into my grave.
POLONIUS Indeed, that is out o’th’ air. [Aside] How pregnant sometimes
 
his replies are! A happiness that often madness hits on, which reason and
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Madness, punning, has a
 
way of sounding like (a) woman: pregnant and deliv ­
ered of meanings in which Reason and Sanity (the Symbolic) are not so
 pro(s)per-ous,32 puns 
(two





A dull and muddy-mettled rascal, peak
Like John-a-dreams, unpregnant of my cause,
And can say nothing . . . (2.2.543-6; emphasis added)
Until he is pregnant, Hamlet “can say nothing.” In order to speak, Hamlet
 
must give birth:
KING Claudius Love? His affections do not that way tend,
 
Nor what he spake, though it lacked form a little,
 Was not like madness. There’s something in his soul
O’
er
 which his melancholy sits on brood,  
And I do doubt, the hatch and the disclose
Will be some danger . . . (3.1.161-6; emphasis added)
In order to be, Hamlet must be(come) female — at the least, he must trope
 
himself as female, and this he does by punning, for in 
his
 mad punning he par ­
ticipates in that two-in-one-ness that yokes madness, punning, and woman.33
 All are improper (that is, promiscuous, but also metaphoric),34 and they pros
­per in pregnancy and delivery, in breeding (not to mention talkativeness). And
 
we
 know what scandal attends such (s)excess: “Get thee to a nunnery. Why  
wouldst thou be a breeder of sinners?” (3.1.122-3). Ophelia must
 
be chastised,  
even if she should be chaste, “for the power of beauty will sooner transform
 honesty
 
from what it is to a bawd than the force of honesty can translate beau ­
ty into his likeness” (3.1.113-15; emphasis added). Ophelia must be (a)
 nun/none, threat to “unpregnant” Hamlet that she is — “ti opheilô; what do I
 owe?” as he might say.33 After all, she is the thing of nought, O(we), that
 naughty thing, waiting to 
be
 filled — O feel/fill ya, the alpha and the omega  
(reversed), lacking only one vow-el, u.36
Surely, Hamlet rocks us so just
 
because in its madness it teaches us what we  
pay for the (communal illusion of the) straight and true, the hard and fast, the
 pure and simple, et cetera: we pay in reality — in the loss of
 
reality — for 
copies of our desire proliferating in the Symbolic. Every line you draw, every
 definition you make, “every breath you take, I’ll be watching you.” The Police,
 of course, are another name for the signifier, whose I, 
we
 have been told, is  
panoptical (Foucault 228). The more copies of ourselves we make, the more
 copies of our desires proliferate, the more likely our secrets are to secrete (the
 
play
 oozes with secretions and secrets alike).
Hamlet So, oft it chances in particular men
That, for some vicious mole of nature in them — ... (1.4.18.7-18.8)
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HAMLET Well said, old mole. Canst
 




Even before the mole begins to dig under his feet, Hamlet, such m-e-t-a-ly “as
 
Great Shapesphere puns it,” knows the mole has already mined his fault(-line):
 he “[s]hall in the general censure take corruption I From that particular fault”
 (1.4.18.19-18.20; cf. Adelman 267-8). The ghost is but a copy of the mole
 Hamlet has seen already within himself (cf. Holland 172), minor that he is.
 Hamlet is always already H-o-mlet (m-o-l-e) the hommelette,37 or “little man”
 (and “broken 
egg
”)38 — that is, the infans whose unorganized desire, like  





hence also retaliation: the mole  in Hamlet is desire for his mother, and  
so the mole outside Hamlet is (the ghost’s) desire for his mother — Hamlet is
 frightened finally by Hamlet because finally Hamlet also desires Hamlet.39




 can almost hear him say, “would it were real,” or, perhaps more  
precise, “would
 
it were a  true copy.” Still, it would be a copy only  and could not  
set him free. Not least of the many achievements in Shakespeare studies in our
 time has been the demonstration of the importance of copia to his writing.40 It
 seems obvious now that we should understand Shakespearean rhetoric explicit
­ly in terms of copiousness. The obvious evidence of copiousness is a copy (they
 are the same word [Skeat 111; Cave 3-9]). If something is rotten in the state
 of Denmark, this is surely, as countless others before me have noted, because
 Elsinore is overripe ([s]-i-n- o-r- e-l-s-e), teeming with and overrun by copies
 — too many Hamlets in particular, for example (cf. Garber 132). The mystery
 of the play, which no reading will ever plumb or 
exhaust,
 seems most spectral  
here, where it adumbrates Shakespeare’s obsession with doubles, twins, mirrors,
 and copies (Fineman, Shakespeares Perjured Eye). As Shakespeare’s art is
 unimaginable without “quibbles,” so too is it unimaginable without
 twins:
 both  
puns and twins are two much in the same plays; and that seems to have been
 the way he liked it.
I don’t know why. Coincidentia oppositorum? Paradox? Plotinus (“All
 
knowing comes by likeness” [Ennead 1, Tractate 8, 66])? Increases in capital
 (Halpern; Kamps)? “The habit of arguing in utramque partem" (Altman
 
34)?  
Doubtless many answers will come from many others.41 But if
 
I may, I will 
suggest  the following. The method I have used in this essay I call juxtology  
(Shoaf, “The Play
 
of Puns”). I use juxtology to approach  what for me is one of  
the most provocative issues in life and art alike and, predictably, as vexing as it
 is provocative —
 
namely, coincidence.42 I think, in particular, that it is the spe ­
cial effect of poetry to challenge, correct, and deepen the ordinary or accepted
 notion of coincidence, 
exposing
 in such a  notion our  efforts to “botch the words  
up fit to [our] own thoughts” (4.5.10), to constrain and control,
 
by calling them  
coincidences, what are, in fact, complex connections of language and reality,
 juxtologues (kin-kind [-king] is a juxtologue in Hamlet’s world, for example),
 that typically disturb, even frighten us, because they confront us with the
 uncanny feeling of our otherness (déjà vous, if you like). Hamlet, I believe, is the
 juxtological play in Shakespeare’s writings: “O, ’tis most sweet /
 
When in one 
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line two crafts directly meet” (3.4.185.8-185.9); 
or
 again, “Your fat king and  
your lean beggar is but variable service — two dishes, but to one table. That’s
 the end” (4.3.23-5). Whatever autobiographical
 
impulse or  historical impinge ­
ment
 
may account  for  this distinction of the  play, to it I propose we add the fol ­
lowing, very simple complement: when the actor plays, he twins himself, 
assumes a juxta-pose between himself and the (other of the) character, and




As I have shown in “For there.’”
I first began the current and related studies in conjunction with my work
 on “duals’’ and “duels’’ in Milton’s poetry during a Fellowship year funded 
by
 the  
National
 
Endowment for  the Humanities (1982-83). My work with Hamlet, in  
particular, began in the mid-eighties and shows the results of my early engage
­ment with the writings of Lacan, whose particular essay on Hamlet has also
 played a role in the present study.
I am pleased to acknowledge the NEH again for another Fellowship, this
 
year




The full text of the relevant passage reads:




 you stock-fish — O, for breath to utter what is like thee! —  
you tailor’s yard, you sheath, you bowcase, you vile standing tuck —
PRINCE Well, breathe a while, and then
 
to’t again, and when  thou  hast tired  
thyself in base comparisons, hear me speak but this.
(2.5.226-32; emphasis added).
All citations of Shakespeare’s texts in this essay are from The Norton Shake
­
speare. All quotations from the first folio are taken from The First Folio of
 Shakespeare and will henceforth be cited as F.
Spevack lists thousands of 
occurrences
 of like in Shakespeare. I plan to  
study them and to publish my findings, from time to time, in such essays as this
 one and the one cited above in note one.
3.
 
Such s/talking is most terrifying, in all of Shakespeare’s characters, in  
Iago, who, as 
his
 name says (I ago = “I act, perform, do, or play”), likes, or not,  
whomever and however it serves 
his




Like all readers of Hamlet, I owe a  debt to Adelman; I have read her just ­
ly famous essay both in Suffocating Mothers and in Wofford’s Hamlet case study.
 I 
cite
 the case study version since it is likelier to be more widely available (for  
the same reason, I 
cite
 Garber’s renowned essay  in the case study version, too).  
My chief difference from Adelman, after my focus on like itself, is my empha
­sis on Hamlet’s (con)fusion
 
with his parents; or, put it this way, for me incest is
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as much trope as it is psychopathology (from this it will be seen that my path
 
to my conclusions passes through Lacan from an origin more, in Heidegger
 than in Freud).
I am also indebted, here and elsewhere in this essay, to Calderwood (63, in
 
particular, in this instance), and to the splendid studies by Parker.
5.
 
Cf. The Norton Shakespeare: “Hamlet hides within himself a spirit of  
political resistance, a subversive challenge to a corrupt, illegitimate regime
 shored up by lies, spies, and treachery” (1660).
6.
 
For a different although not unrelated reading of this line, see Lupton  
and Reinhard, who argue, in particular — and helpfully, I think — that “as a
 pun about punning, about linguistic and sexual similarity and difference, the
 line enacts the structural incest between literal incest and incest of the letter”
7.
 
I will represent anagrams in this essay in this form: I am concerned to  
represent letters in all their insistence and (seeming) impertinence.
8.
 
That is, le Nom-du-Père does not function in Hamlet to support the  
Symbolic 
order:
 see Lacans Écrits 278 and 577ff.; see also Evans 119.
9.
 
Notice now the excruciating irony of Hamlet’s Hercules proportion —
Claudius
 




As even, someone with little Latin and less Greek would know, Hercules was
 
the victim of a woman, Hera, throughout 
his
 life (Gr. ‘HpaKλη S [-KληS], f.  
'H'pa, Hera, wife of
 
Zeus + KλέoS glory, renown, lit. "having or showing the  
glory of Hera’ — OEDII,
 
sub voce). In other words, all four men, tragically, are,  
contrary to Hamlet’s proportion, just alike, showing the glory of Her(a).
10.
 
See Stewart passim on perception of juncture in poetic discourse.
11.
 
I follow Lacan to understand and represent  the overturning of the gen ­
erality of the woman in Hamlet’s emerging self-consciousness: the illusion of
 the woman is gradually fading before the reality of this particular woman,
 Gertrude (and Ophelia must 
die
 before this will be consummated); see “God  
and the Jouissance of The Woman” and “A 
Love
 Letter.”
On the importance to understanding Hamlet of the wordplay between
 Latin mater and English matter (which derives from mater), see Ferguson, espe
­cially
 
294-5; see also Parker, Shakespeare 254, 263.
12.
 
F1 continues Hamlet’s speech just quoted, crucially from my perspec ­
tive, with. 
 
Sir, in this Audience,
Let my disclaiming from a purpos’d euill, .
Free
 me so farre in your most generous thoughts,
That I haue shot mine Arrow o’re the house,
And hurt my Mother, (5.2.177-81, [in F’s orthography; emphasis added])
Q1 and Q2 have “brother,” which may in the end be a better
 
reading,  but I  wish  
to observe that the textual history of the play includes, if only as 
an
 error, the  
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agony
 as well as the irony of Hamlet’s renewed “sanity.” See, further, The Nor ­
ton Shakespeare, which also cites this variant (1752).
13.
 
As others have noted, the rhetorical device most frequent in Hamlet  
that bears the burden of sphtting/doubling is hendiadys; see Holland:
one of the tragedy’s two characteristic figures of speech: hendiadys, which
 
means expressing a single idea by two nouns or adjectives parted by a con
­junction: “the sensible and true avouch of mine own eyes,” “the gross and
 scope of mine opinion . . .” (167)
The
 
word like can be understood to spawn perverse hendiadys: splitting where  
there should be no division
 
— “love like love.” From this perspective, the word  
can also be seen as an agent of Spaltung,
 
which Lacan, following but modifying  
Freud, reminds us, is “cette refente . . . 
que
 le sujet subit de n’être sujet qu’en  
tant qu’il
 
parle” (Écrits 634), “the split which the subject undergoes by virtue of  
being a subject only in so far as he speak
s
” (Écrits: A Selection 269; emphasis  
added).




‘and’” — which is the rhetorical device favored by Claudius:
the principle of similarity . . . governs Claudius’s syntax. . . . Claudius’s iso-
 
colonic style is also characteristically oxymoronic: opposites are smoothly
 joined by syntax and sound, as for instance in these lines from his opening
 speech:
Therefore our sometime sister, now our queen,
 
Th’imperial jointress to this warlike state,
 Have we, as ’twere with a defeated joy,
 With an auspicious and a dropping eye,
 With mirth in funeral and with dirge in marriage,
 In equal scale weighing delight and dole,
 Taken to wife . . . (1.2.8-14)
For another
 view




See Skeat, sub voce; also Ayto, 295. For a discussion of  Shakespeare’s  
neologism “incorpsed” (4.7.72), see Ferguson, 301ff.
15.
 
And to the “tragedy” of Hamlet: the notorious difficulty of the play’s  
genre, even its 
scandal,
 can be compassed, at  least partially, just here: Hamlet is  
obviously like “
revenge
 tragedy” and, just as obviously, it is not — Hamlet, like  
Hamlet, is trying to break free from its likeness to predecessors.
16.
 
In what I consider one of his most moving meditations on the human  
condition, Lacan writes, in “Position de l’inconscient” (I quote at some, though
 not full, length from Écrits):
Separare, séparer, ici se termine en se parère, s’engendrer soi-même . . .
 
ce glissement du sens d’un verbe à l’autre ... est fondé dans leur commun
 appariement à la fonction de la pars.
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 faudrait accentuer quelle n’a avec le tout rien à faire. Il faut  
en prendre son parti, elle joue sa partie toute seule. Ici, c’est de sa partition  
que le sujet procède à sa parturition. Et ceci n’implique pas la métaphore  
grotesque qu’il se mette au monde à nouveau. Ce que d’ailleurs le 
langage serait bien embarrassé d’exprimer d’un terme originel, au moins dans l’aire
 
de
 l’indoeuropéen où tous les mots utilisés à cet emploi ont une origine  
juridique ou sociale. Parère, c’est d’abord procurer — (un enfant au mari).
 C’est pourquoi le sujet peut se procurer ce 
qui
 ici le concerne, un état que  
nous qualifierons de civil. Rien dans la vie d’aucun ne déchaine plus
 d’acharnement à y arriver. Pour être pars, il
 
sacrifierait bien une grande  part  
de ses intérêts. ...
Mais ce qu’
il
 comble ainsi n’est pas la faille qu’ il rencontre dans l’Autre,  
c’est d’abord celle de la perte constituante d’une de ses parts, et de laquelle
 il se trouve en deux parts constitué. Là gît la torsion par 
laquelle
 la sépara ­
tion représente le retour de l’aliénation. C’est qu’il 
opère
 avec sa propre  
perte, qui le ramène à son départ. (843)
I despair of any adequate translation of this testimony. But I will say that this
 
meditation, on the subject moving from “sa partition ... à sa parturition,” from
 his parting to 
his
 birth to his departing, seems to me also to express some cru ­
cial part of Shakespeare’s art.
17.
 
On “close” in the play, see Parker, Shakespeare 254-5, who also notes the  
play with “closet” (254).
18.
 Cf.
 Adelman 264-5; Calderwood 63; and Fineman 89, especially.
19.
 
Here I acknowledge my  debt to Girard and Serres, the two theorists of  
doubling and competition/comparison from whom I have learned the most
 about these issues. In particular, I wish to record my admiration for the work
 of Serres, especially The Parasite, from which I feel I have learned a great deal.
 I owe a debt, also, to the work of Fineman.
20.
 
Even in the postmodern, I take it, since the premise of likeness must  
be present in order to be deconstructed. Cf. Calderwood 192.
21.
 
See the Meno, 368-71. For an excellent meditation on memory in  
Hamlet, see Garber 328ff, especially.
22.
 
Which was not stirring at the beginning: “BERNARDO Have you had  
quiet guard? / FRANCISCO Not a mouse stirring” (1.1.7-8). Here it is perti
­nent
 
to note that repetition in  Hamlet is often a smear of words, a certain stain,  
that spreads across the play even as rottenness spreads through Elsinore and
 Denmark; and like(ness) itself (known otherwise as the “body”) is the (name of





 with a sense of pestilent breeding” (218).
23.
 
I work  (and  play) from Freud’s famous if cryptic utterance, “Wo Es war,  
soil Ich werden” (SE XXII, 80), where “Es” is Freud’s German 
for
 “Id,” the “it”  
of the unconscious. I greatly
 
admire Lacan’s translation, “Là où c’était, peut-on  
dire, là où s’était, voudrions-nous faire qu’on entendit, c’est mon devoir que je
 vienne à être” (É
crits
 417-18), “There where it was ... it is my duty that I  
should come to being” (Écrits: A Selection 129).
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24.
 
“To exist is to take your existence upon you, to enact it, as if the basis  
of human existence is theater, even melodrama. . . . Hamlet’s extreme sense of
 theater I take as his ceaseless perception of theater, say show, as an inescapable
 or metaphysical mark of the human condition. . . . His bar — his lack of
 "advancement’ into the world — is expressed in one’s sense (my sense) of him
 as the ghost of
 
the play that bears his and his father’s name, a sense that his  
refusal of participation in the world is his haunting of the world. (As if he is a  




Cf. Adelman (280), who notes, as does Garber, too (134), the electri ­
fying ambiguity in “have” — possession or action?
26.
 
By this point, the reader will have heard the echolalia in Hamlet of  
stand — an essay on this word in the play could 
be
 written showing that men  




And see also: “HAMLET For by the image of my cause I see / The por ­
traiture of his” (5.2.75-78); or: “Horatio — or I do forget myself” (1.2.161; and
 see, further, Garber 311).
28.
 




On “thing” and “thing of nought” in Shakespeare, see Willbern (and  
for the obscene sense, in particular, 
his
 notes 3 and 4 [260]). This essay is now  
reprinted in his book, Poetic Will, 125-42. I wish to acknowledge here 




I cite, of course, Irigaray, Ce sexe qui n 'en est pas un, one of  the most  
important works of French feminist critique, in part just 
because
 of the power  
of the p(as)un in its title.
31.
 
About the line, “I did enact Julius Caesar. I was killed i’th’ Capitol,”  
The Norton Shakespeare informs us: “Perhaps an allusion to Shakespeare’s own
 Julius Caesar, the actor who first played Polonius may also have played the part
 of Caesar” (1710). Here, I propose, is also the incest of drama, playing with its
 own: “It was a brute part [role, as well as appendage] of him, to kill so capital
 a calf there.”
32.
 
On the “proper” and the problematics of “property” in regard to the  
senses of words, see the essay by Derrida. From one perspective, this is among
 the oldest problems in Western philosophy. Plato is concerned with it, 
for example, in the Cratylus. Heidegger addresses it especially
 
in the essay  “Logos  






Here my work merges most productively with Adelman’s: she shows  
that the play is at a very deep level about Hamlet’s coming to terms with the
 mother, Gertrude; I show that in order to do this, Hamlet must first “become”
 female — give birth to, be-like, himself. Cf. Wheeler 197.
34.
 
In the Latin rhetorical tradition, improprie is one word used to mean  
“metaphorically”; another, equally suggestive, is abusive (reflecting the Greek
 catachresis, “against usage”) — see Shoaf, Dante 33-4 and notes 24-7.
92





Consider the two Greek verbs most like the name Ophelia (I translit ­
erate to emphasize the likeness): opheilô, and ophellô, respectively, “owe, have
 to 
pay
 or account for,” and “increase, enlarge, strengthen” (Liddell, Scott,  
Jones). Hamlet owes Ophelia in many senses, not least perhaps in that she (if
 he makes her pregnant) increases and enlarges, having first made him increase
 and enlarge (erection). He owes her
 his
 love, he owes her to her  family, he owes  
her (potential) child by him to 
his
 lineage (the anxiety of the patriarchy within  
the Symbolic). Ophelia not only represents, she is obligation. But, as the other
 Greek word like this word suggests, she also “advance[s a thing], 
make[s]
 it  
thrive” — she is “useful” (“ophelimity” [OED II, sub voce]): I find here, in debt
 and use, the obscure but palpable paradox of likeness itself.
36.
 
Lest my irony be lost in the monotone of  ideologizing, let me insist  
that I ventriloquize — I personally do not believe Ophelia deserves chastise
­ment, even as, I know, my commentary here
 




Lacan’s pun is of great importance, I think, in understanding Hamlet  
(see the next note especially). Anika Lemaire helpfully summarizes his argu
­ment from 1966, “Discussion de l’article . . .”:
The new-born child, he says, makes one think of the androgynes
 
described by Aristophanes in Plato’s Symposium, or at least the state in
 which they 
were
 left after the division imposed on them by Zeus.
With the cutting of the umbilical cord, the new-born child, like the
 Androgynes, finds itself separated
 
from a part of itself, torn  from the moth ­
er’s internal membranes. Birth causes it
 
to lose its anatomical complement.
The infans, Lacan
 
goes on, is like a broken egg which spreads out  in the  
form of 
an
 hommelette [a portmanteau word meaning both “little man” and  
“omelette” (trans.)]. Allusion is made here to the instinct as it can be rep
­resented in its 
origins. To prevent the hommelette invading everything and destroying every
­thing in its path, it must be enclosed, it must be assigned limits.
The libido, the instinct, will be maintained within corporeal limits and
 
will henceforth be unable to 
flow
 completely other than by way of “eroto ­
genic zones,” which are rather like valves opening towards and by the out
­side.
. . . [T]he delimitation of the erotogenic zone has the effect of canaliz
­
ing the libido (or functional metabolism) and transforming
 
it into a “partial  
instinct.” The erotogenic zone is a cut or aperture inscribed in a suitable
 anatomical site: for example, the lips, the gap between the teeth, the edges
 of the anus, the tip of the penis, the
 
vagina, the palpebral slit.
Limited and canalized in
 
this way, the  libido never appea s in its entire ­
ty in the subjective world and a good part of it is lost. The permanent
 human feeling of dissatisfaction and incompleteness is therefore to be
 “mythically” explained
 
by the separation the child undergoes at birth. (127)
38.
 
Recall Claudius on Hamlet and brooding (3.1.161-6). I think  it diffi ­
cult to exaggerate how important Claudius’ intuition here is: he recognizes, if
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 earlier exclamation, “I like him not, nor stands it safe with us”  
(3.3.1; emphasis added). See, further, Fineman, "Fratricide” 101ff.
39.
 
Hence the notorious crux, in this speech peculiar to Q2 (namely, "the  
dram of eale”), is amenable to a certain emendation:
HAMLET So, oft it chances in particular men
That, for some vicious mole of nature in them —
the dram of [z]eale
Doth all the noble substance of a doubt
To his own scandal. (1.4.18.20-2)
Using some of the Norton editions glosses, I would paraphrase the text to say,
 
with my emendation of "eale” to "[z]eale”: "the tiny amount (eighth of an
 ounce) of excess desire ([z]eale) does make all the noble substance part of a
 doubt, to 
his
 own scandal.”
This construction and paraphrase track and continue the logic of the earli
­er part of Hamlet's speech where "o’ergrowth” and "o'erleavens” suggest a fail
­ure of proportion between the "vicious mole” (a tiny blemish) and the "virtues
 else ... as pure as grace” (1.4.18.17); in other words, my emendation "[z]eale”
 here would 
suggest
 exactly that excess (desire) only  a "dram” of which, a tiny bit  
of which, would be enough to swell so as to overwhelm the "noble substance”
 to the point "of a doubt,” which, in turn, would be enough for 
"scandal.
”
This, of course, is only conjecture.
40.
 
See among others, Parker, Literary Fat Ladies 13ff. For me, also, of  
enduring importance for understanding copia in 
early
 modern literature is the  
remarkable study by Cave.
41.
 
Here it is relevant, not to mention proper, that I acknowledge these  
other scholars precisely by remarking that their copiousness empowers my
 
abil ­
ity to copy from them, as I learn from them, but also that my copying from
 them, to develop 
my
 own theses, attests to and legitimates their copiousness.  
The genealogy of learning is familial — and most of its crises are like those of
 a 
(more
 or less dysfunctional) family (in which incest is not unheard of). Have  
we 
here,
 I permit myself to wonder, one reason why Hamlet is the site of such  
immense scholarly and critical activity? Here, in this play, if anywhere, sons
 and daughters must separare in order to se
 
parere (and my macaronic French and  
English is itself evidence of the crisis). Indeed, now perhaps, just so, is the time
 for me to acknowledge my likeness, and unlikeness, to Shell, who writes bril
­liantly of likeness and the lex talionis in Shakespeare (117-36,
 
in  particular);  but  
not only
 
did I develop my ideas before reading  his work (the obligatory if petu ­
lant plea of professionalism), also I differ from him in my insistence on the
 uncanny 
sign
 of like(ness), even as I depend on him to explain so well "the  
movement . . . from substitution and likeness to identification” (136).
42.
 
I have entitled my next book of poems, almost complete, Songs of Coin ­
cidence; samples can be read on my WebPage.
43.
 
With this conclusion, I look, obviously, to the probable chronology of
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the plays: As You Like
 
It precedes Hamlet which is followed by Twelfth Night,  
or What You 
Will
; all three plays concern themselves both with the subjectivity  
of like(ness) and the arbitrariness of the medium that signifies the like. For
 helpful commentary on As You Like It, see Howard’s headnote in The Norton
 Shakespeare, especially 1598.
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Behold, I stand at the door and knock; if any
 
one
 hears my voice and opens the door, I will  
come in to him and eat with him, and he with
 me.
—Jesus in Revelation (3:20)
We pound the grain, we bale it out.
We sift, we tread,
We wash it — soak, soak;
We boil it all steamy . ..
As soon as the smell rises
God on high is very pleased:
"What smell is this, so strong and good?”
—"Sheng Min,” The
 
Book of Odes (Chou  
Period)
All things move or travel, rocks, atoms, stars. But
 
everything that lives, eats. Why? Must swallowing,
 grotesque act, contain the dire mystery of animal
 existence? "No beast is a cook," Boswell remarked,
 but men, like beasts, may eat their kind. They are
 truly omnivorous, and correspondingly ambiguous in
 everything they achieve.
Chemists, physicists, biologists, anatomists,
 
dietitians, chefs, your mother and mine, all have their
 answer. The laws of thermodynamics, of evolution,
 of pleasure or love, apply. The food chain rises, with
 photosynthesis, from the 
ocean
 floor to the sun.  
Food is energy. Even the gods eat to maintain their
 divinity. (That manna in the desert, is it their
 garbage?) Food is primal, like fire or light.
Food is primal, fundament-al, though poor
 
Antonin Artaud, incandescent madman, couldn't
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bear the indignity of evacuation. He was not alone. In both
 
real and  mock hor ­
ror, Jonathan Swift cried in a love poem: “Celia shits.” It’s a law of life: what
 defiles goes out, not 
in.
 Anyway, lips, teeth, tongue, throat, esophagus, stom ­
ach, duodenum, ileum, cecum, colon, rectum, anus are all in place. Excrement





 a character in Don DeLillo’s Underworld genially argues,  
incited people to build their civilizations in self-defense — not the other 
way around. Still, the ascent from matter to, yes, spirit, continues. Everything
 material rises to converge in mind.
Energy circulates. “Start with the sun,”
 
D. H. Lawrence concludes in Apoc ­
alypse, “and the rest will slowly, slowly happen.” But why, I wonder, start with
 a middling, proximate star? The earth ploughs continually through the dust of
 the universe, and so feeds our dreams.
Food is physical but imaginary
 
too, like lovemaking. Food is light or feces, but  
also sacred, spiritual like flesh, our portable temple. The chemistry, biology,
 gastronomy, ethic, esthetic, theology, or génésique — that sixth, synesthetic
 sense postulated
 
by Jean-Anthelme Brillat-Savarin — maybe indistinguishable  
in the longest perspective, where the actual and the possible meet.
In the beginning, God served the 
universe
 to itself. Plato, in the Timaeus,  
would have us believe that the Creator — the Demiurge, he called him — con
­cocted the cosmos in a cooking bowl. After charging
 
the earliest gods  to “beget  
living creatures, and give them food and make them grow, and receive them
 again in death,” the Demiurge “once more into the cup in which he had previ
­ously mingled the soul of the universe . . . poured the remains of the elements,
 and mingled them in much the same manner.”
Cooking as metaphor of creation, food and death from the start. But Plato
 
does not leave it at that. He proceeds minutely to specify various “juices, con
­cerning the affections peculiar to the tongue.” He describes the diverse func
­tions of
 
the digestive tract. And ever the watchful puritan, he warns against  
“insatiable gluttony,”
 
which might make “the whole [human] race an enemy, to  
philosophy and culture, and rebellious against the divinest element within us.”
 Still, “food” and “motion” remain 
his
 key metaphors for nurturing the higher  
aspects of the soul.
How plain, earthy, commensal, Jesus seems by comparison, when he stands
 
at the door (in my epigraph), offering to eat with anyone hungry
 
to hear. How  
modest in the spirit’s fare when he teaches his disciples to pray: “Give us this
 
day
 our daily bread” (Matthew 6:11). And how scandalous (to the incredulous  
mind) when he reaffirms the ancient miracle of transubstantiation:
And as they did eat, Jesus took bread, and blessed and brake it, and gave it
 
to them, and said, Take, eat: this is my body.
And
 
he  took the cup, and when he  had given  thanks,  he  gave it to them:  
and they all drank of 
it. And he said unto them,
 
This is my  blood of the new testament, which  
is shed for many. (Mark 14:22-4)
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Everything has a history, even mystery. In 1215, Pope Innocent
 
III decreed  
transubstantiation, once a Gnostic heresy, Christian doctrine. The Eucharist
 blurs the literal and symbolic in the act of ingesting God. Call it a banquet of
 immortality, at once mundane and mystical; call it divinity passing through the
 guts. Jesus repeats himself on the subject:
[V]erily,
 I say unto you, except you eat the flesh of  the Son of man, and  
drink 
his
 blood, you have no life in you. Whoso eats my flesh, and drinks  
my blood, has eternal life; and I will raise him up at the last day. For my
 
fles
h is meat indeed, and my blood is drink indeed. He that eats my flesh,  
and drinks 
my
 blood, dwells in me, and I in him. (John 6:53-6)
To prepare for  this celestial rep st, Christians fast, give alms, prove their deser .  
They empty themselves of tainted 
victuals
 to receive heavenly nourishment.  
They deny themselves 
food,
 the staple of one life, for the promise of  another  
and, 
like
 Muslims at Ramadan, feel hugely virtuous, if irritable. Th n they  
break the fast. They rediscover friendship or love (agape) in communion, as did
 the disciples at the Last Supper — and doesn’t this make the betrayal of Judas
 Iscariot all the more vile, all the more poignant?
But this communion was never innocent of violence, never impervious to
 
horror. Aztecs “husked” the human heart, like a corncob from its sheath, in
their sacrifices. St. Ignatius begged to become “the food of the beasts”: “I am
 God’s wheat,” he 
cried,
 “and the teeth of the beasts shall grind me so that I will 
be a pure bread of Christ” (Romans 4:1). And Catherine of Siena put it even
 more 
gruesomely:
 “The immaculate Lamb is food, table, and servant. . . . And  
the table is pierced with veins, which run with blood. . . . [W]hen the [spirit]
 has drunk, it spits up the blood on the heads of its brothers . . . and is thus like
 Christ.” Indeed, master spirits can thirst for blood; and all of us cook, carve,
 live on the edge of a sharpened knife.
Food, festival, spirit, violence,
 
the sacred: they are all in deepest time and every ­
where complicit. The interdictions of certain
 
foods in Hindu, Judaic, Buddhist,  
Christian, and Islamic 
religions
 may have pragmatic consequences — avoiding,  
say, trichinosis — but their roots in older myths and rituals are undeniable. A
 weird power, now proscriptive, now prescriptive, sometimes menacing, more
 often joyous, moves through time and food.
And so, as Edouard de Pomiane reminds us, the Galette des Rois 
reverts
 to  
the Roman Saturnalia; at Easter, 
Russians
 exchange hard-boiled eggs, saying  
“Kristós Voskrése" (Christ is risen); and on Good Friday, even unbelievers in
 France eat morue
 
(smoked cod). In Burma, Mongolia, China, Tibet, men divine  
by chicken bones. In the ziggurats of
 
ancient Ur, the king’s priests, “elevated  
cooks,” prepared votive animals that the god’s icons could “consume” at a  
glance; “at least in origin, temples are public kitchens,” Michael Symons insists
 in The Pudding That Took a Thousand Cooks. And in old Athens, cockfights
 became part of phallic and orgiastic spectacles, featuring Dionysos in his the
­ater, gorgeously clad.
Fertility? Since prehistoric times, sacrificial feasts insured procreation, the
 
fertility of the vegetal, animal, and
 
human worlds. “Because food is the  human’s
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resource,"  Peter Farb and George Armelagos argue, "offering  
food 
or
 abstaining from it are symbolic ways in all societies of showing devo­
tion to supernatural powers.” Do we not still fling 
rice
 like confetti at married  
couples as 
we
 speed them on their honeymoon? Did not the priests of Min —  
the god had a long, thin, elegant phallus — like Egyptian housewives today,
 serve lettuce to stimulate the virility of men? And in European folk customs,
 was not impotence traditionally cured, according to Margaret Visser, "by a
 hilarious, bawdy salting of the disobliging member by a crowd of women”?
Rice, lettuce, salt? Yes, and oysters, carrot tops, tiger testicles, mandrake
 
roots . . . poppycock! And what about that original apple in Eden, which
 brought sexual shame in a bite? The list of aphrodisiacs, anaphrodisiacs, stim
­ulants, soporifics, hallucinogens, foods of every kind that calm or prod, deaden
 or madden, the mind — that list is endless, and reaches back to the first pri
­mate, perhaps first zoon, seeking to assuage some pain with a gulp. For, as we
 all tacitly know, in assimilation there is also acquisition of immaterial qualities
 — hence cannibalism. And there lies both the creation and maintenance of a
 moral order.
Too abstract? Let’s say we eat to become
 
what we want, or at least to safe ­
guard our small space in this very
 
strange and  perilous place, the universe. And  
so food becomes the guarantor not only of our personal affections — "Eat!”




with a slow, leaden crash because Claudius, Nero, Caligula, like  
subsequent emperors, imbibed inordinate quantities of lead from pewter plates
 and flasks? Never mind. It is enough to know
 
that food drives history as sym­




Proust’s tea cake, the
 
famous madeleine, opens for him all the gates of mem ­
ory and brings him to an aesthetic and spiritual apprehension, in Remembrance
 of Things Pasty larger than his own, labyrinthine, endlessly resonant past. But
 your common cook is no stranger
 
to succulent symbols and familiar sentiments:  
a
 
burned chop can be an expression of spite. Gertrude Stein tells this anecdote  
about her French cook, Hélène, in The Autobiography of
 
Alice B. Toklas:
Hélène had her opinions, she did not for instance like Matisse. 
She said a frenchman [sic] should not stay unexpectedly to a meal particularly
 if he asked the servant
 
beforehand what there was for dinner. She said for ­
eigners had a perfect right to do these things but not a frenchman and
 Matisse had once done it. So when Miss Stein 
said
 to her, Monsieur  
Matisse is staying for dinner this evening, 
she
 would say, in that case I will  
not make an omelette but fry the eggs. It takes the same number of eggs
 and the same amount of butter but
 
it shows less respect, and he will under ­
stand.
Food represents social status; a meal can be a metaphor for class as well as
 
individual identity; and even fast-food places have their symbols and rituals
 under the 
sign
 of the Golden Arches, degraded as these may be. Dining out is  
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 this table, this course, this wine instead of another, in a riot of  
semiotic declarations: to flaunt our wealth, power, taste, 
knowledge,
 to forge  
commercial or family alliances, to entertain ourselves or discharge obligations,
 to court, celebrate, announce. . . . The 
food,
 Symons says, is the form that our  
desire to share takes
 
— hence “the key culinary virtue becomes generosity.” The  
food, I would insist, is the equivocal impulse of human life to transcend itself,
 transcend its “material base” — hapless, Marxist phrase
 
—  in spiritual pleasures  
such as love or art, transcend itself even when other sensual pleasures root us to
 this world. The impulse, let us admit it, is conflictual, mixed.
The gourmand at a fine table, de Pomiane asserts, is in harmony with his
 
inner and outer world. It is an insight about 
an
 idealized state, too cheerful, if  
not self-serving, to compel general assent. Still, food, we have seen, engages
 spirit at every turn, and even reconciles human beings to their mortality, as at
 wakes. And, of course, it engages art — as in Finnegans Wake'?
Brillat-Savarin fancied a tenth Muse, Gastréa. He thought all the 
arts
 —  
and sciences too — conspired to heighten the sense of taste. Again, the great
 cook strains 
his
 credibility. But surely he was astute to perceive that the plea ­
sures of the table sublimate themselves into refinements of every kind. See him
 take a flight of nineteenth-century gallantry:
Nothing is more agreeable to look at than a pretty gourmande in full
 
battle-dress: her napkin is tucked
 
in most sensibly; one of her hands lies on  
the 
table;
 the other carries elegantly carved little morsels to her mouth, or  
perhaps a partridge wing on which she nibbles; her eyes shine, her lips are
 soft and moist, her conversation is pleasant, and all her gestures are full of
 grace; she does not hide that vein of coquetry which women show in every
­thing they do. With so much in her favor, she is utterly irresistible, and
 Cato the Censor himself would be moved by her.
Roland Barthes, who
 
was more concerned with the pleasures of the text than of  
the table, nonetheless wrote a
 
long commentary  on the learned and lyrical chef.  
Barthes argued that a “luisance
,
” a nimbus or sheen, irradiates a repast, carrying  
its light, synesthetically, to other senses and other 
arts.
 He speculated that  
appetite, gourmandise, may derive from dream, hallucination sometimes, often
 from memory, giving rise to “une imagination predictive." He
 
went farther, pos ­
tulating “une
 
sorte de mysticisme du plaisir?
That’s poststructuralist sophistication, to which I prefer to add a dash of
 English-language sense before 
chewing.
 In any case, I find precedents to  
Barthes in ancient Rome or medieval Baghdad. In the tenth century, the
 Caliph Mustafki expected
 
his guests to comment on his banquets in verse. The  
poet Ibn al-Mu’tazz obliged, describing an hors d'oeuvre:
Here capers grace a sauce vermilion
Whose fragrant odors to the soul are blown ...
Here pungent garlic meets the eager sight
And whets with savor sharp the appetite,
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While olives turn to shadowed night the day,
 
And salted fish in slices rims the tray . . .
The point is clear, and Leon R. Kass makes it even clearer in 
his
 persuasive  
work, The Hungry Soul, which concludes: “the souls of the hungry acquire new
 hungers of their own, and [cry] for more than nourishment.” .




 “help cure our spiritual anorexia” in an age of extremity, in  
famine as in surfeit? I doubt the general cure but offer some instances of
 calmer, healing joys.
In 1987, my wife, Sally Hassan, and I visited Australia for the first time.
 
Never mind Crocodile Dundee, 
we
 wanted to see Gay Bilson, chef and owner  
of the Berowra Waters Inn. If you are flush, you take an eight-seater seaplane
 from Rose Bay, in Sydney Harbor, and fly low
 
over the North Shore: clear,  yel­
low, rippling sand beaches, limpid waters shading from aqua to turquoise to
 ultramarine, with great swathes of gum 
forests
 in the background, dark, blue-  
hazed, and just menacing enough to recall the unappeasable power of the con
­tinent. The plane will land you at the restaurant dock. Otherwise, you must
 drive for an hour through the cluttered exurbs — garish gas stations, spangled,
 secondhand 
car
 dealers, an edgy four-lane highway, strung out with spiteful  
stop lights — till
 
you reach Ku-ring-gai National Park. One turn, then anoth ­
er, and you
 
park on a  rutted road by an  inlet of the Hawkesbury  River. You step  
gingerly down some board steps and wait for the jaunty, restaurant launch to
 fetch you. Either way, as Gay Bilson will say, “it’s a commitment.” But she will
 always be there, at the top of the spare, modernist stairway, to greet you with a
 warm, shy smile. It’s part of her commitment.
The building is a
 
long, glass box with plain, scrubbed wood floor,  wide lou ­
vers 
like
 mirror slats, square angles and clean lines everywhere, a few, fine paint ­
ings. Say, it’s lunch. You sit at your table and look at the 
steep
 hill, curtained  
with eucalyptus, across the narrow Waters. At first, you think: this is a bit
 glum. Then you notice the 
play
 of shadow on the leaves, skipping sunlight on  
the cove, the clouds, a billowing, shifting canopy above. You notice the silence,
 deeper than muted talk or the soft ring of silverware. You sense the power,
 more absence than presence but power still, and you think: this is where gods
 dwell, like Ayers Rock, 
like
 Delphi or Thebes.
You sit at the table and eat. No fuss, just unblended bliss, or so it seems.
 Because the 
experience
 is primary, the food appears simple. Of course it is not,  
and yet it is. There is a timeless integrity on every plate that no art can con
­ceal. “It’s food for grownups,” Gay Bilson says in a voice like rustling grain. I,
 am no  food writer, and will not sing of this braised tuna  with garlic cloves and  fried eggplant or that crumbed pig’s 
ear




 in 1995 — to the uproar in the papers, Gay Bilson  
responded: “It’s only a restaurant, for God’s sake.” 
She
 moved to the Benne-  
long Restaurant in the Sydney Opera
 
House. She moved on  fro  th re in 1998  
to become restaurateur at large. Who is she in our spiritual and culinary
 scheme?
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 turn sad, and withal a fierce intelligence, suffusing her compact  
frame. It is a moral
 
intelligence, moral as much as epicurean. Gay Bilson: a  
puritan 
no
 less than an aesthete, with an unexpected taste for funk, egalitarian  
yet exacting to the bone. She seems to have read all the books, seen all the
 paintings, attended all the plays; she listens endlessly to music,
 
which she com ­
pares — say, Giorgio Batistelli’s Experimentum Mundi — arcanely to food. 
She knows everyone and inhabits a very private, proud, and vulnerable place. And
 she harbors a harsh, overconscientious streak. 
Is
 it guilt  or anger  or some secret,  
spiritual exigency? I know only she is a woman of
 
character, no, a woman of  
both character and textured temperament — nearly a contradiction.
The Bulletin, an Australian weekly, listed her among "Australia’s 10 Most
 
Creative Minds.” (Well, they have media hype Down Under too.) There, the
 architect Glenn Murcutt writes: “[Gay Bilson] has produced for Australia a
 cultural layer that has helped make this country a phenomenal place to be in.”
 (Well, Australians still need to affirm their national identity.) You would
 expect no less from a woman who says: “If you think about food continually,
 you might become a great chef, possibly the very best in the world. But you
 might also become a great bore to people who don’t speak the same food lan
­guage.” And you would expect no less from a woman who created a banquet
 around body parts, in conjunction with a major exhibition of Surrealism — a
 young girl emerged from a tubful of grapes and figs for dessert. This is how
 Bilson describes the tripes “tablecloth,” over forty meters long and one meter
 wide:
It was for a table which we would assemble in a room at the National
 
Gallery in Canberra in order to serve a banquet to 80 people who had
 attended a Symposium on Gastronomy in 1993. More correctly, it was a
 tablecloth of beef stomachs which is what we
 
bought over  the three months  
before the dinner: whole, uncleaned stomachs, a lesson in physiology, the
 judge’s cap of honeycomb tripes the least of the four distinct pockets. . . .
This was not a cloth to be eaten off or to be eaten. It was a visual
 
announcement of the dinner’s intention (although this was withheld until
 the end) which was to explore the body as meat, 
flesh
 turned into food.  
The menu read Stomach/Egg/Flesh/Bone/Skin/Blood/Heart/Milk/Fruit.
 It was illustrated only with one of Fiona Hall’s Morality Dolls, Gluttony.
This cloth, grotesque to some, was a tablescape of great textural beau
­
ty, of varying colors from dirty white through browns to black, large and
 long enough to have real presence, and as undulating in its folds and pleats
 as our perception of a lunar landscape, heavy with craters and rolling hills.
 It was an idea which took such time and imaginative work to realize, was
 placed on the table and seen for 10 minutes, and then rolled away and
 placed in the gallery’s waste disposal bins. . . .
The tripes tablecloth was, for me at least, a troubling yet powerful
 
metaphor for all that the meal . . . might be.
Here, it seems to me, grossest matter turns into mind even more than into
 
sense. But I would not say the same about the tripe chapter in Rabelais’s Gar-
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gantua and Pantagruel. There, we may recall, Gargamelle, great with Gargan-
 
tua, and refusing to heed the warning of her good man, Grandgousier, devours
 "sixteen quarters, two bushels, and six pecks” of tripe, leading the author to
 exclaim: "Oh, what fine faecal matter to swell up inside her!”
 On an earlier
 
occasion, in 1990, at  the  Fifth Symposium of Australian Gas ­
tronomy, held at St. Francis Xavier Seminary in the Adelaide foothills, Gay
 Bilson participated in the closing meal, a Last Supper, recreated as literally as
 possible by Cheong Liew and Phillip Searle. Michael Symons quoted the
 Russian existential theologian, Nicolas Berdyaev: "My own bread is only a
 material question, but my neighbor’s bread is a spiritual question.” And on a
 later occasion, Bilsons own event at the 1998 Adelaide International Arts Fes
­tival was entitled "Loaves and Fishes,” "an entirely secular event which does not
 argue with the 
sacred.
” Again, in her  words:
It
 
is a response to the  festival’s theme and in particular a  response to the  
possibilities of the site: the water of the Torrens and the bank, a public
 space. The fish are to be grilled over
 
braziers on a barge, not in pretense of  
fishing, but 
because
 the water will act as a gentle proscenium arch and allow  
a sense of
 
separation. Only lamps will light the work. Rowers will bring  
baskets of fish to the shore where the bread is waiting. We will distribute
 the food to those who have
 
bowls. The bowls, simple, unglazed but  marked  
for the event, need to be purchased but the cost is a gesture, only $5 which
 simply covers their production cost. They belong to the 
eaters.
 The com ­
mercial transaction has been shifted from the food. The labor is given, and
 there will be music by the Adelaide Chamber singers. Call it a grace if you
 like.
"Loaves and Fishes” has nothing and everything to do with a New Tes
­
tament story.
This language may be secular, but it is hardly unspiritual, though it shades less
 
readily into theology than into art. Chefs are cooks, yes, but also multimedia
 artists, and even traditional artists sometimes look to food to embody their
 craft. That is why, in 1994, Anya Gollacio painted the walls of the Karten
 Schubert Gallery in London with chocolate. That is why Bobby Baker’s
 "Kitchen Show” was part of the Adelaide Arts 
Festival
 in 1992. That is why  
the works of chef, artist, and magus Phillip Searle, together with Michael
 Symons, Janni Kyritsis, Tim Park Poy,
 
Alicia Rios, and many  others, become as  
much edible as conceptual art, memorable sometimes in the social context —
 say, of a Gay and Lesbian Mardi Gras — memorable more often as perfor
­mances in a museum without walls. And indeed, that is why, in 1998, the
 Museum of
 
Contemporary Arts in Sydney had a full exhibition called "Eat!”,  
with work by Joseph Beuys, Roy Lichtenstein, Andy Warhol, Majima, Hany
 Armanious, and many Australian artists.
All right, do not call it art. Call it, as Gay Bilson does, "dalliance with
 
imagination in that world of sensuality and intellect in which the eye, the
 tongue, the belly, and the brain create new 'dishes’ together.” Such 
dalliance,
I  
add, can become like manna, feeding — in a Judeo-Christi  conceit — those
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who cannot live by bread alone. Not even in Australia, a robustly secular and
 
immigrant culture, which is why I take it for example.
“Food, food, food!” latter-day 
saints
 and eternal philistines may cry, “it’s just  
grub, 
isn
’t it? just an adjunct to survival, pleasure-coated.” But in human,  
beings, pleasure is no small matter. Plato knew this, enough to banish it almost
 from his Republic. And Freud knew that pleasure builds both civilization and
 its discontents. It claims “great Eros” as ally, though in the end, as he mooted
 in Beyond the Pleasure Principle, it “seems actually to serve the death instinct.”
 Here it is again, in its darkness, this death instinct, primal homeostasis that
 stalks pleasure, stalks spirit
 
throughout. Should we not, then, ask: are not plea ­
sures of the table, like those of the bed, sometimes complicit in duskier realms?
 Are they wholly foreign to that melancholy land where, as Keats would have it,
 “aching Pleasure” turns “to Poison while the bee-mouth sips”? And if so, can
 pleasure also spiritualize, just as death continually spiritualizes, our brute exis
­tence?
I would not assert, as Nietzsche did — he philosophized with a hammer —
 
that hedonism, like masochism, is a “signpost to nihilism.” I have slowly come
 to trust my own
 
pleasures tolerably. But I know that human beings live  by con ­
traries. We brutalize and spiritualize ourselves by terror as we do by pleasure.
 We defecate in
 
fright, raise flying buttresses in holy dread. In  love, we turn into  
Circe’s swine or imagine Beatrice in Heaven. But let us give pleasure — plea
­sure of the table too — its due. William Wordsworth, Romantic effusions
 aside, did not err in his homage “to the native and naked dignity of man, to the
 grand elementary principle of pleasure, by which he knows, and feels, and
 
lives,  
and moves.” Pleasure is no small
 




Lionel Trilling worried. He worried about the “fate of pleasure” when “the
 high extruded segment” of modern culture abets “an experiment in negative
 transcendence of the human.” He
 
worried, in short, that an “unillusioned mil ­
itancy of spirit” might tip decisively the balance of our instincts in favor of
 destructive impulses. Would he have worried, albeit differently, at the riot of
 hedonism in our postmodern condition — say, an orgiastic performance by
 Madonna? Say, a concert of gangsta rap?
The “unillusioned militancy of spirit” in
 
postmodern times comes from cul-  
tura
l
 terrorists and totalitarians, ideologues of every stripe. But it is not certain  
that postmodern literature (or art) still insists on “the energy of its desperate
­ness,” as Trilling thought in an earlier epoch; it is not certain that it still howls
 unconditionally for
 
“more life” (Nietzsche). Kitsch and camp, play, parody, and  
self-reflexiveness — those hallmarks of postmodern culture — promise plea
­sures less 
exigent,
 pleasures altogether of a more frivolous kind. Certainly, they  
are not sublime in Kant’s sense, inducing more awe than pleasure, appealing to
 “a higher finality.”
My subject is still food, sometimes the food of the gods. And my point is
 
that no pleasure, even that of a soufflé Rothschild or a Mars bar, can be wholly
 impervious to the underside of the human psyche. There, in that dark under
­side, spiritual 
impulses
 also stir. (Pace Rabelais.) Gay Bilson knows it: “It is
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the work of cookery in the hands of
 
the alchemical few which allows us this  
intimation of the sublime worth of the material, something which is so glori
­ously, so devastatingly
 
dependent on destruction. Dust to dust, ashes to ashes.”
Perhaps all this is gluttony garbed in metaphysics. If so, it is a metaphysics felt
 
in the gut and shared among friends. Or call it a spiritual gluttony, with a
 humanist edge.
I admitted to trusting my
 
pleasures tolerably. That is why dining out, over  
the years, 
may
 have cost me more dollars than accumulating a fair personal  
library, which overflows several rooms. That is also why I may count more
 friends among chefs and
 
waiters than among intellectuals — or academics who  
write articles entitled “Hunger and Ideology,” “Eating Out: Voluptuosity of
 Dessert,” “A Place at the Counter: The Onus of Oneness,” “Eating the Other:
 Desire and Resistance,” or “Dining Out: The Hyperreality of Appetite.” I
 would rather read a menu. In 
any
 case, great chefs are often intelligent, eru ­
dite. Look at their books, look beyond those gorgeous, succulent colored pho
­tos, meant to water the mouth. So much wit, fantasy, humor there, so much
 mindfulness. And the mindfulness is generous, though it aspires to recognition,
 even commercial success — it means to please and to celebrate.
Is it Saturday night? See them crowd into a bar, a bistro, an upscale restau
­
rant, a temple of gastronomy — Charlie Trotter’s, say? With shouts or whis
­pers, they celebrate: 
we
 are here, we are alive, we are mortals. That’s a sound  
high as prayer, deep as mourning, a small roar on the other side of ubiquitous
 silence. And is it not why
 
we sometimes mutter grace at a table, in thanks as  
well as joy?
Forget spirit, if you must. Sitting down to a fine, ordered table is 
an
 expe ­
rience in “luxe, calmer et volupté” (Baudelaire), the experience, in microcosm, of
 a harmonious universe. Or at least the illusion of that experience. Who has
 not felt it on some occasion, at a family meal or in Taillevent? Certainly, plea
­sures vary, and no one knows how to give them legitimacy beyond human need.
 (Some say
 
therein lies the loneliness of every heart.) But all may point, beyond  
that 
famous
 pleasure principle, to a mystery more luminous than night.
Let us count, at least, the food of the gods, which they have stingily
 bestowed on mortals, among the causes of gratified desire, its lineaments some
­times as blessed as any Blake glimpsed on a human face.
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